

Political ideas and the use of part-time work as policy instrument

The effect of ideas on the design of policies affecting the job quality of part-time employees in Austria and the Netherlands



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Abstract

The rising number and increased share of part-time employees as a proportion of the European workforce highlights its importance as a form of employment. However, in several countries part-time employees receive lower hourly wages and are not entitled to the same welfare benefits as full-time employees, putting them at risk of lower job quality. Part-time employment is often also used as a labour market or family policy instrument in order to achieve greater economic flexibility, to create additional jobs, to improve gender equality or to support mothers in remaining active in the labour market. If governments want to use part-time employment as an effective policy instrument, the problems surrounding job quality need to be addressed. Furthermore, depending on the policy goal, part-time employment must be further regulated or deregulated.

This master's thesis explores the differences in aggregated policies affecting the job quality of part-time employees in Austria and the Netherlands, by highlighting the influence of ideas on policymaking. Ideas have distinctive functions in the *problem*, *political* and *policy* streams of policymaking. Through process-tracing and analysis of the ideational content of key policies between the early 1980s and late 2000s, this study shows that Dutch and Austrian policies originated in different paradigms: the Austrian policies from family policy, the Dutch policies from a labour market policy perspective. Both countries expanded employment law and thus improved the job quality of part-time employees; these improvements were universally applied in the Netherlands and specifically targeted at carers in Austria. From the early 2000s onwards, Dutch family policy promoted part-time employment as an instrument to enhance gender equality.

The results of this master's thesis confirm that ideas do have a strong impact on the design and scope of policies and that differences in Dutch and Austrian aggregated policies on part-time employment are explained by the differing paradigms influencing those policies. However, the majority of policies were influenced by a combination of paradigms, including those that were assumed to be contradictory.

Key Words

Austria, Netherlands, part-time employment, family policy, labour market policy, ideas

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Abbreviations

&	and
€	euro
§	clause
%	percent(s)
ed.	edition
eds.	editors
e.g.	exempli gratia / for example
et al.	et alii / and others
etc.	et cetera
f.	and the following (page, paragraph etc.)
ff.	and the following (pages, paragraphs etc.)
AK	Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte (Chamber of Labour, Austria)
AZG	Arbeitszeitgesetz (Austrian Working Time Act)
BKA	Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery, Austria)
BMASK	Bundesministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Konsumentenschutz (Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection, Austria)
BZÖ	Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria)
CPB	Centraal Planbureau (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)
EU	European Union
Eurofound	European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria)
GDP	Gross domestic product
ILO	International Labour Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ÖVP	Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People's Party)
SPÖ	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (Social Democratic Party of Austria)
SZW	Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, Netherlands)

1 Introduction

The number of part-time employees in the EU has grown strongly in recent decades. In the beginning of the 2000s around 16% of the employees worked part-time and by 2014, it had increased to 20% (Eurostat 2015). Even during the economic crisis, the number of part-time employees grew consistently (OECD 2013). Part-time employment has become an important employment form and in several EU member states more than a quarter of all employees and half of employed women are working part-time. More and more newly created jobs are part-time jobs. It is also a prominent topic in international and national political discourse. The European Council recommended its member states to modernise their labour laws in order to increase the attractiveness of part-time employment (Visser and Yerkes 2008, 224). With the Part-time Work Directive 97/81/EC, the EU reached an agreement in 1997 on the importance of regulating the working-conditions of the growing number of part-time employees. However, the amount of part-time employees varies greatly among EU member states, as does the position of governments on part-time employment. Some countries actively support the use of part-time employment, whereas others discourage it. For instance, Dutch employees have the statutory right to part-time employment, whereas, in Austria, only parents are covered by such a right.

Part-time employment is not only a growing employment form, but can also be used as an explicit policy instrument. Many scholars and politicians see part-time employment as an instrument to fulfil the flexibility needs of the growing service sector (i.e. Smith, Fagan, and Rubery 2002, 45ff.) or to support parents to reconcile the labour market and family sphere (i.e. OECD 2007, 90ff.; Thornthwaite 2004). Thus it can be used to respond to pressing problems of the post-industrial society and economy. Some countries use part-time employment as an explicit labour market or family policy instrument in order reach specific goals, such as gender equality, better labour market attachment for informal carers, creation of new jobs and improved economic competitiveness. However, part-time employment does not come without costs. For instance, the hourly wage of part-time employees is often lower than of full-time employees (Lee, McCann, and Messenger 2007, 128; Manning and Petrongolo 2008), and in some welfare states, part-time workers are not entitled to the same amount of social benefits (Ginn and Arber 2002). These aspects can lead to a lower job quality¹ for part-time employees in comparison to the majority of the workforce. Thus, if governments want to use part-time employment as an effective policy instruments, these problems need to be addressed.

¹ Job quality covers the general working conditions of employees, but also their entitlement to welfare schemes and coverage by labour law. In this study the concept of job quality is used to compare the situation of part-time and full-time employees in regulations of their daily work and beyond, such as in pension entitlements and unemployment benefits.

Depending on the choice of the policy goal and the use of part-time employment as a policy instrument, countries have specific compositions of aggregated policies and legislation regarding the job quality of part-time employment. This raises several questions. What explains the construction of policy goals and the choice of part-time employment as suitable and effective instrument? Why do aggregated policies designed to regulate or deregulate the job quality of part-time employees differ between countries? These questions shift the attention to the processes that influence the intention and strategies of governments, and how political goals and suitable policies are constructed. Several scholars emphasise the effects of specific institutional set-ups (e.g. Hall and Taylor, Rosemary C. R. 1996; Pierson 2000) or the impact of power resources of organised labour and capital (e.g. Korpi 2006). However, policymaking takes also place in an environment of abstract and concrete ideas, that define which problems have to be addressed and which are the best strategies to do so (e.g. Campbell 2002, 22ff.; Hall 1993, 279ff.). On the individual level, ideas constrain the analytical process of individuals before and during decision-making (Jacobs 2008). On the societal level, ideas affect the range of appropriate and suitable options, from which a policy-maker can choose (Campbell 1998, 394). Ideas are not only secondary factors in the policy-making process, but have an independent effect and shape directly the position of governments and countries on part-time employment.

This master's thesis will analyse the causal effect of ideas and highlight its explanatory power regarding the policies affecting the job quality of part-time employees. Therefore, the main concern of the study is the differences in Austrian and Dutch aggregate policies affecting part-time employment. Both countries have high rates of part-time employees and show a long tradition of using part-time employment as a policy instrument. Hence, they are suitable cases for the longitudinal analysis of the effect of ideas on the policy-making process. The differences in aggregated policies will be explained by differing ideational orientations and foundations of governmental actions in the two countries. Thereby, the research focus rests on macro-level political decisions on part-time employment in key legislative acts, and the actual job quality of part-time employees is only indirectly considered. However, the job quality of part-time employees is strongly shaped by governments' actions. Job quality is regulated by labour law and regulations of entitlement to welfare benefits, which originate in explicit governmental decisions on their design, scope, coverage and focus.

This master's thesis will focus on answering the following question: Why do aggregated policies designed to regulate or deregulate the job quality of part-time employees differ between Austria and the Netherlands?

Accordingly it is hypothesised that the dominance and influence of particular ideas in each stream of policymaking will lead to specific policies that affect the job quality of part-time

employees differently. Four specific paradigms are defined that portray part-time employment as a labour market or family policy instrument, and also require from the government far-reaching intervening reforms or limited responding decisions. Each paradigm highlights different problems, derives different policies, and is supported by different policy actors. Chapter three illustrates the hypotheses and research question in more detail. The analysis of the causal effect of ideas considers key policies affecting part-time employment in Austria and the Netherlands between the early 1980s and late 2000s. In addition to tracing the causal process, the study also illustrates the genesis of aggregated policies affecting part-time employment. Thereafter, the findings of the two case studies are compared and the two distinctive policy paths regarding part-time employment and differing influential ideas are analysed. The effect of ideas is not only tested within but also among the two cases.

The thesis is structured as follows. The following paragraph will illustrate the suitability of Austria and the Netherlands as country cases. In the second chapter, existing theories on explaining policy-making are reviewed, and based on ideational theory, the causal functions of ideas are defined. Moreover, four distinctive labour market and family policy paradigms that influence the use of part-time employment as a policy instrument are constructed. In section three, the research problem and the hypotheses of the study are presented in detail. The fourth chapter gives information on the methods and data used in the analysis. The empirical analysis is carried out in chapter five, which is divided into three subsections. In the first part, the genesis of aggregated policies affecting part-time employment in Austrian is presented and concurrently its ideational content examined. In the second part, the same research is conducted for Dutch key policies. Each part examines the results independently for both countries. In chapter five, these findings are compared and the accuracy of the hypotheses tested. The conclusion summarises and discusses the results of the thesis.

1.1 The cases: Austria and the Netherlands

Part-time employment is a well-used term in academic literature and in colloquial language. However, its exact meaning depends on national laws and regulations. The International Labour Organisation defines a part-time employee as “an employed person whose normal hours of work are less than those of comparable full-times” (ILO 2011, 2). There is no internationally agreed threshold of hours that separates full-time and part-time work. The study will respect the national definitions of the two country cases. In Austria, part-time employment is defined as a job with less than statutory working time or the collectively decided regular working time at the company, respectively less than 40 hours per week and in some sectors less than 38.5 hours per week (§19d AZG1969). Part-time employment in the Netherlands is also defined in relation to full-time employment and not by a specific amount of hours. Identical to the Austrian definition, any employment form with less working hours than the statutory or

collectively defined full-time employment is defined as part-time employment (Visser et al. 2004, 192). These broad and inclusive definitions cover a heterogeneous group of employees with highly different amounts of working hours.

The decisive aspect in the selection of Austria and the Netherlands as cases for comparison was the exceptionally high number of part-time employees in both countries. Based on recent data from the EU Labour Force Survey², in 2013 26.6% of all employees in Austria and around half of all employed people (50.8%) in the Netherlands were working part-time. The two countries have some of the highest part-time employment rates in the EU. According to the same survey only 20.5% of employees in the EU were working part-time; much less than in the Netherlands and also less than in Austria. The Dutch part-time employment rate is the highest in the EU, whereas Austria was ranked fourth after Germany and the United Kingdom. The part-time employment rate is not only higher than in other member states, but also increased between 2010 and 2013³ by 5.6% in Austria and by 3.9% in the Netherlands.

The high rates of part-time employment and its growth, while the general employment rate in the two countries roughly stayed equal, illustrate that part-time employment is a common and important employment form among Austrian and Dutch employees. However, the rates of uptake of part-time employment of men and women differ greatly and also between Austria and the Netherlands. Part-time work is in both countries much more common among women than among men. In 2013, 77.2% of Dutch employed women were working part-time, in contrast to only 27.9% of Dutch male employees. In Austria the male part-time employment rate of 10% is significantly lower than their female counterpart of 45.5% and also in contrast to the Dutch rate. The huge gender gap in part-time employment decreased by 6.5% in the Netherlands and by 3% in Austria in the last three years.

The total rates of part-time employment in Austria and the Netherlands are increasing. In particular, the percentage of men working part-time is growing, however, the rate of women in part-time employment is still significantly higher. In both countries there exists a significant gap between the female and male part-time employment rate and the majority of part-time employees are women. The majority of full-time employees in both countries and in the EU are male, whereas the majority of part-time employees are female. The Distribution of part-time employment between men and women is more equal in the Netherlands than in Austria. Despite the high gender gap, part-time employment is in both countries an important employment form. However, part-time employment in the Netherlands is more accepted for

² The statistical data used in the cases' selection is based on the EU Labour Force Survey data from Eurostat [2015] and was obtained on 27.03.2015.

³ The European Labour Force Survey data from 2010 and 2013 are used to illustrate the current state of part-time employment and also the developments in the most recent years.

both genders, whereas in Austria, it is predominantly a female employment form. In both countries, female part-time employees are also working longer weekly hours than men.

Concerning the level of education of part-time employees, people with a lower-level education are in both countries more represented among part-time employees than full-time employees. This difference is particularly strong in the Netherlands. The largest share of part-time workers in the Netherlands work in the human health and social work sector, which is also the sector with biggest share of the total workforce. Part-time employees are therefore well represented in the largest sector. The largest sector among part-time employees in Austria is the wholesale and retail trade sector. Part-time employees are underrepresented in the manufacturing sector, which is the strongest sector in total. The most common occupation among part-time employees in both countries is that of service and sales workers. This occupation is also the most common among female part-time employees, whereas the occupation with the greatest number of male part-time employees is that of professionals.

Austria and the Netherlands are suitable cases for analysing the genesis of policies regarding part-time employment, because both countries have a high number of people affected by these policies. The differing gender composition of part-time employees indicates that the countries might have a different perspective on part-time work as an employment form for only women or for the entire labour force. A more detailed analysis is needed to examine if the Dutch and Austrian governments are using part-time employment as a policy instrument for different goals.

The Dutch and Austrian policymaking processes share a specific practice, in that in both countries social partners, such as trade unions and employer organisations, have an institutionalised role. Particularly in the field of labour market and economic policies, these organisations are consulted before policies are implemented. The roles of social partners are traditionally embedded through the system of *Verzuiling* (pillarisation) in the Netherlands (Kickert 2003) and *Sozialpartnerschaft* (social partnership) in Austria (Obinger et al. 2010, 24). In both systems, certain societal groups and interest groups are closely linked with particular political parties. Concerning the design of policies the most important consequence is cooperative tripartite policy-making and thus the influence of interest groups. However, its extent depends on the parties in power and also on its societal acceptance. In the Netherlands the system of *Verzuiling* was dismantled in recent decades (Becker 2000, 223f.), whereas the *Sozialpartnerschaft* in Austria was only suspended during the first half of the 2000s. Due to the common institutional practices, both countries are interesting cases to analyse differences and similarities in the genesis of part-time employment as a policy instrument and to examine the independent effects of ideas.

Concerning the general orientation of the Dutch and Austrian welfare states, they both share conservative roots but also differ strongly in the details. The structural setting of Austria's welfare system reflects the Bismarckian tradition. Its foundations are still social insurances and a great number of benefits are tied to labour market participation. Until the early 1970s, the Austrian welfare state could be described as a "prototypical Bismarckian or corporatist-conservative welfare regime" (Obinger et al. 2010, 30); and today as "partially defrosted" (Obinger et al. 2010, 79). The Dutch welfare state shares certain aspects of the conservative welfare state, however, it has been classified by several scholars as a mixed case between the social democratic and the corporatist-conservative regime (Kammer, Niehues, and Peichl 2012, 456). Great parts of the Dutch welfare state are based on the Bismarckian ideal type of insurance systems (Ferrera 1996), however, concerning the decommodification effect it partly resembles the social-democratic regime type (Esping-Andersen 1990). The Dutch welfare system also contains liberal aspects and thereby has to be classified as a hybrid case with characteristics of all three ideal-type welfare regimes (Arts and Gelissen 2002, 151).

The actual value and composition of the dependent and independent variables are examined through process-tracing and a longitudinal analysis of policies and ideas in Austria and the Netherlands. However, the illustrated aspects already indicate that these two countries are interesting cases to analyse the relationship between ideas and policies. Austria and the Netherlands have in three aspects, namely the rate of part-time employees, the actors in the policy-making process and the general orientation of the welfare state, important commonalities. However, the two countries are not identical and thus are suitable cases to analyse the effect of ideas.

2 Explaining policy-making

In order to explain the different approaches of Austrian and Dutch governments in regulating part-time employment, it is essential to examine the existing theories as to why governments' act in a certain way and implement certain policies. This chapter will illustrate different approaches of explaining social policy-making and argue that the government is the key player in shaping policies. The main argument of the study is that governments' collective ideas on part-time employment are the key factors in shaping the content and design of policies regarding part-time employment. The ideas, which have been considered in this study, each contain a distinctive declaration why part-time employment is the most effective and appropriate employment form to solve specific problems. Those ideas shape the strategic use of part-time employment as an instrument, and also define which societal group part-time employment is most suitable. The origin of problems is manifold. Functionalist theories argue that the social economic development causes general post-industrial pressures due to the universal process of modernisation (Pierson 2001, 82ff.). The structure and orientation of the

welfare state function as a filter for problems. Whereas, social structuralism emphasise the role of societal groups and political actors in the problem construction. The socioeconomic pressures can be interpreted differently by different actor and thus lobby for different responses. The policy answer to a problem depends on policy actors' understanding of the problem pressure (Pierson 2001, 101). Even if the origin of pressures are unalterable, governments have leeway in deciding on the right response to the pressures. The problems may be a product of socioeconomic developments and their nature is shaped by structures. However, pressures do not directly implement social policies, governments do. Ideational factors affect the decision on the suitable and appropriate approach to solve the new problems. The study focuses on the role of ideas and its influence on policy-makers' understanding and, thereby, their definition of policy problem to which part-time employment is a suitable instrument. The following paragraph will illustrate different approaches of explaining the factors influencing social policy-making, and will highlight the role of ideas.

2.1 Partisan theory

Certain political parties are associated to specific policy agendas and thus the strength of political parties in the executive and legislative strongly shape the output of the policy-making process. Welfare policies are likely to reflect class-related distributive and partisan politics (Korpi 2006, 168). Traditionally, left parties receive support by unions and organised labour, and are in favour of a generous social democratic welfare state. Conservative and liberal parties inherently hold also specific preferences concerning welfare. Religious parties are in favour of a conservative welfare state, secular-conservative and liberal parties are in favour of a liberal welfare state (Schmidt et al. 2007). Concerning the generosity of the welfare state, important assumptions are that left parties are inherently interested in reducing inequality and in implementing social programmes (Olsen and O'Connor 1998, 20) and that employer are opponents of the welfare state. However, the actual position of parties and of influential interest organisations might fluctuate depending on the environment and structures. In general, any party on the left-right spectrum can choose an approaches to new problems, such as part-time employment, which might deviate from their political foundation. Since part-time employment as majoritarian female employment it is also an important feminist topic and not only a labour market concern. The situation of part-time employees can be a concern of other parties than the social democratic and the conservative people's parties. Therefore, it is important to analyse the actual ideas of governments and not limit the analysis to the left-right positions and strength of organised labour and employer organisations in the country. The position of parties and other organisations might differ from the assumed interests that are based on their traditional positions and their connection to trade unions and employer organisations. Commonly, parties have two main interests, to seek office and to pursuit policies (Schmidt 1996, 156). Governmental parties have the means to realise their preferences and implement

policies. Therefore, the ideas and programmes of governmental parties and secondly of institutionalised interests groups will be the main focus on the analysis.

2.2 Discourse theory

Discourses are crucial for welfare reforms, because they affect the ability of governments to gain agreements among policy actors and the public opinion (Schmidt 2002, 167). Following Vivien A. Schmidt's definition, a discourse is broadly everything, that policy actors say to each other and to the general public in the efforts to construct and legitimate their policy programme (Schmidt 2002, 167). Discourses contain ideas about the necessity of a reform and its appropriateness. It is an interactive process of policy design and communication, in which a consensus for change is created. Schmidt highlights that rational political arguments alone cannot fully explain welfare state retrenchments. Instead, the political discourse effects the decision-making and helps to overcome entrenched interests and institutional obstacles by altering the perceptions of actors and of the general public (Schmidt 2002, 169). The government needs the public legitimation and support of other political actors to implement a successful welfare state reform. Discourses constitute the social and linguistic boundaries of what is possible to think, say and do, and thereby are instantiations of the social operations of power (Padamsee 2009, 417).

Depending on the structural characteristics of the political systems, governments need to create different majorities, and therefore to have different kind of discourses, such as a coordinative or communicative discourse. Communicative discourses are more prominent in single actor systems, in which the government needs to convince the public to successfully implement policy. Whereas in multiactor systems, coordinative discourses are essential for reforms. Instead of convincing the general public, the discourse aims at generating commonalities among the political actors. Discourses are thereby not independent of political system's institutional set-up, and institutions are attached to norms and patterns of behaviour.

The prominence of the type of discourse also depends on the policy field. Family policies and labour market policies have different institutional set-ups. Trade unions and employer organisations quite often have influence on the policy-making process concerning labour market problems. Whereas in family policy, governments might have more leeway in shaping the policy content. Governments have to use different kind of discourses in different policy fields in order to realise their proposals. Independent of the type of discourse, a proposal needs to be packaged in normative accepted societal beliefs to be successful (Hiilamo and Kangas 2009). Governments have to link their proposals to dominant ideas or the hegemonic discourse in society in order to get the support of the public and other political actors. However, ideas are not stable and varieties of ideas will exist in the society, in particular concerning new

problems. Policies are also influencing and altering ideas. By linking policies to ideas, the government chooses a set of beliefs and affect its popularity.

2.3 Cultural explanations

In discourses Ideas are expressed and function as restricting or supporting vehicles. Cultural explanations are based on a more abstract level, and consists of systems of meanings and the practices in which ideas are embedded. Culture provides meanings, which are expressed in symbols guiding the thinking, feeling and behaviour of its members and, thus values, beliefs and norms (Padamsee 2009, 416). It can be seen as toolkit of symbols, rituals, and world views that can be used by individuals and organisations in varying configurations in order to solve societal problems (Swidler 1986, 273). By providing meaning and practices, culture guides strategies of actions, which might produce persistence in actions, and therefore also in policies.

Important cultural aspects concerning part-time employment are gender cultures and ideals of mother's role and work. Pfau-Effinger (2002) analysed in her paper the interrelationship between culture, structure and action, in particular how culture affects the societal process of women deciding on their working time structure. Her main findings were that the cross-national differences in part-time work can mainly be explained by differences in gender culture and in particular in the cultural ideals about the role and work of mothers. However, she also emphasised the role of state as key actor of policy-making. Through policy and social programmes the state influences the societal ideas. Policy instruments can change what is considered to be the norm and desirable, and thereby the hegemonic cultural ideas and ideals. Pfau-Effinger highlighted that the cultural roles are changing, and thereby criticises the path dependency orientated welfare regime approaches. Women's labour market participation changes in the long-run the gender culture of a country.

The relationship between culture and policies is complex. As illustrated, the success of policies depends on their link to the hegemonic discourse in society. The government needs to frame its policies in order to reflect the connection between its policy and the societal accepted values. On the other hand, policies affect the societal ideas and thereby behaviour. The landscape of societal ideas is also complex, and depending on the social structure, different ideas might be dominant. Social groups need to adhere their demands to ideas in order to make them political effective. Power struggles also decide upon which ideas are on the political agenda. In the political sphere, different parties are representing, to a different extent feminist ideas and support of part-time employment. This influences the hegemonic frame within family policy and labour market policy is debated (Hiilamo and Kangas 2009, 460).

2.4 Ideational theory

Culture and discourse are both ideational theory concepts. The relationship between concrete ideas and culture can be seen as a hierarchical one. Following the concept of culture, ideas are a subset of culture and are more explicit on the ways culture can influence policies and politics. Ideas range from specific policy proposals to broad statements about the world and society as it is or should be (Padamsee 2009, 416). The concept of idea represents a range of different ideational types. Campbell (1998; 2002) categorises the different types of ideas on two dimensions: if they are normative or cognitive and if they function in the foreground or in the background of policy debate. Surel adds a third dimension: the degree of abstractness or concreteness (2000, 497f.). Culture and discourse are both abstract types and contain primarily normative concepts. The first functions in the background and the latter is explicitly articulated.

2.4.1 Types of ideas

Strongly linked to discourses are frames, which are explicitly articulated, concrete, normative and in the foreground of policy debates. Frames are strategically used by political actors to legitimise their policy proposal or to challenge existing policies, by linking it to societal accepted norms and previous reforms (Campbell 1998, 394f.; 2002, 27f.). They can take the form of public discourses to convince policy-makers or the public of the need to reform and the suitability of the proposal. Frames can also be used as an instrument to form coalitions or to counter criticism (Béland 2009, 570). Ideas are primarily seen as instruments for political actors to realise their interests and as focal points to form coalitions (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). However, frames build on a society's cultural repertoire and symbols, which are in the background and taken for granted.

These normative frameworks are shared by a great majority of the society and constrain the normative range of solutions available to policy-makers (Campbell 1998). They define which alternatives are legitimate and perceived as acceptable. The cultural approach covers those ideas, and as already illustrated, they constrain policy actors in their actions, and also function as toolkits of symbols and meanings. Those toolkits can be used to create new policy approaches and ground them in society's cultural understanding. In contrast to frames and other explicit ideas, normative frameworks are non-purposively. They provide individuals and organisations with general guidelines and rules of behaviour (Berman 2013, 223). However, they may consist of multiple ideas that are not coherent and could contradict each other. Political actors can draw from this multiplicity of ideas and discourses to support their proposal with a suitable frame, or draw from the variety of ideas to generate new ideas (Padamsee 2009, 428ff.). In sum, abstract and taken for granted ideas in the background are diverse,

function as normative constraints, are enabling toolkits and are widely accepted by the public and political actors.

Both frames and normative frameworks are primarily normative elements. Campbell (1998) classifies two types of ideas as cognitive, which are more explicit on the suitability of policy solutions and not on the appropriateness. Paradigms are the cognitive counterpart to the normative framework, they function in the background of policy debates and constraint the cognitive range of useful solutions from which political actors can draw. Paradigms provide understanding of the functioning of the world and how political institutions and policy instruments should be organised to achieve broader goals. They consist of the definition of goals, of nature of the problem and suitability of instruments (Hall 1993, 279). They are in the background of policy debates and heavily effect policy-making by limiting the range of suitable policies. Similarly to its normative counterpart, paradigms exist on a general and sectoral level (Béland 2005, 8). Thereby, containing different degree of concreteness. Paradigms in themselves are coherent, however the existing universe of ideas consist of a range paradigms which might not be coherent. The multiplicity of paradigms provides political actors a cognitive toolkit out of which they can draw new suitable policy responses. The degree of coherence among existing policy paradigms depends on the policy field. For instances, among economic policies paradigms are more explicit, and therefore the composition of policies more coherent than in social policy (Béland 2009, 565). In social policy, the theories and assumptions are not always explicit and therefore a greater multiplicity of paradigms exist. Political actors can draw from this multiplicity, which leads to a more diverse composition of policies.

Similar to the relationship between frames and normative frameworks, programmes are more explicit than paradigms and draw their legitimacy from the more abstract concept. However, it is a cognitive legitimacy, and therefore they illustrate suitability and less appropriateness. In order to be successful, they need to be formulated in clear and simple terms and contain clear guidelines, explicit instruments, goals and problem definitions. Programmes define the most suitable methods and means to achieve values and objectives, which have been set up by normative frameworks and paradigms. Programmes are the heart of concrete policy proposals, because they specify the cause and effect relationships that resides unarticulated in the background (Campbell 2002, 22). They are explicit policy alternatives. The content of programmes are results of policy debates on existing policies within the normative and cognitive limits, defined by paradigms and normative framework.

Programmes are only implemented as policy if a problem has been constructed, which clearly depends on the perception of the political elites and public. Policy responses entail the process of interpretation, further contains a specific perception of the cause, problem identification, and choice of policy instruments and allocation of responsibilities. Those processes are strongly

influenced by the different kinds of ideas. Normative frameworks and paradigms constrain the normative and cognitive range of appropriate policies, frames are essential for the realisation and programmes for the explicit content and instruments of a policy. Programmes are limited on scope and formulated for a particular policy issue, due to their concreteness and explicitness. Political actors might hold a range of programmatic ideas that are not necessarily related to each other. This is also true for institutional and policy field level, a range of different policy instruments based on various ideas might exist next to each other. For instance, a country's approach to part-time employment can consist of different schemes and laws, which root in different ideas.

2.4.2 Ideas and political actors

In order to be realised, ideas need political actors that support and push the idea in the political sphere. Policy entrepreneurs, consisting of individuals or organisations, need to actively bring the new ideas in the political process and build a coalition, which supports the idea. Advocacy coalitions might also include political actors inside and outside the policy-making process, which share a set of normative and causal beliefs and engage in coordinated activity (Sorel 2000, 502). Ideas need a strong coalition among policy-makers to be implemented. Political organisations outside the policy-making institutions can put pressure on the government, but their influence depends on the institutional setting.

The likelihood of implementation of ideas depends on several factors. The policy entrepreneur's characteristics and the policy proposal's characteristics are essential factors. Policy entrepreneurs are individuals or organisations, which have to be capable of persuading other political actors to reconsider their actions and ways of thinking (Berman 2013, 227). They need to be capable of forming an influential coalition or hold a strong position in the policy-making process. The institutional setting, public sentiments and policy legacies are influential factors that affect the likelihood of implementation. However, intrinsic characteristics of the idea also strongly affect its success. Political ideas need to be feasible, familiar, mature, political resonant (Mätzke and Ostner 2010, 134f.). Familiarity can be created by having linkages to previous policies and ideas or gradually by incremental implementation. Maturity and feasibility depends on testing and learning from other policy fields and countries. The proposal needs to be linked to an idea, which political actors know and are confident of their functioning. Its political resonance depends on the beliefs and identities of the political actors and the existing public sentiments. The content of the idea needs to provide a suitable alternative to a failed or overhauled idea. It also needs to present a logic on why the old idea failed and why the problem has to be solved. The successful idea, thereby, possesses the epistemic privilege (Block and Somer 2005) and is administratively, politically and socially viable (Campbell 2002, 33).

2.4.3 Causal function of Ideas

Pre-existing mental models, such as normative and cognitive ideas, constrain the analytical process of individuals before and during decision-making. Paradigms and normative frameworks affect the range of options, from which a policy-maker can choose by excluding inappropriate and unsuitable options. Further, decisions between different policy options are complex and require a great investment of time and resources in order to consider all potential outcomes. Ideas are functioning as an interpretative framework, specifying goals, instruments and the nature of problems (Blyth 2002, 37; Hall 1993, 279). They provide a shortcut and reduce the complexity of decisions, by guiding and constraining the process of reasoning. They function as filters during the interpretation process and contain a simplified representation of the anticipated outcomes of the policy.

The different type of ideas exercise distinctive causal effects on the policy-making process. The policy-making process can be divided in three streams (Béland 2009, 562f.; Kingdon [1984] 1995):

1. Problem stream (construction of the policy problem)
2. Policy stream (formulation of policy alternatives and measures)
3. Political stream (coalition forming and framing)

The main process in the problem stream is the definition of a policy problem. Exogenous events, such as crises, can push a specific problem on the governmental agenda. However, endogenous events and processes, such as policy feedbacks or the failure of a policy instrument can also define as problem to which the government has to react. Exogenous and endogenous events focus the attention and thus place the problem on the governmental agenda (Kingdon [1984] 1995, 90ff.). However, the policy problems exist already before they are moved on the governmental agenda where they competed for attention. In the problem stream, ideas altering the perception of existing policy and its failure to respond to problems. Normative frameworks and paradigms are essential in the construction of policy problems, because they contain assumptions about how the world works and how world is and should be. Individuals and institutions are guided by ideas and, thereby, act on questions of appropriateness and effectiveness, not just on anticipated consequences (White 2002, 727). Exogenous shocks occur, when existing policies fail to prevent emergence of new problems. The failure opens the call for alternatives and new ideas. However, exogenous shocks are interpreted through the cognitive and normative lenses of policy actors, who use them to make sense of potential problems and solutions (Padamsee 2009).

Similar to the problem stream, policy proposal float in the 'primeval soup' and which are in need of being moved on the governmental agenda in order to be implemented (Kingdon [1984] 1995, 116ff.). The proposals might contradict each other or share instruments and goals. Their

encounter can cause new formulations and lead to new policy proposals. In order to be put on the governmental agenda the proposal has to satisfy certain conditions, such as technical and financial feasibility, correspondence to public opinions, but also to fit with dominant societal values (Campbell 2002, 33). Paradigms and normative frameworks contain problem definitions, goals and values. Therefore, they affect not only what is considered to be a problem, but also the choice of new policy goal. Ideas function as guidelines and toolkits when formulating policy alternatives. Programmes, as explicit ideas, consists of concrete instruments and guidelines in order to reach defined goals in a most effective way. Further, they provide a justification based on effectiveness and usefulness, which political actors can use in the discourse with other actors and the public. Programmes are the core of policy proposal due to their concreteness and guidelines.

In the political stream, a winning coalition needs to be found that agrees upon the necessity to react on a certain problem and or to advocate for specific policy proposal (Kingdon [1984] 1995, 145ff.). The primary institutions for the political stream are the executive and the legislative. The partisan composition of the government strongly influences which problems and policies are on the governmental agenda. However, other internal and external political actors, such as trade unions, employer organisations, interests groups or court decisions can have strong influence on the governmental agenda. Normative and cognitive ideas create identity and foster the development of a collective consciousness. "Cognitive [paradigms] and normative frames allow actors to make sense of their worlds, and to locate themselves and develop in a given community, by defining the field for exchange, by allowing meaning to be conferred on social dynamics, and by determining the possibilities for action" (Sorel 2000, 500). Ideas and group identities are interdependent. On one side, ideas are crucial for the development and definition of social actors, by unifying individuals with similar cognitive and normative ideas. On the other side, group identity provides a set of ideas and defines the boundaries of options and the field of exchange. However, identity is constituted by the interplay of individuals and groups. It can be modified and the linked ideas changed. Frames function as an instrument highlighting the failure of existing policies and ideas. At the same time they create the new reform imperatives and illustrate suitability of the policy proposal. Frames have an internal and external purpose in the policy-making process. As internal instruments they facilitate the creation of a winning coalition of political actors. In order to build the winning coalitions, proposals need to contain ideas that function as focal points around which political actors can agree and through which they can realise their goals (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). Frames highlight those focal points by linking the proposal primary to norms and also to paradigms. Frames are also an external instruments and mediate between the public and political elites. They are strategically used by policy-makers to justify and legitimise their proposal. As previous illustrated, the institutional setting determine the type of discourse,

which is needed to implement a policy and, thereby, also the content of frames. In a coordinative discourse, frames are primarily addressed to other political actors. In a communicative discourse, frames are primarily addressed to the public. The policy field, its normative and cognitive heritage, and the previous policies further determine the content of frames. To draw popular support, policy proposals and ideas need to resemble consistency with previous policies, provide motivation to be implemented and provide the anticipated results (Hall 1993, 291).

In order to implement a policy, the defined problem needs to be coupled to an appropriate policy response and supported by sufficiently powerful coalition of political actors. An open policy window increases the likelihood of a proposal to be adopted and also highlights the significance of problem. In a policy window, political actors and advocates leave their extreme position and are open for compromise in order to use the window and implement their interests. A policy window can occur due to several reasons, but primarily because of changes in the political or problem stream (Kingdon [1984] 1995, 168). Problems can gain importance due to exogenous or endogenous events. Similarly, change of government or change in the influence of other political actors transform the distribution of power, and thereby the strength of policy coalitions in the political stream. Policy entrepreneurs are special political advocates that are willing to invest their resources to promote a position for anticipated future gain (Kingdon [1984] 1995, 179). They are insiders of the political process with good connections to influential political actors and are well-informed about the developments in the problem and policy streams. They assist the coupling of problems and policies in order to implement their goal. Their position can be compared to a surfer waiting for a wave that uses the developments and not god-like creating the policy window (Cairney and Jones 2016, 41). Their main activity is the coupling of a problem to a policy and thus feasible solutions. An appropriate coupling needs to correspond to prevailing ideas in order to find a winning coalition.

Theoretically the ideational processes can facilitate a rapid response to an exogenous shock, through providing cognitive and normative heuristics. However, a high number of policy changes are not triggered by exogenous shocks and paradigm crises. The majority of ideational change is discursive, incremental and gradual. Mätzke and Ostner (2010) highlighted the important effect of duration, in shaping the essential conditions of familiarity, maturity and political resonance. Ideas need a certain incubation period before being implemented. Further, policy change might happen gradually from the periphery to the centre of a policy fields (Palier 2007). Therefore, an ideational change might be difficult to observe while it is happening, and its start might be only identified retrospectively.

Retrospectively, it is also possible to identify events, which appeared unimportant at occurrence, but were influential after all. Failed ideas can affect the societal discourse and the

content of alternative policy proposal basis, by diverting the attention in a specific direction (Béland 2007). A proposal that introduced a new ideational concept might fail at first, but by softening up the discourse and defining the problem the ideas might be successful at later stage. It also creates the opportunity for alternatives, which correspond better to the public sentiments and are cognitively more suitable.

A policy proposal and its ideas are also the result of policy debates on existing policies. Cooperation between different political actors is needed to approve and implement a policy. As a result, proposals are ambiguous agreements and their content rather vague (Palier 2007, 100). This is particularly the case if no dominant actor exists in the policy-making process, who has the capabilities to implement the proposal without major adoptions. The ideational content of policies might contain aspects of different normative frameworks and paradigms. Framing further blurs the connection to certain norms and paradigms, by highlighting aspects strategically and not objectively. Concerning the analyses of the ideational content of policies, it is important to extract the most dominant norms and paradigms and look across the employed frames and arguments. Programmes, as the explicit core of policies, illustrate the connection to paradigms and norms through advocating the use of a certain instrument in order to reach the goals of a policy. The justification contains normative and cognitive arguments, which need to be the centre of the ideational analysis of part-time policies in the Netherlands and Austria.

2.4.4 Theoretical paradigms in part-time employment policies

Part-time employment can be interpreted as regulative policy problem, by emphasising the aspect of regulating working time and working conditions, but also as redistributive policy measure with the emphasise on redistribution of work. The different type of policies are closely connected to different paradigms and norms. The crucial question is which normative and cognitive ideas are employed by political actors when interpreting part-time employment as a policy topic. Specifically, part-time employment is situated in two distinct policy spheres: labour market policies and family policies. They are connected to different types of policy-making structures, but also to different prevailing types of cognitive and normative goals.

Due to the link to both policy fields, several paradigms influence political decisions on part-time employment. This study will concentrate on four main paradigms and analyse their impact on Dutch and Austrian part-time employment legislation. Part-time employment can be portrayed by the same ideas as appropriate and effective policy solution to a specific problem, thus the study will follow the initial concept of paradigm defined by Peter Hall that covered normative and cognitive ideas (Hall 1993). The theoretical ideas are defined as paradigms despite containing normative and cognitive elements.

2.4.4.1 Work-sharing

The first paradigm primarily focuses on the macroeconomic functioning of the labour market and its supply of employment. Work-sharing became a prominent defensive instrument for the post-industrial pressures during the economic recession in the late 1970s and 1980s, in particular to tackle the decline of growth and the increase of unemployment. The aim of work-sharing is “redistributing work amongst people so as to reduce the extent of involuntary unemployment” (Dreze, Persson, and Miller 1986, 562). Part-time employment is one of the instruments under the work-sharing paradigm, others are early retirement and the reduction of standard working time. They all have the goal of redistributing working time between employed and unemployed individuals. The division of a full-time position into part-time positions, while all rights and privileges attached to the original positions remain, is the key concept of job sharing. Job sharing through part-time employment is used as an instrument to tackle the potential mass unemployment and to overcome the market failure in supplying jobs (Dreze, Persson, and Miller 1986, 579). In particular, part-time’s job creation effect is expected to increase employment among young people and women, who are primarily affected by firm’s labour hoarding approaches (Dreze, Persson, and Miller 1986, 597; Roche and Fynes 1996, 144). However, work-sharing also affects already employed people through its employment preservation effect. Endangered full-time can be secured through transformation into a part-time position and thus reduce the labour costs for the employer. Governments also benefit strongly from preventing mass unemployment through part-time employment. Every unemployed person creates costs by receiving unemployment benefits and not paying income taxes. Both arguments are frames through which work-sharing can be promoted. Part-time employment is also discussed as an instrument to meet the flexibility demands of companies in a globalised and competitive economy. However, in the work-sharing paradigm the goal is to decrease unemployment and secondary increase flexibility (Brodsky 1994). Therefore, part-time employment is an instrument for job creation and preservation. Following the paradigm, governments should introduce measures that promote the uptake of part-time employment, ease the transition from full-time employment to part-time employment and equate part-time employees regarding welfare benefits and contributions and labour legislation.

2.4.4.2 Economic flexibility

The second paradigm of “economic flexibility” is closely connected to the macroeconomic shocks of recession and rising unemployment, however, the focus is the competitiveness of domestic companies in a globalised economy. The two paradigms concerned with the labour market share the same causes: the recession, the increase of economic competition and the decrease of job and economic growth. Both promote part-time employment as an effective instrument to react on macroeconomic shocks. However, their definitions of the main problem differ greatly. As illustrated, the first paradigm defines increasing unemployment as the primary

problem, whereas, the second paradigm defines the decline of economic growth and the mismatch of companies' flexibility demands as the primary problem. Part-time employment is an instrument to increase the temporal and numerical flexibility of labour, and therefore an instrument for companies to react on the fluctuations in market demands and production (Atkinson 1984; Barbieri 2009, 621). For instances, part-time employees can be a secondary workforce, which meet the temporal demands of the fluctuating production or services. In particular, tougher peaks and bottoms in production demand a workforce, which can react on short notice and work outside the normal working hours (Rubery, Smith, and Fagan 1998, 95). The creation of a periphery or secondary workforce contributes to the construction of a two-tiered labour market, consisting of standard employment with high levels of job security and of a highly-flexible non-standard workforce with low job security (Barbieri 2009, 622). This type of employer-based temporal flexibility requires, from the government, the construction of a deregulated employment form outside the standard employment. Therefore, the government is required to introduce exemptions from universal job security, in particular for part-time and temporary employment. The main goal of politicians following this paradigm is the creation of a flexible workforce in order to increase or preserve the competitiveness of the national economy. The policies can also be framed as preservation of standard jobs, because the level of job security of the labour force's majority is not altered, only for the minority of periphery part-time employees. The derived policies differ greatly from the work-sharing paradigm's policies and part-time employment is not portrayed as a universal employment form.

2.4.4.3 Dual-earner / dual-carer

In contrast to the labour market orientation of the first and second paradigm, the third and fourth paradigms are primarily situated in family policy. Both paradigms contain a great degree of normative aspects concerning the provision of care. Part-time employment is interpreted as an effective reconciliation instrument, emphasising its function to enable care work and labour market participation at the same time. Both paradigms rely on the assumption that care is primarily provided informally and privately. A certain degree of public and market care service are nevertheless necessary to enable parents to work and care simultaneously, however it remains a secondary source. In contrast to the universal breadwinner paradigm, which promotes full-time employment for men and women and the externalisation of care (Fraser 1994, 601ff.). Apart from their common interpretation of care as reconciliation instrument, the two paradigms differ greatly in their focus and in their underlying family definitions and normative "ideals of care" (Kremer 2006, 262f.).

The third paradigm sees part-time employment as a reconciliation instrument for mothers and fathers, and care as a parental sharing concern (Kremer 2006, 265). Part-time employment enables both parents to stay active on the labour market and to care for their child at the same time. The paradigm can be defined as 'dual-earner / dual-carer' based on the concepts of

“dual-breadwinner/dual-carer” (Pfau-Effinger 1999, 63) and “earner-carer” model (Misra, Budig, and Moller 2007, 138), where both parents equally participate on the labour market and provide care for their children. The main problem that the paradigm addresses is the gender inequality on the labour market and in the private sphere. In particular, it tackles the prevailing dominance of fathers in the labour market and mothers in domestic and caring work. It is based on two principles: a better balance of time allocation between men and women, and a better balance in the allocation of time between paid and unpaid work (Plantenga, Schippers, and Siegers 1999, 101). The aspired gender equality in both public and private spheres is a radical change from the gender roles of the male breadwinner/female housewife model. Part-time employment is therefore not a female employment form, but an employment form for both parents. The dual-earner / dual carer paradigm acknowledges the need for steady employment of their citizens and the provision of expanded services to help to combine employment and parenting. It is based on an individual approach, such as the adult worker model, where each adult is treated as an individual and, for instances, taxed individually and not as a couple or household. The same holds true for the entitlement to social security and welfare schemes. In contrast to the work-sharing paradigm, the focus rests on the reconciliation of work and family and, thereby, promoting part-time employment for parents, not for the entire labour force. Nancy Fraser highlighted the dismantling of gender roles as an effective instrument to decrease gender inequality, by making the women’s life patterns the norm (1994, 611). The anticipated uptake of part-time employment by men and women in all economic sectors would contribute to the prevention of part-time employments’ marginalisation. However, in order to reach the goal of gender equality in work and care through part-time employment, men, in particular, need to be encouraged to make greater use of this employment form. The associated policy programmes need to acknowledge the stimulation of fathers to work part-time and to be active carer (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013, 10). An active role of the state through subsidisation or employment rights is essential in order to prevent part-time employment as gender equality instrument is offered selectively by companies only for their high-qualified staff (Rubery, Smith, and Fagan 1998, 96). Selective provision could lead to further labour market segmentation between high-quality and marginalised part-time jobs, thereby, failing in the promotion of gender equality for the whole society.

2.4.4.4 Primary carer & secondary earner

The fourth paradigm only focuses on mothers, who are the main care provider. Part-time employment enables them to be active on the labour market next to their main obligation. It acknowledges the failure of the male breadwinner system, in which the male partner earns enough to financially care for the entire nuclear family. The post-industrial economy does not guarantee the provision of this family wage and the additional income of the female partner’s income is needed. However, Women are mainly perceived as mothers and cares. Employment

remains to be secondary for women (Misra, Budig, and Moller 2007, 137). The main concern of the paradigm is “to enable women with significant domestic responsibilities to support themselves and their families, either through care work alone or through care work plus part-time employment” (Fraser 1994, 606). It is a combination of the male breadwinner and female part-time worker model (Pfau-Effinger 1999, 63). The difference to the traditional male breadwinner model is the shift of emphasis from the female role of household-carer to part-time worker. In the “traditional housewife model” men and women are active in two complementary spheres (Pfau-Effinger 2004, 383f.). Men in the public sphere with paid work and women in the private household with unpaid work. The paradigm softened the strict separation and women are also active in the public sphere. However, men’s participation in the domestic sphere is not a concern. In order to enable mothers to reconcile their two roles, the welfare state needs to acknowledge mothers’ caring obligation and provide support for instances through child care allowances or (part-time) child care service (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013, 9). The government also has to motivate women to take up part-time employment in order to fill the earning gap and to provide care for their children. Women are encouraged to have a short career break for their motherhood, and return to their job soon after the birth, simultaneously fulfil the traditional caregiver obligations. Part-time employment is the solution for the potential conflict between labour market participation and the provision domestic child care (Rosenfeld and Birkelund 1995, 112). From a feminist perspective part-time employment as employment form might contribute to reduce the gender inequality, by enabling mothers to earn their own salary and pay social insurance contributions (Mandel 2009, 709). Thus, part-time employment is essentially a female employment form and policies will reflect this gender imbalance. In welfare schemes and other policies, family is portrayed as an institution and parents treated as an entity. The intended gender employment differences will consolidate the dual labour market and probably lead to marginalisation of part-time employment and reinforce women domestic labour (Fraser 1994, 609). Table 1 summarises the main aspects of the four paradigms that are used to explain the different part-time employment policy approaches of Austria and the Netherlands.

Table 1: Theoretical paradigms on part-time employment

	Main problem	Causes of the problem	Policy goal	Part-time employment as instrument for...
Work-sharing	Mass unemployment	Recession, decline of job growth and market failure	Job creation and preservation	Job sharing, split of full-time positions into part-time positions
Economic Flexibility	Domestic companies' competitiveness in a globalised economy	Economic change, global competition	Meet Companies' demand for temporal and numerical flexibility	Part-time employment as deregulated, highly-flexible employment form
Dual-earner / dual-carer	Gender imbalance in paid work and unpaid care work	Traditional family roles	Equal participation of father and mothers on the labour market and in care and domestic work	Individual reduction of working hours through part-time employment for both men and women. In particular, stimulation of fathers' change in working time and caring
Primary carer & secondary earner	Women's non-participation on the labour market while caring	Failure of male breadwinner system & post-industrial economy to provide family wage	Conserve women's labour market attachment and prevent career break	Creation of part-time jobs meeting the flexibility demands of mothers

Part-time employment is situated in two distinct policy spheres: labour market policies and family policies (Table2). Thus, they are connected to different types of policy-making structures, but also to different prevailing types of cognitive and normative goals. The work-sharing and economic flexibility paradigms are situated in the labour market field. Both promote

policy proposals which are primarily change the labour market. The dual-earner / dual-carer and primary carer & secondary earner paradigms are situated in the family policy field. Their focus are on the role of parents and the reconciliation of unpaid care and paid labour. The second dimension is more complex and covers several related aspects. It describes the role of the government, the depth and consequences of the political intervention and the size of the group of people affected by it. The first subdimension specifies an intervening role of the government. Policies connected to those paradigms are aiming at reforming and radical changing the gender relations or the labour market. The government intervenes proactively in those two spheres and their actions are aimed at affecting all parents or the entire labour force. Part-time employment is an instrument of redistribution. In contrast to the second subdimension, the policies of those paradigms are focused on preservation of a system and roles. The government responds to the specific demands and its actions affect only a subgroup, such as mothers and atypical employees. Instead of redistribution, the role of part-time employees are only altered and the government’s intervention in the functioning of the system is as small as possible.

Table 2: Structure of the theoretical paradigms

	<i>Intervening</i>	<i>Responding</i>
<i>Labour market</i>	Work-sharing	Economic Flexibility
<i>Family</i>	Dual-earner / Dual-carer	Primary carer & Secondary earner

The four paradigms and their grouping within two dimensions provide a suitable tool to analyse the different approaches to part-time employment in Austria and the Netherlands. In order to extract the influence of ideas on policy-making regarding part-time employment, the first step will be to determine in which policy field the policy is situated and the second which role the government exercises and if it is a system change or preservation with small alterations. Each of the paradigms proposes different policy programmes, highlights different problems and is supported by different political actors that form a coalition to push the topic on the decision agenda. Those three aspects of each paradigm will be operationalised in the following chapter.

3 Research problem

3.1 Research question & Dependent Variable

The main research question of the paper is: Why do aggregated policies designed to regulate or deregulate the job quality of part-time employees differ between Austria and the Netherlands? Therefore, the dependent variable are policies designed to affect the job quality of part-time employees in the Netherlands and in Austria. Those policies are part of the broader

strategy regarding part-time employment and are situated in two particular policy fields. For a comprehensive analysis of these policies, it is essential to examine the major labour markets and family policies reforms in Austria and the Netherlands. The paper focuses on outputs of the political systems and the design and intention of policies. The process from output to outcome is affected by several factors inside and outside the policy-making system. It would exceed the research focus of the paper, if these factors would be considered.

3.2 Hypotheses & Independent Variable

As illustrated in the previous chapters, ideas have an independent effect on the policy-making process and content of policies. The different approaches towards part-time employment in Austria and Netherlands will therefore be explained by the difference in dominant paradigms on part-time employment.

Hypothesis: The difference in Austrian and Dutch aggregated policies regulating and deregulating the job quality of part-time employees can be explained by the difference in influential paradigms. Each paradigm has unique impacts on the three streams of policy-making and thereby determine the content and design of policies regarding part-time employment. Intervening paradigms lead to greater support for policies improving the job quality of part-time employees than responding paradigms. The policy type further determines if part-time employment is portrayed as employment form for people with care obligations or for a greater share of the labour force. Leading to policies with conditional or general validity.

Paradigms influence the policy-making process in all of its three streams. The four paradigms, which have been theoretically defined in the last chapter, highlight different problems, derive different policies, and are supported by different policy actors. In a policy window all three streams align and a policy entrepreneur couples a problem and a policy. A coalition needs to be found to place the policy on government's decision agenda. Paradigms propose specific couplings and ease the process of coalition building. "Theoretical arguments that are attached to concepts must be translated into specific, observable implications that one can examine via process tracing" (Rohlfing 2012, 164). Table 3 illustrates the different theoretical problems, policies, political actors and unique impact on the dependent variable of the four paradigms.

Table 3: Paradigms' content in three streams of policy-making

	Perceived Problem	Perceived suitable policy	Winning coalition	Expected effect on aggregated policies
Work-sharing	Mass unemployment; Decline of job growth; Market failure to supply jobs	Equalisation of employment and social rights between full-time and part-time employment; Demolishing barriers for employers	Left parties; Trade unions (with limitations)	Positive effect with general validity
Economic Flexibility	Domestic companies' competitiveness in globalised economy	Exemptions in labour law for part-time employment; Deregulation of part-time employment; Creation of a highly-flexible secondary workforce	Liberal parties; Secular conservative parties; Employer interest groups	Negative effect; Dismantling job quality of part-time employees
Dual-earner / dual-carer	Gender imbalance in paid work and unpaid care	Support for parents' reconciliation of work and care; Parental right to part-time work; Support for parents' flexibility in working hours; Benefit bonus for fathers working part-time; Subsidies for parents who share work and care equally	Left parties; Green parties; Feminist interest groups	Positive effect, limited to parents
Primary carer & secondary earner	Market failure to provide family wage; Mothers' non-participation on the labour market	Support for mothers' reconciliation of work and care; Encouragement to work part-time during care	Religious centre parties; Church	Small positive effect, limited to mothers

The four paradigms on part-time employment are crucial for the construction of a problem and the definition of the policy goal. The work-sharing paradigm, in particular, highlights the pressures of rising mass unemployment due to the decline of job growth and the economic recession. The labour market and the economy do not provide enough jobs for the entire labour force. This will have negative effects on the life of individuals and creates increasing costs for the state. In contrast, the economic flexibility paradigm emphasises the pressure of a globalised economy on the competitiveness of domestic companies. Both paradigms share the same cause of their problems, but emphasize a different effect and thereby two distinctive problems. In order to perform well in competitive market and to preserve or increase the level of GDP, companies need a flexible labour force. Through temporal and numerical flexibility companies can react to fluctuations in production and demand of services. A decline in GDP will have also negative effects on the life of citizens and the functioning of the state.

The two family policy paradigms highlight specific pressures on the life of families and parents. Gender imbalance in paid work and in the provision of unpaid care creates inequality between parents, which is the primary problem of the dual-carer / dual-earner paradigm. The imbalance contradicts the pursuit of gender equality and the participation of all able adults on the labour market. The equal role of both parents in care and domestic tasks is a core goal of the paradigm. The primary carer & secondary earner paradigm does not promote gender equality, but emphasises the pressure of mothers' non-participation in the labour market, while caring for their children. Families with a single income will have financial problems in the short-run. A long career break of mothers will also create financial problems in the long-run, due to their declining and outdated job skills and experiences. Mothers need to be encouraged to provide a second income for the family next to their main obligations of caring. All four paradigms direct the attention of political actors to different problems and offer four distinctive cause-effect relationships. The dominance of a paradigm will lead to the prominence of one of the problems on the governmental agenda.

In the policy stream, paradigms function as toolkits by offering acceptable and useful alternatives, and influence the choice of appropriate coupling of policies and problems. The policy goal of the work-sharing paradigm is to create and preserve jobs through work-sharing and replacement of full-time jobs with part-time jobs. The policies are target at increasing the number of part-time employees and encouraging full-time employees to decrease their number of working hours. The governmental strategy is the demolishing of all barriers in legislation for work-sharing. Workers also need to be encouraged to work part-time by equalising the job quality and employment rights of part-time and full-time worker. Potential policies are the right to change her or his working hours and the modification of welfare benefits' calculation towards favouring part-time employment. The economic flexibility paradigm promotes opposing policies, despite the shared fundamental cause of the two paradigms. Its policy goal is to

increase the competitiveness of the domestic economy through a highly-flexible secondary workforce. Part-time employment is seen as an instrument to respond to fluctuations in labour demand. Thus, governments will introduce policies to deregulate part-time employment and to exempt these jobs from employment rights.

The dual-carer / dual-earner paradigm emphasises the equal distribution of paid labour and care work between parents, and the reconciliation of those two spheres for each parent. A core policy of the paradigm is the right to work part-time for parents. The demands of flexibility for parents need to be met by giving them control over the amount and scheduling of their working hours. Their bargaining position contra their employer has to be strengthened through rights or exchange of experience. Further supportive policies are welfare bonuses or other benefits for parents who equally distribute care and, in particular, for fathers who work part-time. In Austria and the Netherlands, mothers are often the main carer and work part-time. Fathers as male breadwinner are often only secondary carer. In order to dismantle this gender imbalance, fathers need to be encouraged to change their work and care patterns, in particular, to reduce their working hours. Mothers and fathers need to be enabled to have a continuous career during parenthood and therefore need part-time employment with good job quality in all economic sectors and positions. Deviating from the work-sharing paradigm, part-time employment is not portrayed as an employment form for the whole labour force, but for parents. Both paradigms share the ambition to reform an entire system. The dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm aspires gender balance in all families, and thus better job quality policies for part-time employees, but with an emphasis on or exclusiveness for parents. The policy focus of the primary carer & secondary earner is even further limited. Part-time employment is an exclusive employment form for mothers next to their main obligation of care. Policies will support the reconciliation for mothers and strengthen them in their right to work part-time. In particular, the mothers' autonomy over the scheduling of their working time is increased. Policies are based on a traditional family role model, where mothers are responsible for care and domestic tasks. However, to preserve their labour market attachment and to support the family through a second income, the government will introduce policies, which create part-time positions that fulfil the flexibility needs of mothers. The focus will not rest on improving the job quality of all part-time employees, but to enable mothers to reconcile work and care obligations. The reduction of differences in hourly wages between full-time and part-time employees is of secondary importance, because the largest part of the family income is provided by the primary breadwinner. All four paradigms have a distinctive policy orientation and portray part-time work as employment form for different parts of the labour force. Thereby, the support for equalisation of rights and entitlements between part-time and full-time employees differs dramatically.

In the political stream, paradigms shape the process of coalition building by providing focal points for political actors. The intersection of beliefs, interests and identities of particular

political facilitate the formulation of policy coalitions. Austria and the Netherlands have both parliamentary governmental systems, in which parties play a major role in the legislative and in the executive. The party composition of the government constitutes the dominant political actors, and therefore the study will focus on parties⁴ as key actors in the political stream. However, both countries also include to a certain degree, interest groups such as trade unions and employer interest groups in the political process. These social partners are in particular influential in the labour market policy field. The work-sharing paradigm is likely to be supported by left parties and with reservations by trade unions. If the rights and the positions of trade union members are sustained or the share of part-time working trade union members high enough, trade unions support work-sharing policies. Full employment is an initial political goal of left parties. In an economic recessions, traditional means to reach full employment will fail. Therefore, a window for alternative ideas and policies opens up. Left parties are potentially open for alternative ideas to reach their primary goal. Policy entrepreneurs might be academic communities that promote alternative economic policies, or also members of the left parties. The economic flexibility paradigm is supported by parties with a strong focus on economic growth and less on welfare. Liberal and secular conservative parties are potential political supporters of deregulating part-time employment. Both are opponents of extensive social protection and might advocate exemptions from employment protection in order to strengthen the competitiveness of the domestic economy. Employer interest groups are especially interested in increasing the performance and turnover of their members. They are potential policy entrepreneurs and fight for policies designed to increase the temporal flexibility of the labour force.

In the family policy field, trade unions and employer interest groups have less influence. The dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm is most likely supported by left and green parties with a great interest in gender equality. Feminist interest groups as external pressure are important political actors in creating public and political attention for gender equality. The position of a party depends on the share of influential members who are supporting feminist ideas and in particular gender equality. Left and green parties have a higher likelihood to promote those ideas, however, other political parties might also support gender equality. In the primary carer & secondary earner paradigm the traditional male breadwinner family model is a primary foundation for policies. The church as interest group and provider of child care institutions is an external pressure group potentially fighting for conservative family values. Religious centre parties are representing those interests in the political sphere. A conservative party government confronted with the problem of failure of the male breadwinner system is likely to

⁴ The definition of party families is based on Schmidt et al. (2007).

introduce measure to increase mothers' employment, while simultaneously promote the traditional understanding of care.

Table 3 further illustrates the expected effect of the four paradigms on the dependent variable. Each of the paradigm has a distinctive effect on the orientation and scope of policies affecting the job quality of part-time employees. The work-sharing paradigm has a strong positive effect, by universally equalising the labour law and welfare benefit entitlement for part-time and full-time employees. Thus, if this paradigm is dominant a range of far-reaching policies designed to increase the job quality of part-time employees will have been implemented. In order to create and preserve jobs, part-time employment is promoted as employment form for the whole labour force, therefore social rights and job quality policies of part-time employees have to be identical with those of full-time employees. Part-time employment is portrayed as potential standard employment form and a lower employment rights would lead to a lower take up and contradict the policy goal of working time redistribution.

The second strongest positive effect is expected from the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm. The anticipated group of part-time employees is not the entire labour force, but parents. To reach gender equality it is expected that the majority of parents are working part-time next to their care work. The paradigm does not provide guidelines for the non-parental labour force, thus, the policies regarding job quality of part-time employees will be limited to parents. In particular, policies such as the right of parents to work part-time and benefits for fathers who are working part-time are expected. Employment rights of part-time employees are expected to be equal to full-time employees, however, it is anticipated that they are linked to parenthood and emphasize the reconciliation of fathers.

The primary carer & secondary earner paradigm will lead to limited policies designed to improve the job quality of part-time employees. In particular, policies will be adopted that support the reconciliation of mothers. However, since the primary family income is provided by the full-time working partner, the income of part-time working mothers is portrayed as secondary. The necessity to implement policies to improve the job quality of part-time employees is small, because it is only a marginal employment form and the worker is supported by their partner. Therefore, the scope of policies will be limited and targeted at mothers.


The economic flexibility paradigm has a strong negative effect on the existence of job quality policies for and employment rights of part-time employees. Part-time employment is primarily an instrument for companies to increase their numerical and temporal flexibility, therefore this workforce has to be highly flexible. The flexibility will be achieved with exemptions from the employment rights and policies aimed at deregulating part-time employment. These deregulations might potentially affect the whole labour force if they take up a highly flexible part-time employment. The strategy of the state is to adapt the labour market in order the

secure the functioning of the economic system with a strong focus on competitiveness. Low job qualities and exemptions from employment rights in non-standard employment are accepted to reach the policy goal.

3.3 Causal model

The dependent variable of the research paper are policies regulating or deregulating the job quality of part-time employees. The phenomena, which the paper seeks to explain, is the difference in scope and strength of those policies between Austria and the Netherlands. As illustrated in chapter two, ideas have independent effects in each stream in the policy-making process and thereby the four paradigms affect the policy output. Figure 1 illustrates the underlying causal model of the paper and the functions of ideas in each stream of policy-making.

Figure 1: Causal model “role of ideas in policy-making”



The causal model in combination with the operationalised four paradigms and the two dimension are functioning as the main tools of the following empirical analysis. The paradigms create different needs for action to regulate or deregulate part-time employment in Austria and the Netherlands. At different points in time, mostly when politicians had to face crucial

decisions, the arguments and reasoning of politicians will be examined. The empirical data and secondary analysis of reforms will be compared with the theoretical problems, policies and politics of each paradigm in order to extract which of the four has been the dominant idea of the reform.

4 Research Methodology

The nature of the research question puts high demands on the research methodology. By asking why the scopes and direction of policies differ between Austria and the Netherlands, the research question asks for the explanation of the causal mechanism between the paradigms and policies addressing part-time employment, as output of the policy-making process. Therefore, the research method needs to illustrate the differences in scope, but also to enable the examination of the causal process that links the independent variables with the output. In the case of policies regulating or deregulating the job quality of part-time employment, the total scope consists of the all legislative acts that address part-time employment. The accumulating nature requires from the research method to illustrate all important legislations and their evolution over time to provide a coherent picture.

The second major requirement is the provision of diagnostic evidence through which the reasons for the implementation of the legislations can be examined. The causal model specifies the functions of the four paradigms and thus the causal process of the influence of ideas on the content of policies. The theoretical impact of the four paradigms on policy-making needs to be tested with sufficient data points that are spread between two countries over time.

4.1 Process-tracing

Process-tracing is an appropriate method for the analysis of causal mechanisms (Rohlfing 2013). By systematically tracing the impact of paradigms in each of the three streams of policy-making, the study will highlight the ideational content of policies. The causal process is traced and analysed, simultaneously the genesis and scope of the dependent variable in detail illustrated. The careful reconstruction of events and perspectives can show how actors carry specific political ideas into the policy-making process (Campbell 2002, 29). At the same time process tracing focuses on the evolution of the phenomena and the temporal aspect of the causal mechanism. It is suitable fulfil the high requirements set by the research question.

4.1.1 Definition of process-tracing

Ingo Rohlfing defines process-tracing as “a method for the collection of observations in order to be able to reconstruct the process that leads to the outcome of interest” (Rohlfing 2013, 36). His definition is purposely broad to allow the examination of different kind of processes, such as anticipated and realised processes. George and Bennett which are pioneers of systematic process-tracing defined process-tracing as follows: “The process-tracing method attempts to

identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and the causal mechanism – between an independent variable (variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005, 205). Causal mechanisms are “theoretical formulation, one that adduces properties of the relations among phenomena with the potential to recur, which helps explain why x causes y” (Hall 2013, 23). A combination of both definitions is used in this study. It includes the important aspect of the causal process into Rohlfing’s definition. The intervening causal process are the causal functions of ideas on the streams of policy-making

A thorough description of the phenomenon is an essential part for both deduction and inductive research. Process-tracing describes the temporal and causal sequence of events that lead to the explanandum (Kittel and Kuehn 2013). For this study the scope of Dutch and Austrian policies designed regulate or deregulate the job quality of part-time employees need to be thoroughly described. As already illustrated an essential part of the study is the temporal aspect of the causal process, therefore, the evolution of independent variables and dependent variables need to be illustrated. That implies the evolution of policies and the change in dominance of paradigms.

An integral part of process-tracing is theory testing by comparing the empirical causal mechanism with the theoretical causal mechanisms proposed by the hypothesis. A battery of test are a popular tool of causality-testing in process-tracing. Those test examine the necessity and the sufficiency of a theoretical causal mechanism (Bennett 2010, 210; Collier 2011, 825ff.; van Evera 1997, 31f.). A ‘double-decisive test’, which consists mostly of a combination of ‘hoop’ and ‘smoking-gun’ tests, proofs that the independent variable and its causal mechanism are necessary and sufficient to explain the empirical process and outcome. It thereby eliminates all alternative explanations. However, those test are based on the assumption of exclusiveness of the hypotheses. The four paradigms as independent variables are non-exclusive, which collides with the concept of necessity and sufficiency. Ingo Rohlfing (2014) illustrates that despite non-exclusiveness the causal inference of the hypothesis can be proven. In order to prove the hypothesis of the paper, the analyses needs to demonstrate, that the theoretical causal mechanism are consistent with the outcome and the strength of each paradigm’s impact on the empirical policy (George and Bennett 2005, 207).

4.1.2 Research steps

Process-tracing identifies the most important elements in the causal chain and regularities in it from which causal inference can be drawn. This study is an analytical explanation of the cause of policies and the difference in their scope between Austria and the Netherlands. The analyses is based on explicit causal hypotheses based on the ideational theory and multiple stream theory. The examination will focus on the key steps in the causal sequence and, therefore, resting on a higher level of generality and not providing a detailed tracing.

Peter A. Hall's approach of systematic process analysis consist of four steps (2006, 27 ff.):

1. Theory formulation
2. Deriving predictions
3. Making observations
4. Drawing conclusions

Step one and two are essential steps in the preparation of the analysis in order to guarantee descriptive and causal inference. The main task in 'Theory formulation' is the formulation of a hypothesis, which is derived from a single or a set of theories and identifies the principle causal variables, causal chain and the outcome. Chapter two illustrated the theoretical foundation of the paper and in particular the four theoretical paradigms. The structure of policy-making is based Kingdon's (1995) multiple stream concept, where problem, policy and political stream are independent of each other. A topic and policy moves on the decision agenda of the government when the three streams join in a policy window.

Step two 'Deriving predictions' can be compared with the process of operationalisation in the quantitative research. That means in the concept of process-tracing the deriving of predictions of patterns which will be observable. Patterns can be a chain of theoretical events, which need to match the sequence of empirical events to proof the hypotheses. Chapter three operationalised the problems, policies, politics and outcome of policies regarding part-time employment of each paradigm. These predictions are theoretically and thus potential empirical aspects of the policy-making process.

In step three 'Making observations' the actual collection of empirical data takes place. The empirical process by which the paradigms affected the scope of job quality policies for part-time employees has to match to the proposed processes. Key observations are the events that constitute the outcome, such as, the key policies affecting part-time employment, but also the actions of governmental politicians, their statements about their reasons implementing and non-implementing policies. Secondary observations, such as reforms in other policy fields or societal and economic developments provide important narrative in order to interpret the primary observations.

In step four 'Drawing the conclusion' the observed process is compared with the proposed processes. By comparing the "congruence between the predictions of each theory and the observations" (Hall 2006, 28) the validity of the theories are determined. The hypotheses needs to demonstrate that it explains the process and the outcome. The plausibility of the theory also depends on the support from other studies, as well as on the quality of deductions, which are determined in the first two steps.

4.1.3 Data

The observations which are the basis of step three and four need to be good snapshots at a series of specific moments. For this study the descriptive components need to be the key legislative acts which constitutes the Dutch and Austrian policies regulating the job quality of part-time employees. To analyse the effect of the main hypotheses for each legislative act governmental statements and secondary analysis that illustrate the beliefs and ideas are needed. Based on the Bayesian logic, the more unique and unexpected new evidence is, the greater is their corroborative power (George and Bennett 2005, 219). In general, process-tracing can work with a range of data, for instances official documents, biographies, secondary sources or interviews. Any data which sheds light on the politics of policy-making and allows to examine the evolution of the dependent and independent variable can be used for process-tracing. In the case of ideational hypotheses any document that contains evidence about reasons and motivations of implementing a policy are valid data points. “[...] when the decisions or actions of key participants are crucial to the outcome, by comparing statements and actions of those participants, the process analyst can often establish the relative influence various factors had over them with more precision than can be secured by statistical analysis” (Hall 2006, 29). Because this study analyses the evolution of job quality policies in two countries over a long period of time it cannot analyse micro-level sources such as interviews with politicians or protocols of governmental meetings, but relies on secondary sources. Commentaries made by experts are functioning as secondary sources, which reflect on the discourse and thereby on the normative and rational arguments made. The political ideas of the government can be analysed by how they are justified their support of and non-interested in certain policies and topics. In particular change of terminologies are important indicators of ideational change and the strength of certain ideas. The criticism of other political parties or political actors also reflect the position of the government and function as indicators of governmental ideas.

The study focuses on the explanation of the origin of policies and also the difference in scope. The actual job quality of part-time employees in both countries as outcome of the policies needs to be the subject of a further study. The impact of the policies and also the effect of others factors need be considered in a thorough study of the actual job quality. Due to practical limitations this thesis cannot provide a thorough study and therefore does not analyse the actual job quality of Austrian and Dutch part-time employees.

5 Analysis of the ideational effect on part-time employment legislation

The empirical analyse will cover the output of the policy-making system in both countries from the early 1980s until the economic crisis in the second half of the 2000s. The anticipated impacts of the four paradigms on part-time employment policies will be examined for each country and in a following step compared. The cross-country comparison will explain the difference in scope and orientation and test the causal model and ideational theory. Since both countries approach part-time employment differently, their policies regarding part-time employment, and thus the data points of the study, occur at different points of time and are distributed differently in the observation period.

5.1 The Netherlands

In general, the Dutch labour market can be classified as a transitional labour market, which uses part-time employment as important employment form over the life-cycle (Knijn and Smit 2009). It is a popular employment form that is dominantly used by women and to reconcile work and care. The popularity of part-time employment increased with women entering the labour market. However, governmental policies shaped the uptake of part-time employment and also its relation to full-time employment.

5.1.1 First attempts

The first policies affecting part-time employees were introduced in the late 70s by a centre-right coalition. Part-time employment was promoted as job-rotating system to tackle youth unemployment. Resembling the cause-effect relationship of the work-sharing paradigm, the failure of the market to supply jobs for young people was defined as the main problem and work-sharing as suitable policy (Visser 2002, 29). The state introduced two specific schemes to encourage employers and employees to use part-time employment. Companies received subsidies if they split a full-time position into two part-time positions. Secondly, employees could qualify for temporal wage supplement if they agreed to reduce their individual working hours, and thereby support the creation of a second part-time job. The use of part-time employment as job creation instruments and encouragement schemes are essential aspects of the work-sharing paradigm. However, the political support for the policy came from a non-anticipated actor. The conservative government is seen as opponent of the work-sharing paradigm, however in this instance, they introduced policies to promote work-sharing. Further, the policies were focused on youth unemployment, and thereby on a defined target group. The policies were not designed to reform the labour market and to use work-sharing through part-time employment as universal tool. The policies can be classified as responding, with intervening aspects. The programme was stopped by the centre-right government in 1982 due to lack of success. Additionally, the government stopped earlier experiments with part-time

employment. The short-run of the policy resembles the expected position of conservative governments.

5.1.2 Wassenaar Agreement 1982

A big step for the acceptance of part-time employment in the Netherlands was the Wassenaar Agreement in 1982. It is seen as an important starting point for a new form of economic policy in the Netherlands. However, it was not a universally binding governmental policy, but instead an agreement between Dutch employer organisations and trade unions. The output of the agreement were recommendations for consecutive collective agreements. It further became a template for later employment policies in the Netherlands, and thereby heavily influenced the governments' attitude on and policies for part-time employment. The structure of the Dutch industrial relations is one of the pronounced in Europe, and in the field labour market policies, the two social partners have strong influence on the content of policies (Visser and Yerkes 2008, 226). The agreement is also seen as revival of consensus collective bargaining and of a coordinative discourse on labour market policies (Schmidt 2002, 180). The agreement was not a governmental policy, and therefore not directly part of the dependent variable of the study. Due to its importance as general settlement about the strategy of employment policy between the social partners, it has to be analysed on its ideational content.

Problem

The main concern of the agreement was the rising unemployment in the Netherlands, and therefore the failure of the market to provide enough jobs for the labour market (Plantenga 2002, 56). This resembles strongly the problem of the work-sharing strategy. The agreement was also strongly employment-centred in its problem definition

Political

The two dominant political actors of the agreement were the social partners in cooperation with the bipartite labour foundation. The government was not part of the negotiations, but it threatened to intervene in wage moderation if the social partners did not agree (Mätzke 1999, 18). The threat had, in particular, an effect on the employer organisation. The agreement is seen as important revival of collective bargaining in the Netherlands and manifested a change in strategy of the social partners. It also had an effect on the governmental position, which thereafter implement activating labour market policies and discussed the need to reform the welfare state (Trampusch 2000, 320). After the agreement the strategies of the government and of the social partners changed noticeably, which illustrates the importance of the agreement for the genesis of Dutch employment and economic policies. Concerning the ideational content, employer organisation advocated the use of part-time employment, whereas trade unions opposed individual reductions and argued for collective working time reductions. Employer organisation strongly opposed further collective working time reductions

and alternatively proposed part-time employment. The position of the trade union resembled the interests of the traditional full-time male workforce. Their core members were strongly interested in job preservation through collective working time reduction. Both positions are not conclusively resembling the anticipated behaviour of political actors in the four paradigms. It is quite obvious that the family policy paradigms were not present, but the positions of the social partners do not resemble the expected positions of the work-sharing and economic flexibility paradigms. Trade unions rejected part-time employment in general, and employer organisations resembled partially the work-sharing paradigm. During the negotiations the Dutch government consisted of a centre-left and subsequently of a centre-right government. This would partially fit to the work-sharing paradigm, however, the government was not an active actor in the negotiations.

Policy

The core of the agreement was a compromise that included the acceptance of wage restraints by the trade unions and the revocation of employers' veto on working-time reduction. The agreement was a response to the economic recession and was targeted as preventing further rise in unemployment. The objective of the agreement was to structurally improve employment through better distribution of existing employment. The agreement listed a range of instruments for the redistribution of employment, such as early retirement, but also part-time employment. The creation of jobs through redistribution of existing employment and part-time employment is the core of the work-sharing paradigm. In general, the agreement prioritised employment over income growth, which was in particular manifested through trade union's acceptance of wage restraints. However, the commitment of trade unions to accept wage restraints was concrete, whereas the commitment of employer organisation remained vague (Bruff 2010, 628). The defined problems, goals and instruments of the agreement are coherent with the policies of the work-sharing paradigm. However, the social partners did not decide upon the main instrument for distribution of work. As illustrated, trade unions favoured collective working time reduction and opposed part-time employment as individual strategy of working-time reduction. In contrast, employer organisation promoted part-time employment and maintained this position before and after the agreement. From the employers' perspective, part-time employment was also portrayed as flexibility strategy, which complied with their demands for flexibility and de-standardisation of employment (Mätzke 1999, 24; Plantenga 2002, 56). The rejection of part-time employment by trade unions can be explained by their opposition to de-standardisation of employment. Employers' demands illustrated the presence of economic flexibility paradigm. Part-time employment is on one side illustrated as work-sharing strategy, but also as means to fulfil the flexibility demands of companies. These demands for flexible workforce have been based on the transformation towards a service economy and the divergence of working and business hours.

In sum, the ideational content of the policy aspect of the agreement was unambiguously based on the labour market policy. The work-sharing paradigm was strongly present through the goal of redistribution existing employment and the definition of unemployment as core problem of the current economic recession. However, aspects of the economic flexibility paradigm influenced the agreement, in particular, the position of employer organisations. Both paradigms were present and influential, and since the employer organisations supported part-time employment in the agreement, the promotion of work-sharing cannot be separated from their demands for a flexible workforce. The agreement was seen as an important template for subsequent Dutch economic and labour policies, and thereby introduces both paradigms in governmental policies.

5.1.3 Amendments to the Pension and Savings Act 1990 & to the Minimum Wage and Minimum Holiday Act 1993

The first legislative act, which tackled the unequal treatment of employees based on working hours was the amendment to the Pension and Savings Act (Pensioen en Sparfonds Wet) in 1990. The core of the Dutch pensions system consists of two independent pillars⁵. The first pillar is a mandatory universal state old-age pension (Algemene Ouderdoms Wet), which provides a basic pension for all inhabitants of the Netherlands. Benefit levels are linked to the duration of one's residency. The second occupational pillar (Pensioen en Sparfonds Wet) is organised at the sectoral level and its design and content are negotiated by the social partners. The government provides only the institutional framework through the Pension and Savings Act and does not prescribe the structure of these occupational pension schemes. The benefits from these schemes make up a crucial part of workers' pensions. With its amendment in 1990 the government intervened in the functioning of existing pension schemes and made it illegal to apply an hour threshold for admittance in occupational pension schemes. Each employee, independent of his or her number of working hours, is entitled to contribute to the respective pension scheme and thereby to pension benefits. The benefits are based on an insurance system and calculated proportionally to the paid contributions. If income thresholds are applied, the pay of a part-time employee had to be converted to full-time level (Visser et al. 2004, 209). The amendment was the first manifestation of a general policy to remove hour thresholds in labour law and social security systems.

The second reform designed to improve the equal treatment of part-time and full-time employees came into force in 1993. The amendment to the Minimum Wage and Minimum Holiday Act of 1968 removed the hour threshold for the entitlement to minimum wage and holidays. The initial act excluded workers with less than one-third of the standard working hours. The standard working week in the early 90s consisted of 38 hours per week, which led

⁵ see SZW (2011) for an overview of the Dutch pension system

to the exclusion of employees with less than twelve hours per week. These workers are particularly in danger of precarious working conditions, due to their low income and nature of employment. The amendment of 1993 removed a crucial legislative discrimination based on working hours. Part-time employees with a low number of working hours were included in the minimum wage scheme, however since the amount of minimum wage are based on working hours the guaranteed wage is still quite low. The act also included the removal of the one-third criterion in minimum holiday entitlements. From 1993 onwards, each employee between 15 and 64 years is entitled to 20 working days of holiday each year. A part-time employee is entitled to the same amount of holidays in proportion to her or his number of working hours. For instances, if an employee works 50% of the standard working week and she or he is entitled to 20 half-days off (Visser et al. 2004, 209).

Problem

Both amendments were designed to remove specific aspects in labour law or in social security, which caused unequal treatment of employees based on working hours. The goal of both amendments was the improvement of treatment of part-time employees and to equalise their position in relation to full-time workers. The unequal treatment of part-time and full-time employees in labour law and social security regulations was the defined problem. An important change that might triggered the second amendment was the change in government's composition in 1989. Between 1989 and 1994 the Dutch government consisted of a centre-left coalition with participation of the social democratic party. The regulation of working-time and of working conditions in the Netherlands is primarily done in collective agreements. Traditionally the government follows a passive role. However, with the two amendments the government took an active role in setting the agenda and pushing normalisation of part-time employment.

A second factor that contributed to the implementation of the two amendments was the economic situation in the early 90s. The Netherlands was hit by a mini-recession that caused a decline in job growth, and thus problems on the labour market and in the national economic performance (Visser et al. 2004, 197). At the same time the government published a report on job growth in the 80s and came to the conclusion that most of new jobs were created by redistribution through part-time employment. Part-time employment was portrayed as the job motor of the economy in the 80s (CPB 1991). This clearly illustrates, that the argumentation behind the two amendments had a strong labour market foundation. Work-sharing was found to be effective in the 80s and thus a legitimate policy response to the labour market problems in 90s. The government followed with the two amendments the recipe of the 80s and increased the attractiveness of part-time employment to increase its work-sharing capability.

Political

Ruud Lubbers was the Dutch Prime Minister during the two amendments. From 1989 till 1994 his cabinet consisted of a centre-left coalition with the social democrats. His key objective was the reduction of public expenditure and the scaling down of the welfare state. For instances, in his previous term, the government implemented a freeze on social security benefits in 1983. Subsequent governmental policies changed the calculation of benefits, lowered the replacement rate from 80 percent to 70, and halted the indexation of minimum wage (Levy 1999, 260; Visser 2000, 31). In sum, during his time as prime minister, public expenditures and in particular welfare expenditures, were reduced and strong incentives to increase the employment rate were implemented (van Klaveren and Tjidsens 2015). The social democratic party as coalition partner from 1989 onwards pushed for the restoration of several benefits, for instance, the indexation of the minimum wage. The government agreed upon the reactivation of indexation, but with conditional linkage to the level of labour force participation. Thereby, the centre-left government introduced a strong incentive to focus its work on increasing the labour force participation. The government followed several strategies in the labour market policy field. Firstly, to increase the necessity to take up employment, by decreasing welfare benefits and by reducing the cost of employment. This approach contained aspects of the economic flexibility paradigm, by focusing on companies' performance and the reduction of employment costs. Secondly, it followed a part-time employment strategy, which was successful in the 80s. The government's interest in promoting part-time employment can be illustrated through its request of advice from the Labour Foundation regarding working conditions of part-time employees⁶. Its letter emphasised the beneficial effects of part-time employment and pushed the bipartite Labour Foundation to position itself and its member organisations regarding part-time employment.

The trade unions had a short second campaign for the collective reduction of working time to tackle the economic crisis in 1993 (Visser et al. 2004, 1997). However, they abandoned their initial rejection of part-time employment. In the 80s and 90s trade unions suffered from a membership crisis and were forced to open up to new members outside standard employment. In combination with the increasing pressure from the women's lobby inside the trade unions, they changed their position on part-time employment. Their new strategy was to put pressure on the government to increase the job quality of part-time employees and to create equal treatment independent of working hours. The employer organisations as second partner of the labour foundation favoured part-time employment as work-sharing and flexibility strategy already in the 80s. This explains the strong pressure from the Labour Foundation to reform the minimum wage and minimum holiday act (Mätzke 1999, 25). To conclude, both labour market

⁶ see Stichting van de Arbeit (1993)

paradigms were influential in the political stream of the two amendments. Both were implemented under a centre-left coalition and with support of the social partners. The assumed political actors of the work-sharing paradigm dominated.

Policy

Since part-time employment has been portrayed by the government as the job motor of the 80s, the two amendments were strongly influenced by the work-sharing paradigm. Part-time employment was seen as a labour market instrument that was successful in the last decade and thereby was an appropriate instrument to tackle the recession in the early 90s. The government improved the working conditions of part-time employees with the two amendments by including the most precarious part-time employment forms into the minimum wage, minimum holidays and also into the occupational pension scheme. Despite government's key objective to reduce welfare costs, two amendments were implemented that included an additional group of workers in several social security schemes. In general, the Dutch welfare system underwent great changes in the 80s and 90s. Its main purpose was to transform it from a safety net to a stepping stone into employment (Valkenburg and Coenen 2000, 554). The main goal of Lubber's welfare reforms was to increase the incentives of taking up employment. By abolishing labour regulations that contributed to the construction of part-time employment as atypical employment form, the government increased the attractiveness of part-time employment. Part-time employment was portrayed as an important employment form, in particular for its labour market effects, but also for its employer-based flexibility. In its request to the Labour Foundation the government pointed out the necessity for a collective agreement in order to increase the equal opportunities between men and women (Stichting van de Arbeit 1993, 5). This illustrates the introduction of gender equality considerations into the discourse, but the main goal of increasing labour market participation through part-time employment remained dominant. Part-time employment in the 80s and 90s was strongly used by women and less by men. Equal treatment of part-time and full-time employees aimed at activating potential labour force and less at reducing the gender inequality in care and work. The work-sharing paradigm was the dominant ideational source for the two amendments in the policy stream.

In sum, the two amendments were important steps in the genesis of Dutch policies regarding part-time employment. In particular the inclusion into the minimum wage system was a strong incentive to take up part-time employment. "While the more dispersed occupational distribution of part-time jobs in the Netherlands has contributed to this superior situation, it is the minimum wage system which is the main reason why average part-time wages are similar to those for full-timers" (Fagan, O'Reilly, and Rubery 2000, 180).

The dominant paradigm in the two amendments was the work-sharing paradigm. The inclusion of part-time employees with a low number of working hours into multiple social security schemes, despite general welfare state retrenchment policies, illustrates government's trust in part-time employment as job motor. Both policies share the defined problem of the work-sharing paradigm. It was based on the assumption that during an economic recession the market failed to provide enough jobs and new jobs could be created through part-time-based work-sharing. The political supporter of the amendments further complied with the hypotheses of the work-sharing paradigm. The reforms were implemented after the social democratic party became part government, and also after the trade union changed their position on part-time employment. However, the government also actively pushed the topic on social partners' agenda through their request of advice from the Labour foundation. The conservative party of Lubbers and the employer organisations supported the use of part-time employment as labour market instrument, which illustrates the economic flexibility connotation of the reform. Part-time employment was seen as an instrument to create jobs, but also to support the economic performance. However, the government acted intervening and increased the job quality of part-time employees. It did not support the creation of a secondary workforce. Instead part-time employment became further regulated and "normalised". Formerly excluded parts of the workforce were included in universal social security schemes and labour law. The expected output of the work-sharing paradigm was confirmed by the two amendments. Further, the primary carer and secondary earner paradigm found entry in the discourse on part-time employment. Due to the female nature of part-time employment in the 80s and 90s, it was seen as an instrument to increase women's participation on the labour market. However, the focus rested on the labour market participation and not on provision of care. Both amendments were primarily labour market policies and not family policies. Influential regulations that prevented people to take up part-time employment were abolished by the amendments. The amendments were not specifically targeted at women, instead the policies were general valid.

5.1.4 Act on Non-discrimination on Grounds of Working Time 1996

The implementation of the Act on Non-discrimination on Grounds of Working Time (Wet verbod op onderscheid naar arbeidsduur) in 1996 was the first far-reaching legislation on equal treatment of part-time and full-time employees in the Netherlands. In contrast to the two previous amendments, the act did not abolish specific hour thresholds instead it prohibited any discrimination against part-time employment in working conditions (Cuesta and Martín 2009, 232f.). The act led to the inclusion of Art. 7:648 to the Dutch Civil Code. Part-time employment was decreed to be equivalent to full-time employment. For instances, part-time workers need to be equally treated in wages, access to promotion and training opportunities (Plantenga, Schippers, and Siegers 1999, 108). The equal treatment in continuation and termination of an employment contract was the crucial aspect of the act. Exemptions are permitted if an objective

justification for different treatment existed. The act followed the Equal Treatment Act (Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandling) of 1994, which explicitly prohibited discrimination on grounds of gender, marital status, race, nationality, religion, belief, political opinion and sexual orientation (Havinga 2002, 76). The Act also installed the Equal Treatment Commission, which monitors the compliance with the non-discrimination legislation and provides advice on specific cases. With the Act on Non-discrimination on Grounds of Working Time, the commission was authorised to monitor its implementation and to examine whether any discrimination has taken place. Part-time employment was decreed to be equal to full-time employment independent of being employed in the private or public sector⁷.

Problem

The act on equal treatment was a strong signal by the government. By lifting part-time employment to the same legal level than full-time employment, part-time employees were empowered and part-time work was advocated as typical form of employment. In order to understand the underlying problem definition of the article, it has to be analysed together with the Working Hours Act (Arbeidstijdenwet) of 1996⁸. The act replaced the working time law from 1919 and introduced a system of dual-norms. The standard-norm provided legal standards of working hours' regulation. The second consultative-norm transferred the process of defining the actual content of working time regulation to the social partners. The act is a prime example of Dutch policy strategy at that time. It set binding standards and diminished the negative working conditions of non-standard employment. At the same time it allowed flexibility based on collective agreements (Flecker, Herman, and Mairhuber 2001, 138). The act on non-discrimination also needs to be considered through the government's strategy to diversify the labour force and its forms of employment. Part-time employment was pushed as a regular form of employment and set on the same level as full-time employment. Despite being generally in line with the work-sharing paradigm, the underlying problem of the act was not the decline in job growth, but companies' and also employees' need for flexibility, thus the economic flexibility paradigm. The Working Time Act included employer's obligation to consider the care duties of their employees, when setting their work schedule (Visser 2000, 29). It also gave social partners the power to decide upon working time regimes in order to fulfil the flexibility needs of companies and employees. In contrast to expected policy of the economic flexibility paradigm, the anti-discrimination act did not support the creation of a secondary workforce. In contrast, it included a previously atypical form of employment into the universal labour law. Greater flexibility was created by allowing collective agreements to bargain in a well-defined playing

⁷ Anti-discrimination on grounds of working-time in the public sector was implemented by Article 125g of the Central and Local Government Personnel Act.

⁸ for more information: SZW (2010)

field. The problem definition is a mixture of equal labour rights for part-time and full-time employees and of economy's need for a flexible workforce.

Political

The general elections in 1994 lead to the formulation of a "purple" coalition, consisting of the labour party as largest party and two liberal parties. Wim Kok, the former Deputy Prime Minister, became the head of the new coalition. In 1995, the Dutch government adopted a new approach to labour market flexibility and proposed a balance between flexibility and social security in its memorandum "Flexibility and Security" (Bekker et al. 2008, 72). The paper contained proposals for enhancing temporal employment by deregulating temporal work agencies on one side, and as well as improving the legal position of temporal workers on the other side. The memorandum reflected the previously described dual approach of the government. It argued in favour of improving the working conditions of atypical employment in combination with increasing the flexibility of typical employment. Parts of the proposal were implemented in the 1999 Flexibility and Security Act, but it did not severely cut the rights of standard employment. The anti-discrimination act of 1996 followed the ideas of the memorandum, by guaranteeing equal treatment and thus improving the working conditions of non-standard employment.

The government directly intervened in the responsibilities of the social partners with the anti-discrimination and working time acts (Plantenga, Schippers, and Siegers 1999, 108). This illustrates government's support of equal treatment and its support for of universal coverage. Collective agreements might produce better working conditions than legal standards, however they cannot guarantee a standard for all employment forms and sectors. As illustrated, social partners were granted freedom to agree upon regulations that exceed the standard, and thus to reach negotiated flexibility. Trade unions and employer organisation also agreed upon a 'New Course' central agreement in 1993 that corresponded to the governmental strategy (Visser et al. 2004, 201). Greater differentiation between employees or firms and more decentralised decision making was agreed upon in order to increase the labour market participation, of women and older male workers in particular. Any exclusion of part-time employees from collective agreements became unlawful with the anti-discrimination act. The social partners followed the government's strategy and they agreed in most collective agreements to remove or reconsider thresholds in overtime payment, which was not covered by the act (Visser 2002, 33f.).

The political dimension of the anti-discrimination act reflected the assumptions of the work-sharing and dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm. Left parties supported by trade unions are expected to implement policies, which grant further rights to part-time workers. The position of the trade unions federation were strongly formed by the internal women's lobby (Flecker,

Herman, and Mairhuber 2001, 140f.). However, deviating from the work-sharing paradigm, employer organisations and liberal parties supported the act, which illustrates the negotiated flexibility aspect of the working-time act and thus the economic flexibility paradigm.

Policy

In contrast to the multiple influence of several paradigms in the problem definition and political stream, the policy content of the anti-discrimination act was unambiguous. The equalisation of part-time and full-time employment and the implementation of universal binding standards were clearly derived from the work-sharing paradigm. The anti-discrimination legislation did not consider the family sphere and also did not target specifically parents, which would have been the case if the dual-earner / dual-carer dimension was dominant. The economic flexibility paradigm could not have been influential, because instead of deregulating part-time employment, it increased the regulation and lifted part-time employment to the same legal level than full-time employment. The influence of the work-sharing paradigm is also reflected by the absence of a sole point of reference for standard employment in working-time regulation. Full-time was not considered as the sole standard employment (Burri 2005, 61). The definition of standard employment in the Netherlands was diversified through the two acts. Part-time employment was regarded as a standard employment form, and thus corresponds to the government's strategy of increasing the labour market participation through diversification of employment. The negotiated flexibility strategy of the government combined work-sharing policies with ideational aspects of the economic flexibility paradigm. The policy goal has been balancing the flexibility needs of both employers and employees.

The anti-discrimination act was a forerunner policy on working-time regulation among European countries. Interviews with several key policy-makers in EU and Dutch institutions highlighted that the EU Directive on part-time employment was largely based on the Dutch Act on anti-discrimination of part-time employees of 1996 (Martín 2008, 27). The Dutch legislation on equal treatment of part-time workers was ahead of the European policy discourse and already fulfilled or even exceeded subsequent EU directives and suggestions.

In sum, the ideational content of anti-discrimination act was based on the work-sharing paradigm. However, in particular the problem definition was based on a mixture of the inequality between part-time and full-time employees and the flexibility needs of companies and employees. Due to its focus of increasing the rights of part-time workers, it was unambiguous derived from the work-sharing paradigm. Increasing the labour market participation through part-time employment remained the main goal of government's policies- However, the act was not an answer to economic recession, but an instrument to activate additional groups of the potential labour force. The anti-discrimination act became an important legislation in improving the working conditions of part-time employees. In the first two years

following the introduction of the law, the Equal Treatment Commission examined twenty-five cases on grounds of working-time. The majority of the cases were lodged by employees, but employers and work councils also requested advice from the Commission. In general, the Commission considered that purely financial reasons are not acceptable for the different treatment of part-time and full-time employees (Visser et al. 2004, 214). Thus the Commission followed the normalisation of part-time employment argument. It also promoted the regulation of salary payments on a pro rata basis, thus streamlining condition of employment with the functioning of the majority of Dutch social security schemes. The Commission does not possess any legal binding powers and only provides advice. Legal proceedings based on the Act of non-discrimination on grounds of working-time have been rare. Until 2004 only two cases of potential discrimination were tested in court (Visser et al. 2004, 211f.). The number of cases for the commission also declined after the first two years. It seems that the implementation of and compliance with the act went well. The output of the anti-discrimination act was a strong instrument to improve the job quality of part-time employees. The government chose to implement legal rights and not to request social partners to consider anti-discrimination on grounds of working time in their collective agreements. This was a clear signal of normalisation of part-time employment, which has been strongly influenced by the work-sharing paradigm and the idea of balancing flexibility needs.

5.1.5 Adjustment of Working Hours Act 2000

The Adjustment of Working Hours Act (Wet aanpassing arbeidsduur) of 2000 followed the approach of the 1996 act on anti-discrimination, by granting universal rights to all employees. Since July 2000, employees in the private and public sector have the right to change unilaterally their number of working hours. This contradicts in some ways the tradition legal understanding of employment contracts, through which an employee and an employer agrees bilaterally on the conditions of employment. The act gave employees the right to alter the contractual defined number of working hours. Thus, the working time of autonomy of Dutch workers in general was strongly improved. Alteration of one's working hours implies to change from full-time to part-time, but also vice versa from part-time to full-time. Employers can only reject the changes if they can present serious compelling business reasons (Visser 2002, 32). The act, however, does not cover work scheduling or the choice of location. In these aspects employees can articulate their preferences, but the employer does not need to agree. All employees have the right to adapt the amount of working hours, regardless of gender, parental and marital status or number of working hours, however, employees at companies with less than 10 employees are excluded. The government advises small companies to agree collectively on company-level regulations of working-time reduction that are in accordance with the act (Visser et al. 2004, 206). The Adjustment of Working Hours law regulates in detail the

procedure of its application and the terms of entitlement. It also emphasises specific norms, such as fairness of division of hours, good employership and good employeeship.

Problem

The goals of the act were clearly stated in the accompanied explanatory policy document (Visser et al. 2004, 206). First of all, to increase the supply of labour, by encouraging more people to work part-time and also to encourage people outside of the labour market to take up employment that meets their time demands. Secondly, to improve the reconciliation of paid work and unpaid obligations, such as care. The shortage of care facilities and the high percentage of female part-time employees led to governmental support of part-time employment as a reconciliation instrument (Martín 2008, 37). The second aspect, in particular, is aimed at increasing the economic independence of people with care obligations, and thereby primary women. However, men also gained great support in their wish to decrease their working hours and in their role as active carer. Men received legal justification for their wish to reduce working hours, which functions as great support in negotiations between them and their employer. By providing this support, it was intended that a female partner would be liberated from the involuntary share of care obligations that they had to take up, due to employers' resentments to agree to their male employee's wish to reduced working hours. The underlying problem of the act was on one side the gender inequality on the labour market and in care obligation. On the other side, labour market concerns were influential and the act supported the diversification of employment forms, thus the supply of jobs.

Political

In 1997, the purple coalition had already published a policy document, in which it emphasised that employment has to provide living wages and secondly to enable workers to reconcile employment with care and other unpaid work. The memorandum also contained the political target of increasing the general labour market participation and the equal distribution of paid and unpaid work between men and women (Plantenga, Schippers, and Siegers 1999, 100). This illustrates the governmental position to link policies designed to create jobs, with policies on increasing gender equality inside and outside the labour market. Part-time employment was used as an instrument to achieve both collectively.

The first attempts to adopt a law on working time autonomy were already done in 1993 by the Green Left party in the Dutch parliament. They proposed to add a clause to labour law by which all employer would have been obliged to comply with employees' request to reduce their working hours up to 50%. Every employee who had worked at the company for at least one year would had access to the right. The proposal was discussed in the Dutch parliament until 1996, when the lower house agreed upon an adapted version. It would have allowed for a change in working hours up to 20%. However, the proposal was rejected in the upper house.

In particular, the Christian Democratic senators voted against the proposal due to practical and party-political reasons (Plantenga 2002, 57f.). The social partners also did not follow the proposal of the Green Left and instead emphasized that working hours regulations should be part of collective agreements. In 1992, the Centre-left government requested from the social partners a recommendation regarding the concept of a right to part-time employment. The Labour Foundation advised to refrain from such rights and emphasized the importance of regulating these aspects in collective agreements (Stichting van de Arbeid 1993). In 1993, the social partners agreed in a memorandum to include the clause in collective agreements that employers need in principle to comply with the request to reduce working hours, except it violates company interests (Visser 2002, 32). In the following years the majority of collective agreements integrated the qualified right to working time changes. During the 1990s the percentage of companies that offered the employees the right increased up to 70%. However, collective agreements do not reach all employees and also do not grant all employees the same terms and conditions in contrast to labour law.

The successful Adjustment of Working Hours Act of 2000 was proposed by the Green Left in cooperation with the social democratic party and the liberal party, and thereby with the majority of the government. A proposal of the conservative Christian Democratic party followed shortly after and suggested changes in labour law to ease the reconciliation of work and care (Visser et al. 2004, 203). This illustrates, that the majority of parties in the Dutch parliament supported the strategy of adapting employment to the working time needs of carer, however, not all parties agreed to the far-reaching approach of granting rights. The coalition was re-elected in 1998 and subsequently advanced with their strategy of encouraging part-time employment and to diversify working time patterns on the labour market. The proposal was passed by both chambers and was adopted in 2000. It was presented as part of the 2001 Work and Care Act and acknowledged the difficulties of reconciling paid work and care. The political negotiations that lasted nearly one decade, illustrates the difficulties and significance of the act. It was proposed by the opposition and at first failed due to the rejection of the conservative party. It needed a policy collation between governmental and oppositional parties in order to enable the adoption of the act. The change in government in 1994 and the re-election of the government in 1998 altered the political sphere and made the adoption possible. The composition of the winning coalition reflects the assumed political supporters of the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm. The link to the forthcoming Work and Care Act and the government's labour market strategy illustrate the mixture of the dual-earner / dual-carer and the work-sharing paradigm. In contrast to previous reforms, family policy concerns were dominant and gender equality was the main goal of the act.

Policy

The increasing rate of female part-time employees and the low number of men working part-time, despite existing preferences to decrease their working-time, were the main pressure that led to the adoption of the act. It was therefore not only designed for women, but for both genders. Its main aim was to decrease gender inequality at work and in unpaid care. By granting an individual right for all employees, independent of their gender, parental and marital status, the act was based on the assumption that more freedom and working time autonomy will lead to a better balanced distribution of paid and unpaid work between men and women (Martín 2008, 39). This was clearly rested on the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm, and also on the assumption that men and women are interested in gender equality and to balance parental roles. This approach is unambiguous intervening, because the expected problem that led to gender imbalance was the structure of the labour market and the working time restrictions. The government aimed at changing the functioning of the labour market, by granting rights to employees and by enhancing the diversification of working time forms. The policy is primarily a labour market policy, despite its strong focus on gender inequality. Dual-earner / dual-carer assumed policies, such as subsidies for equal sharing of work and care by parents, were not granted and the right to change one's working hours was not limited to parents. Part-time employment was equalised to full-time employment. The act went even further and abolished the concept of a single standard form of employment. Workers are free to decide on their desired amount of working hours and do not need to present relevant reasons for it. The obligation to prove rests on the employer. They can only reject working time changes if serious business reasons exist. Since any discrimination on grounds of working time were forbidden in 1996, change in working time should not lead to any unproportional change in income and in working conditions. The policy instruments of the act are identical to the assumed policies of the work-sharing paradigm with a strong orientation on gender equality. The government predicted that the diversified pattern of employment emerging from the right will fit well with the flexibility demands of companies (Visser et al. 2004, 205). However, the act does not directly support employer oriented flexibility, but improved employee based flexibility with the acknowledgment of reconciling paid work and care.

In sum, the policies of the 90s gradually increased the working conditions of part-time employment. The 1996 Anti-discrimination on Grounds of Working Time Act raised part-time employment to the same legal level than full-time employment. The 2000 act on Adjustment of Working Hours deconstructed standard employment. Workers have the right to change their amount of working hours that were defined by their employment contract. The focus of the act was clearly employee-oriented flexibility. A study on the growth of part-time employment concluded that the popularity of part-time work among women in the Netherlands resulted in a de-standardisation and individualisation of working hours (Plantenga 2002). However, despite

it work-sharing effect, the act is a political reaction on the high number of part-time working women and the lack of care facilities. The act was designed to enhance the match between working time regimes and the labour market behaviour of carers, mainly women (van Wel and Knijn 2006; Visser 2002). If the primary care & secondary earner paradigm would have been influential, the act would have been purely targeted at the needs of mothers. However, the act granted the right to all employees. The act also manifested the introduction of policies based on the combination scenario. Its main goal was to engage both men and women in paid and unpaid work (Lewis et al. 2008, 273). The right to part-time work has no conditional clause, and thereby improved the job quality of all part-time workers.

It covered not only the right to part-time work, but also the right to increase the number of working hours. If a part-time employee experiences different treatment, despite the anti-discrimination act, he or she can switch to full-time employment. The Adjustment of Working Hours Act was heavily influenced by the dual-earner / dual-carer and the work-sharing paradigm. As illustrated, the government followed their strategy to combine policies on increasing the labour market participation with policies tackling the gender inequality. However, the specific policy restriction of the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm, that policies will be limited to parents, was not applied. Hence, the work-sharing paradigm was the dominant paradigm in the policy sphere and the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm was most influential in the problem definition and in the political sphere. The output is a work-sharing policy with a strong gender equality focus.

5.1.6 Work and Care Act 2001

The Adjustment of Working Hours act was presented as part of the Work and Care Act (Wet Arbeid en Zorg) of 2001. The main focus of the Work and Care Act was the reconciliation of these two spheres. The lack of child care facilities has been a prominent problem in the Netherlands since the beginning of female participation on the labour market. Concerning the financing of child care facilities, the Netherlands implemented a system of co-financing by employers, parents and state subsidies. The scarcity of child care facilities made part-time employment a popular option to combine paid and unpaid care. Informal care by parents prevailed in the Netherlands and was supported by the government. This led to short part-time working hours of women and negative effects on job quality of part-time employment (Lewis et al. 2008, 273). One of the governmental policy aims since 1993 was the dismantlement of negative effects. The Work and Care Act was designed to encourage equal share of care obligations between parents and in general one of the most important family policy reforms in the Netherlands. The act modified the parental leave legislations of the 90s, added new leave schemes and in general conflated the existing schemes (Misra and Jude 2008, 126). It also regulated the organisation and entitlement to temporary full-time and part-time leave due to pregnancy and young parenthood (Burri 2005, 59). It granted mothers state-

paid maternity leave for 16 weeks and fathers two days full-paid paternity leave. Additional emergency leaves, short-term carer's leave and the option of career break leave were also implemented.

The initial parental leave legislation of 1991 implemented the right to unpaid part-time leave up to six months. However, employees with less than twenty weekly working hours were excluded from it. Since parental leave in the Netherlands is unpaid and has to be taken part-time, to include already part-time working parents was not considered to be necessary. The Work and Care Act extended unpaid parental leave to all employees, independent of their working hours (Visser et al. 2004, 208). In particular women were working in small part-time jobs due to the scarcity of child care facilities. Therefore, the exclusion affected primarily mothers with caring obligations. From 2001 onwards, they are entitled to the reduction up to 50% of their working time for parental leave.

The right to parental leave was also individualised. Each parent has equal leave rights, as long as they were employed at the one employer for at least year (Knijn 2008, 162). Several temporary contracts at the same employer are considered in their total duration, in order to include temporary worker. In general, the act implemented a less strict interpretation of existing leave schemes. Along with the inclusion of part-time employees, the act allowed to take parental leave in up to three parts until the child reaches her or his eight birthday.

Problem

The defined problem of the act was the gender inequality and unequal share of parental tasks between parents. In the field of family policies, the purple government aimed at implementing the combination scenario. Both parents should combine paid work and care, which should be made possible by each person working 32 hours on average over their career (Burri 2005, 59). This implies that women remain in their current working time pattern, and men reduce their working hours and adjust their working time patterns to those of women. The act not only supported mothers to reconcile paid work and care, but also gave fathers two days of paternity leave. Two days seems to be a short duration, however, before 2001 no legal entitlement existed and fathers had to use holiday if they were not covered by corresponding collective agreements. The act supported an alteration of the concept of fatherhood and strengthened the right of fathers to take leave. The problem definition was explicitly based on the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm. The gender imbalance in unpaid care was the main focus and the labour market dimension was only mentioned in connection to reconciliation and fatherhood.

Political

The act was proposed by the government and in contrast to its accompanying Adjustment of Working Hours Act not by an opposition party. Thereby, the act clearly illustrated the strategy of the government to implement the parenthood model of the dual-earner / dual-carer

paradigm. The reform was implemented by the purple coalition, which was re-elected in 1998 and responsible for both acts. The reform was primarily situated in the family policy field, in which the social partners have a less prominent role compared to labour market policies. However, the employer organisations responded negatively to the introduction of the short-term carers' leave scheme (Tijdens 2000, 23). The new scheme granted parents ten days of leave in order to care for a sick child. Companies had to pay up to 70% of the income during emergency leave. The employer organisation expected negative effects on the labour volume due to the increase of employees who take parental leave. They also expected an increase in costs due to the necessity to pay full wages during certain leave schemes. The purple coalition with the social democratic party as strongest governing party was the policy entrepreneur of the act. This reflects the anticipated political actors of the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm. Employer organisation's objections confirmed the employee and parental focus of the reform.

Policy

The main focus of the Work and Care Act was to support women's and men's rights and their responsibilities as carers. It implemented schemes to balance paid work and care between parents and to encourage fathers to take up an active role as carer. Based on the traditional concept, care is expected to be primarily provided informally in the Netherlands and combined with part-time employment. This is in particular illustrated by the terms of parental leave. The Dutch parental leave is unpaid and has to be taken part-time. It is expected that parents work next to their care responsibilities and that they receive their income through employment. Parents are thereby not detached from their career and remain a part of the company's workforce. This was one of government's goal with the reform. Employees with care responsibilities shall be made the standard point of reference for employers' decisions on working time (Tijdens 2000, 22). In general, the government aimed at increasing the labour market participation of mothers and at encouraging fathers to be active carers. Gender inequality in both sphere was tackled by the combination of the Work and Care and the Adjustment of Working Hours Act. The Work and Care Act contained the family policy part of the reform and followed the anticipated policies of dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm. It also implemented a paternity leave scheme that is solely target at fathers. The general structure of the Dutch parental leave system illustrates the importance of part-time employment as reconciliation instrument.

To conclude, the novelty of the reform was the paternity leave scheme and the inclusion of all part-time workers. The dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm was dominant in all three streams of policy-making. The underlying problem definition of the act was the gender imbalance in unpaid care, and the difficulties of combining work and care for both parents. The Work and Care Act, in contrast to the Adjustment of Working Hours Act, solely focused at family policy concerns. The political supporters of the act further resembled the assumptions of the paradigm. The

social democratic party was the dominant actor and the strongest coalition partner. The output of the policy stream resembled strongly the policies of the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm. The government even disregarded the objections from the employer organisation. This illustrates that the labour supply concerns of the work-sharing and economic flexibility paradigms were not present. The act unambiguously has a family policy and gender equality focus. Fathers' participation in unpaid care was supported by the new paternity leave system, which was expected to increase the employment rate of women with young children. In 1992, 42% of mothers with children under three were employed, in contrast to 70% in 2003 (Misra and Jude 2008, 105f.). This resembled the focus of the governmental strategy: to increase the labour market participation of mothers and to encourage fathers to reduce their working hours and to participate in unpaid care. The governmental intentions to disseminate the combination model was rooted in the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm, which portrays part-time employment as the standard form of employment for both parents. It further emphasizes the equal share of paid work and unpaid work between both parents and the combination of both spheres for each worker. The government took a strong family policy turn regarding part-time employment with the Work and Care Act. However, it did not suspend the previous labour market policies, but improved part-time employment's gender equality capabilities.

5.1.7 Life-course Saving Scheme 2006

The Life-course Savings Scheme (Levenslooplegeling) of 2006 initiated a severe restructuring of Dutch leave system into a voluntary self-insurance scheme. It did not consider part-time employment as specific family policy or labour market policy instrument. However, because parental leave has to be taken part-time in the Netherlands, and part-time employment is strongly associated with reconciling work and care, the following paragraph will analyse the act on its implication on part-time employment. The Life-course Savings Scheme replaced the Work and Care Act of 2001 and implement a novel idea of organising social security. Between 2006 and 2012, all employees had the option to save 12% of their annual gross salary in privately organised funds or insurances. The contributions to the scheme, and thereby part of the income, were exempted from income tax. These savings could be used to finance any kind of unpaid leave and were taxed on withdrawal. The system of reversed taxation was expected to encourage employees to save up in order to finance their so called 'rush hour of life' (Groenendijk 2005, 2). This term covers parenthood and the period of life in which employees need to reconcile paid work and the provision of informal care. The necessity of informal care provision increased with the childcare law (Wet Kinderopvang) and the Work and Welfare Act (Wet Werk and Bijstand) of 2005. These two acts privatised all child care centres in the Netherlands, aimed at reducing welfare dependency by not longer excluding lone mothers from the obligation to work and in general prioritised informal care provision. By encouraging workers to take care of their financial support during parental leave by themselves, the Life-

course Savings Scheme followed the main strategy of those two acts. On one side it created freedom of choice and self-determination. On the other side it implemented the need to self-provision and defined parenthood as a private insurance matter. The use of the Life-course Savings Scheme for parental leave was encouraged through a partial exemption from taxation. If used for parental leave, a tax credit of 50% of the gross minimum wage per day of unpaid leave was granted. Parental leave was also the only leave scheme, which could be taken without employer's consent. Taking any kind of leave and to withdraw one's savings was only possible while being employed, thus benefits could not be used for transition periods between two jobs. The government also encouraged the use of the scheme by granting an indexed tax credit (€185 in 2006) per year of participation when leave was taken (Delsen and Smits 2010, 585).

Problem

The defined problem of the Life Course Savings Scheme was the need for individual coverage of new risks of employment through privately financed savings system. The scheme was in particular designed to finance any kinds of leave, such as parental leave or leave for further education. It did not dictate to use the leave for specific purposes, however, the use for parental leave was encouraged. In contrast to the Work and Care Act, the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm of tackling gender inequality was not influential. The scheme was designed to ease reconciling work and care, and was based on the adult worker model. The problem definition has some work-sharing and flexibility connotations. It also assumed that employees will use their self-financed leave to maintain their employability through further education (Huiskamp and Vos 2011, 537f.). Thus it has a labour market dimension by encouraging an educated, flexible and diversified work force. However, through its strong connection to parental leave it has also family policy dimension. Since part-time employment is not an instrument or focus of the scheme, the assumed problem definitions of the four paradigms do not correspond fully to the Life-course Savings Scheme. In general, it was liberal market-based approach of leave financing, which could be used for labour market and also family policy purposes. The approach was based on the idea of a small state that only regulates welfare, while the provision and financing is done privately. The economic flexibility paradigm is strongly connected to the idea of a small state and liberal welfare provision. In addition, privately financed leaves for further education in order to fulfil the companies' needs for a qualified flexible workforce is one of the targets of the scheme. Therefore, the economic flexibility paradigm is the most dominant paradigm in the scheme's problem definition.

Political

The adoption and development of the scheme were accompanied by strong political oppositions and public demonstrations. The first proposal for life-course based policies was published in 2002 by the purple coalition of Wim Kok. However, the new centre-right

government under Jan Peter Balkenende from the Christian Democratic Party created the first Life-course Savings Scheme plans in 2002. The first concrete governmental proposal was published after the general elections in 2003 and after changes in the party composition of the centre-right coalition. It was primarily focused on discouraging early retirement. The government did not follow the traditional way of tripartite policy-making and did not request the advice of the Social-economic Council. Trade unions strongly opposed the governmental proposal, due to the accompanied cut of all tax support for early retirement and the planned incorporation of the early retirement scheme. In contrast, employer organisations agreed to the proposal. The scheme shifted the responsibility of provision to the employing company and the employers could choose from several privately provided savings schemes from insurances and banks. However, the government emphasised the small administrative burden for companies and kept an employer's perspective by making the employer's consent necessary for taking leave.

The government decided to proceed unilaterally and not include the objections of the trade unions. In October 2004, the Netherlands saw the biggest demonstrations against a governmental plan since the World War II (Delsen and Smits 2010, 588). In particular, trade unions demonstrated against the budget cuts in social security and against governmental plans to reduce public provision of welfare services. The public objections led to insertion of a parliamentary audit, where experts stated their criticism and recommendations for the Life-course Savings Scheme. The main concerns of the experts were the juridical inconsistencies, administrative burdens and exclusionary nature of the proposal (van der Meer and Leijnse 2005, 16). A watered-down proposal that included several of recommendations was accepted by social partners in November 2004. The parliament adopted the proposal in 2006, and it was supported by all major parties. However, the initial intention to stop early retirement was missed. The Life-course Savings Scheme was open to older workers and could be used for early retirement. Based on the composition of the initial policy coalition, the scheme reflects the assumptions of the economic flexibility paradigm. The centre-right government, consisting of a conservative party and several liberal parties, with support of the employer organisation formed the winning coalition.

Policy

The preceding Work and Care act was based on the combination scenario that aims at encouraging equal participation of both parents on the labour market and in the family sphere (Knijn 2008, 162). In contrast, the replacing Life Course Savings Scheme was based on the adult worker and the life-course model. The individualised worker model is a suitable approach for governments, when family relations are increasingly fluid and norms regarding adult behaviour and contributions to families are becoming harder to identify (Lewis et al. 2008, 277). The adult worker model treats both men and women equally as individuals and it assumes that

their labour market behaviour is the product of individual decisions (Daly 2011, 4ff.). The focus remains on men and women as potential worker and not as parents. The regulation of the scheme was gender neutral, but neglected the existing difference in unpaid care provision and employment pattern of men and women. Women are more likely to work part-time and to have a lower salary, and thereby are less likely to save up to 12% of their annual income. However, women are also more likely to take parental leave and thus receive lower financial benefits. The Life Course Savings Scheme favoured the work patterns of full-time employees, which could afford to individually finance their leaves. People with a less linear work pattern were partly discriminated by the scheme, due to its privately based financing and also the need to being employed while taking out benefits. The scheme was designed to encourage employees to build up savings for their 'rush hour of life', in particular for parental leave. However, due to the design of an individual savings scheme, it was mainly used by full-time working men to finance their early retirement (Delsen and Smits 2010). The intended outcome has not been reached and the scheme even contradicted its initial purpose to step early retirement. After the adoption in 2006, the government also modified the terms of scheme several times. For instance, the government tackled the barrier for part-time employees with the inclusion of an indexed tax credit. The credit was not linked to the amount of paid contributions, and therefore independent from the income of the beneficiary.

The life-course model, as main foundation of the scheme, is based on the neo-classical economic supply-side theory. It opposes collectively arranged welfare schemes and promotes individual provisions of financial benefits as most efficient way to support individuals in their different periods of life (Knijn and Smit 2009, 488). The ideational foundation of the approach was a radical change from collectively risk sharing to individual insurance and temporal redistribution of income over one's life. It was based on the liberal welfare paradigm, in which each individual decides upon his or her insurance of personal risks and also choose from a range of different private providers. The government framed the scheme as best answer to the needs of the post-industrial labour market, by guaranteeing efficient transition to and from employment and financing of further education.

The Life-course Savings Scheme was based on the theory of Lans Bovenberg (2005) and has been adopted by the Christian Democratic Party in order to implement an alternative to a collectively paid leave system. Since the Dutch system of care provision strongly favours informal provision, the Life-course Savings Scheme was also portrayed as support for parents to reconcile paid work and care. The scheme introduced a change of perspective on children as collective risk to an individual risk, for which employees should insure themselves individually. This illustrates a new approach to social policy, to embrace privatised and individualised risk-taking schemes of the liberal welfare model (Knijn and Smit 2009, 510).

The policy content of the scheme is primarily based on the idea of a liberal welfare state, where welfare is privately provided and financed individually in order to meet the diversified needs. Risks were mainly seen as private matter and therefore citizens should have the freedom to decide on their insurance package. The scheme did not tackle market's failure to provide jobs or the gender inequality in care work. Mothers' non-participation on the labour market was also no target of the scheme. It was designed to ease transition from and into employment and to encourage the use of leaves. However, the specific terms of the scheme, such as the necessary consent from the employer and the required employment contract during leaves, made it difficult to use the leave for periods of transition. The adult worker model also treated labour market behaviour as outcomes of choices, thereby it did not tackle unequal treatment on grounds of working time. It indirectly accepted inequalities between part-time and full-time employees. Based on these aspects, the policy dimension of the Life-course Savings Scheme was primarily influenced by the economic flexibility paradigm. Despite its stated support for parents, it did not implement a scheme focused on the needs of carers. It also replaced the Work and Care Act that had strong dual-earner / dual-carer based policies, with policies that emphasised the need to insure oneself for the private risks of parenthood. This supports the scheme's liberal perspective of shifting the responsibility of welfare provision and financing to the individual. Several experts at the parliamentary audit stated the potential barrier for part-time workers and low-earning employees to participate in the scheme. These objections were only partially considered, and thus negative consequences for part-timer worker implement.

In sum, the scheme manifested an ideational change in Dutch family policies and was accompanied by severe changes in policies on child care centres. The privatisation of all public child care centres and the cash instead of services policies illustrate the liberal welfare perspective of the centre-right government. The Life-course Savings Scheme followed this strategy and also had strong roots in the economic flexibility paradigm. Part-time employment was not directly target by further regulations or deregulations. However, the terms of the scheme installed barriers for people with lower income, and thereby created inequalities for part-time workers in financing parental care. The combination scenario as reference point for Dutch family policies and its strong gender inequality focus were overhauled by the life-course model. The government reduced its responsibility for family policy and intended to create greater freedom and individually tailored benefit plans for each employee. The precondition for the scheme was employees' working time sovereignty in order to prevent unintentional and unilateral economy-enforced flexibility (Bergmann, Papouscheck, and Sorger 2010, 71). Thus, the scheme was linked to the previous Adjustment of Working Hours Act. However, the individually financed savings scheme suited the interests of the full-time working male employee with a sufficient salary to renounce from 12% of their income. It is questionable that young workers earned enough at the beginning of their career and were able participate in the

scheme long enough to finance their parental leave (Lewis et al. 2008, 272ff.). It created disadvantages for the stated target group of employees that reconcile paid work and care. Each employee had to earn enough before parenthood in order to finance their leave periods. Thus, the indirect recommendation was that people should not work part-time before their 'rush hour of life'.

The Vitality Scheme was designed to replace the Life-course Savings Scheme in 2013 and to improve the support for reconciling work and care. The Life-course Savings Scheme was discontinued in 2012, but the plans for the new Vitality Scheme were shortly after discarded. Dutch life-course-based policies existed from 2006 to 2012 and were not replaced with subsequent policies. One of the reasons for the end of the Life-course Savings Scheme was the low take up, but also the severe criticism from experts, such as of the pioneer of Dutch life-course policies. Lans Bovenberg declared the scheme a failure already one-half years after its implementation (Bovenberg and Conneman 2007). The scheme did not fulfil the expectations of the public, but also not the expectations of the leading theorists.

The economic flexibility paradigm functioned as the ideational foundation of the life-course policies in the Netherlands. The problem definition of the scheme clearly outlined the need for employees to individually finance their periods of leave. It was possible to use leave to provide care, but also to maintain employability and update skills. The modern economy is in demand of a highly qualified and flexibly workforce and the scheme was a policy response to those needs. However, the initial intention of the scheme to encourage people to tackle the new risks of the transitional labour market was not realised. The Life-course Savings Scheme has been rarely used for training and to maintain the individual employability (Huiskamp and Vos 2011, 543). The composition of the winning coalition reflects the assumptions of the economic flexibility paradigm. The initial objection of the trade unions and the liberal and conservative orientation of the government fit to the political actors of the economic flexibility paradigm. To conclude, the policy stream of the Life-course Savings Scheme did not reflect the specific needs of part-time workers and even implemented some inequalities. The economic flexibility paradigm as dominant paradigm of the scheme had a negative effect on job quality of part-time workers. The implemented necessity to individually finance parental leave could not be fulfilled by all kinds of employment. Full-time worker with higher income were better equipped to make use the Life-course Savings Scheme than part-time workers. Thus, the inequalities caused by scheme primary hit people who reduced their working hours and renounced part of their income in order to provide informal care.

5.1.8 Short-time Work and Part-time Unemployment Scheme 2008 – 2011

The Short-time Work (Werktijdverkorting) and the Part-time Unemployment Scheme (Deeltijd-Werkloosheidswet) were anti-crisis policies and ad-hoc programmes to prevent severe

negative consequences of the global recession and financial crisis. In the Netherlands, first severe effects of the recession were experienced in 2008. The Dutch GDP declined significantly and employment participation was marked by a steep drop. However, in relation to other EU member state, the Dutch unemployment rate remained one of the lowest in Europe during the crisis. The Dutch anti-crisis policies were referred by several experts as main causes for the limited effect of the crisis on employment (Tijdens et al. 2014, 180f.). The government implemented two consecutive anti-crisis policies.

The initial measure was the Short-time Work Scheme, which came into effect in November 2008. In the height of the economic crisis in April 2009, the scheme was replaced by the Part-time Unemployment programme, which was in place until July 2011. Both schemes were based on the work-sharing paradigm, because they provided companies the opportunity to decrease the working hours of their employees. The employees received replacement benefits from the unemployment insurance (Flecker and Schönauer 2013, 72ff.). The original work-sharing scheme existed already since 1945. It banned employers from unilaterally reduce employees' working hours, however, they could file a request for short-time work, due to extraordinary circumstances. The scheme was rarely used and the permission was granted very restrictively. The short-time work scheme of 2008 did not replace the previous programme, but was specifically designed to tackle the consequences of the economic crisis. Employers that were severely affected by the crisis could reduce employees' working hours. They could apply for an initial period of six weeks of reduced working hours, which could be extended three times for in total for 25 weeks. Their employees received benefits from their unemployment insurance and the companies had to offer training to their staff. However, the entitlement had several preconditions. Companies had to proof that they were affected by the crisis and their decline in turnover had not been caused by the regular fluctuations of business cycle or had been self-inflicted. A minimum decline in the business cycle of 30% in a two-month period since September 2008 had to be presented. The strict entitlement criteria illustrate the aim of scheme: "to support those companies that are sufficiently economically viable to survive the crisis, despite the lack of orders and turnover, by helping them to retain their skilled and productive staff, vital the company's future" (Wilthagen 2010, 5f.). Participating companies had to provide training to their staff and also guarantee a four-week dismissal protection after the end of scheme.

The budget of scheme was exhausted in the beginning of 2009 and in March the programme was terminated. Thus in the height of the economic crisis the government had to implement a new anti-crisis policy. Based in the recommendations of the tripartite crisis response team, the Part-time Unemployment Scheme came into effect in April 2009. Identical to the Short-time Work Scheme, employers could reduce the working hours of their employees up to 50% and the affected personnel received unemployment benefits proportionally to the number of

reduced hours. Based on the regular formula for unemployment benefit calculation, the workers received 75% of their forgone pay in the first two months and 70% in the subsequent months. In contrast to the previous scheme, the strict entitlement criteria for companies were lifted and the sole precondition was an agreement between employer and labour representatives. The maximum duration of coverage depended on the percentage of staff that reduced their working hours. The smaller the proportion of employees in the programme, the longer the maximum duration of entitlement. In addition, the scheme contained a minimum duration of 26 weeks. Companies had to consider carefully how many and which employees were moved into part-time unemployment, because they could not be easily reactivated. If companies violated the minimum duration or they dismissed their employees during or shortly after part-time unemployment they had to pay back half of the support (Mandl et al. 2010, 118). The benefits were deducted from the individual unemployment benefit entitlements of the employee. That was potentially consequential for the employee in case of dismissal. During the part-time unemployment duration the employees had to be in employer-financed training. After several budget extensions, the programme was terminated in July 2011. In comparison to other short-time work schemes in Europe, the special features of the Dutch programme were the minimum duration, the link of the maximum duration to the proportion of staff participating in the scheme and the obligation to pay back half of the benefits if the terms were violated. Thereby, the scheme was classified as relatively restricted and targeted at vital companies and the core workforce (Wilthagen 2010).

Problem

Both schemes were anti-crisis measures to restrict the negative effect of the global recession on the employment rate and companies performance. The problem definition was unambiguously based on the expected decline of job growth and potential mass unemployment due to the crisis. Thus, it was assumed that the market failed to provide enough jobs to maintain the employment rate during the crisis. The government intervened directly with its policies. It invested in work-sharing by making it possible to reduce the working hours of employees and allow them to withdraw parts of their unemployment benefits while being employed. Gender and care provision concerns were not influential in the design of the programmes, it was solely a labour market policy. Employability, which was a target of the Life-course Savings Scheme, was addressed by the precondition for companies of training provision for their staff. Employees could update their work skills and thereby maintain or improve their employability for the economic upswing after the crisis. The programme had a company-perspective by securing the skilled and productive staff that was assumed to be vital for the companies' current and future performance. The extra costs of re-hiring the core workforce after the crisis should be prevented. Thus, the economic flexibility paradigm was influential in the problem definition. The scheme was based on the assumed and real market

failure to provide jobs and on the assumed negative effects on domestic companies' competitiveness after the crisis.

Political

Both programmes were adopted during the centre-left coalition under Jan Peter Balkenende from the Christian Democratic Party. The social democratic party was part of the coalition from 2007 until 2010, when their ministers resigned due to the governmental disaccord on the military mission in Afghanistan. Balkenende was the Dutch Prime Minister from 2002 until 2010, and the previous economic flexibility-based policies were introduced with the Christian Democratic Party's majority in government. In comparison to other EU member states, the Dutch government reacted quickly to the economic crisis. However, the social partners criticised the government that their reactions lacked decisiveness. In particular, the limited budget of the short-time work scheme was portrayed as problem by both trade unions and employer organisations (Grünell 2009b). However, concerning the design and content of the Short-time Work Scheme the social partners agreed with the government. The government appointed a tripartite crisis taskforce in January 2009 (Grünell 2009a) and the Part-time Unemployment Scheme was one of its products. The aim of the taskforce was to make use of the crisis to modernise the labour market. The part-time unemployment scheme was scheduled to end in June 2009, however, the social partners pushed for several extensions. The programme ended on the first of July 2011, two years later than initially planned. One additional reason for the extensions was the late impact of the crisis on the construction sector.

To conclude, the government was a centre-left coalition consisting of a conservative majority in cooperation with the social democratic party. This does not resemble the assumed political set up of the work-sharing paradigm. Further, both social partners supported the programmes. However, there have been disputes on the budget and duration of both schemes between the social partners and the government. The political coalitions of the schemes resembled both the work-sharing and the economic flexibility paradigm. It is consistent with the job creation and employability approach of the programmes. The government abandoned its regulatory role of their previous economic flexibility policies and directly intervened through the Short-time Work Scheme. It seems that the economic crisis led to necessity of direct investment and the quick adoption of policies. The second scheme was planned by the tripartite taskforce and the government had more time to design its terms, therefore, it resembles more the regulatory approach of the conservative party.

Policy

The policy instruments of the two programmes were designed to temporarily change the regular working pattern in targeted companies. Both programmes supported employees to reduce their

working hours and the foregone income was proportionally compensated through unemployment benefits. This reflects the core policy of the work-sharing paradigm. The programmes granted the option to reduce working hours, however, the focus rested on companies and not on employees. The short-time work scheme had strict entitlement criteria and was targeted only at companies which experienced a decline in turnover, due to the economic crisis. The strict conditions were lifted with the Part-time Unemployment Scheme. It implemented new terms, such as the minimum coverage duration and linkage of the maximum coverage to the percentage of employees that were registered by their company. The focus was to secure only the essential workforce and to force companies to assess carefully which and how many employees should reduce their working hours. Deviating from the work-sharing paradigm, policies were strictly targeted at vital companies and at essential workforce. Further, the policies were only temporary and defined by a limited budget. The competitiveness of domestic companies was also targeted by making training obligatory. This approach is linked to the employability idea of workers' responsibility to maintain their skills in order to meet the needs for a highly-qualified workforce. The main concern of the scheme was to prevent companies from overreacting to the economic crisis and prevent dismissal of the essential workforce for an economic upswing (Flecker and Schönauer 2013, 92). The policy aspect was mainly based on the work-sharing paradigm with the influence of ideas that are related to the economic flexibility paradigm. The liberal welfare orientation of the government was reflected by previous policies. However, the governmental reaction on the crisis was primarily to encourage work-sharing and prevent the costs of rising unemployment.

In sum, the programmes were successful and experts assessed them as main cause for the relative low impact in the employment rate in the Netherlands (Grünell and Houtman 2011). Four out of ten jobs in danger were saved due to the part-time unemployment programme (Wilthagen 2010). The biggest group of beneficiaries were male full-time employees in the metal industry between 31 and 46 years old (Flecker and Schönauer 2013, 94). Before the economic crisis, the government contributed with its flexicurity policies to the growth of employees with temporary contracts. These workers were the first who were laid off in the economic crisis (Tijdens et al. 2014, 180f.). Companies made use of their flexible workforce before they participated in the work-sharing programmes. Both schemes were targeted at the core workforce that was assumed to be essential after the economic crisis. The defined problem was to prevent mass unemployment, but it was not universally applied. It was targeted at a specific group of workers, and in particular at vital companies. Thereby, the schemes diverted from the work-sharing paradigm. Part-time employment subsidised with unemployment benefits was promoted as the main strategy to secure employment and companies' competitiveness.

The government's perspective on part-time employment was also illustrated by the pre-crisis Task Force Part-time Plus. Its main purpose was to develop policies directed at women that wished to increase their working hours (Grünell 2009c)⁹. The income of part-time working women was portrayed by the task force as supplementary, and the proposed policies were based on the primary care & secondary earner paradigm. Part-time employment was criticised based on its lower income provisions and thereby its failure to provide enough income for women's independence and for a continuous career. This highly diverged from the Work and Care Act's view on part-time and the combination model was finally abandoned.

Work-sharing was the primary instrument between 2008 and 2011 in order to tackle the negative effects of the economic crisis. The problem definition was influenced by both, the work-sharing and the economic flexibility paradigm. The supportive actors in the political stream illustrate a collation between the major conservative and left party with support from both social partners. The policy stream was dominantly influenced by the work-sharing paradigm, however, liberal concepts such as employability, which had been influential in the Life-course Savings Scheme were present. The assumed positive effect of work-sharing policies on the job quality of part-time employees was not recorded. Part-time employment was promoted as a suitable instrument for the economic crisis, but both programmes were temporary and did not include any general improvement for the working conditions of part-time employees. In addition, the policies did not have general validity, instead they were highly targeted. On the other side, the job quality of part-time employees was not dismantled by the policies. Employees in non-standard forms of employment were the firstly affected by the economic crisis, however, the policy did not contribute to it. Despite having been a prominent anti-crisis policy in several European countries, the Dutch policy did not have long lasting effects on job quality policies for part-time employees. Part-time employment was a temporary vehicle to secure employment and companies' competitiveness.

5.1.9 Summary: Ideational genesis of Dutch part-time employment legislation

The genesis of part-time employment in the Netherlands is strongly connected to the rise of female employment. The scarcity of child care facilities, specifically for children under three, made part-time employment the dominant way to combine paid and unpaid care. Informal care by parents, specifically by mothers, prevailed during the last decades and led to short part-time working hours of women (Lewis et al. 2008, 273). The political efforts to create affordable child care remained small and in the mid-2000s all child care centres were privatised. The part-time employment strategy of Dutch governments in the 90s and 2000s compensated the lack of an explicit public care policy (Plantenga 2002). Despite the actual use of part-time employment strongly resembling the primary carer & secondary earner paradigm, the

⁹ for more information, see: Task Force Part-time Plus (2010)

paradigm was in contrast to the other three paradigms not influential in the major reforms of policies affecting part-time employment.

The genesis of part-time employment as a labour market and family policy instrument in the Netherlands began in the 70s with limited experiments targeted at young unemployed people. However, part-time employment as an explicit policy instrument in long-term governmental strategies was introduced by the first equal treatment legislations on grounds of working time in 1990 and 1993. The governments of the 90s with constant participation of the Social Democratic Party under Wim Kok followed two main strategies. In both part-time employment was defined as a crucial element. The first strategy aimed at normalisation of part-time employment (Visser 2002) and the second promoted the combination-model of equal sharing of work and care between men and women (Plantenga 2002).

The work-sharing paradigm was the dominant ideational foundation of the legislative acts in the 90s. It raised part-time employment to the same legal level as full-time employment in crucial social security and labour law regulations. The Dutch government aimed at normalising part-time employment in order to enhance its job creation and employee-oriented flexibility capabilities. In particular, the Act on non-discrimination on grounds of working-time in 1996 contributed strongly to the legal normalisation of part-time work. The long-term governmental strategy was to diversify employment and working time patterns in the labour market, by creating a legal framework of equal treatment. However, the concrete regulations of working conditions were determined by collective agreements. Thus, the government implemented the model of negotiated flexibility that was based commonly in the work-sharing and economic flexibility paradigm. Part-time employment was promoted as an instrument to redistribute work, but also to meet the flexibility demands of employees and employers. However, the assumed negative effects of the economic flexibility paradigm on policies regulating the working conditions of part-time employees did not occur. The equal treatment and anti-discrimination acts in the 90s contributed to a severe extension in the scope of part-time employees' job quality regulation.

In the family policy dimension, the government promoted the combination model. The core of the model was to equally value and share paid and unpaid work. Depending on the worker's life phase, he or she should be able to choose their personal mix of the amount of working hours, the time for unpaid care and the amount of outsourced care. The combination model was adopted as the main guideline for policies in the field of labour and care in 1999 by the national action plan. Use of part-time employment as a family policy instrument to tackle gender inequality was at the core of the Work and Care Act in 2001. Dutch parental leave regulations were merged into a single law, part-time employees with short working hours included and fathers' active care role encouraged. The act was unambiguously based on the

dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm. Part-time employment was promoted as an instrument to reconcile unpaid care and paid work for both mothers and fathers. Since parental leave in the Netherlands can only be taken part-time, it is the standard form of employment for the parents with young children.

Contrasting to the conservative understanding of families as an entity, in Dutch parental leave regulations each parent is individually entitled to six months of parental leave. With the combination model, the government combined its policy of normalisation of part-time employment with its family policy concern of tackling gender inequality. Part-time employment was promoted as a standard form of employment for carers in order to self-finance parental leave, but also to reduce gender inequality on the labour market and in informal care provision. The act had a positive effect on the scope of policies regulating the job quality of part-time employees, however, the effect was lower in comparison to the previous equal treatment legislations. The Act was also limited to parents, which confirms the assumed effect of dual-earner / dual-carer policies. Its policies are designed to support part-time working parents, but not to improve the working conditions of part-time employees in general.

The greatest positive effects on the scope of policies affecting the job quality of part-time employees were the Anti-discrimination on Grounds of Working Time Act in 1996 and the Adjustment of Working Hours Act in 2000. Both were dominantly rooted in the work-sharing paradigm, however, the additionally influential paradigm differed. Whereas the economic flexibility paradigm influenced the anti-discrimination act, the right to part-time work was affected by the tackling gender inequality goal of the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm. The act was part of the Work and Care Act and thus was the manifestation of both governmental strategies in 90s. The far-reaching right to unilaterally change the contractual defined working hours is a unique right of Dutch employees. Each employee had the legal right to adjust her or his amount of working hours to her or his flexibility needs. By making part-time employment available to all employees its capability of redistributing employment but also to reconcile work and care was strongly strengthened. The act was a clear signal by the government that part-time employment is a standard form of employment and employees should decide by themselves on their right amount of working hours. The universal approach of the work-sharing paradigm led to the improvement of job quality policies for all part-time workers. In contrast to its sister policy, the Adjustment of Working Hours Act, it was not limited to parents and affected the rights of all employees.

The common element of both governmental strategies in the 90s and early 2000s was the emphasis on individualisation and diversification of employment patterns. It supported both the work-sharing and gender equality capabilities of part-time employment. The governmental strategies changed severely with the new government in 2002. It adopted a stronger focus on

individualisation in social policy and to alter the role of the state toward regulating instead of provision. The Netherlands has a strong political culture of subsidiarity, in which the state only intervenes if an immediate or local level cannot perform the task more effectively (Misra and Jude 2008, 96). The centre-right government reinforced the idea of subsidiarity by shifting the responsibility for welfare provision during and financing of leave periods to the individual level with the introduction of the Life Course Savings Scheme in 2006. The scheme was the governmental answer to the demands for a paid parental leave programme. Part-time employment was not particularly considered by the scheme, but it affected part-time employees through two aspects. Firstly, parental leave in Netherlands had to be taken part-time and was unpaid. Therefore, people who use the scheme for parental leave will be temporary part-time employees. Secondly, part-time employees receive lower salaries than their full-time colleagues, due to their reduced working hours.

The anti-discrimination legislation abolishes any differences in hourly wages for the same job between part-time and full-time employees, but the total income differs naturally. The Life Course Saving Scheme grants the option to save up to 12% of the annual salary for later leave periods. Employees with a lower salary have less leeway to renounce 12% of their income. The scheme indirectly advises to work full-time before the 'rush hour of life' in order to create enough savings for parental leave or educational leave. The government abandoned the idea of life course based saving schemes in 2012 and did not implement the subsequent Vitality Scheme. In contrast to the majority of previous policies, the Life Course Savings scheme was solely based on a single paradigm.

The ideational foundations of the scheme were the life course model and the adult worker model. Both are rooted in the economic flexibility paradigm. In particular, employability, as the de facto main concern of the scheme, is an ideational product of the paradigm. Employees need to invest part of their income into training in order to maintain their employability and fulfil the companies' demands for a highly-qualified and flexible workforce. The second goal of the scheme was to ease the transitional periods in the life course of a worker. However, the savings could not be withdrawn while being unemployed and further needed the consent from the employer. The use of the Life Course Saving's benefits for parental leave was supported by a tax credit and by the exclusion from employer's consent. Generally, the terms of the scheme privileged full-time workers with a sufficient salary. The scheme was intended to stop early retirement, however, the majority of beneficiaries used their savings for early retirement and not for their 'rush hour of life'. The unequal treatment of part-time employees in the scheme manifested a negative effect on the job quality of part-time employees. The economic flexibility roots of the scheme confirmed the hypothesis that the paradigm will lead to negative effects in policies regarding the job quality of part-time employees.

In contrast to the assumed effects of the four paradigms on policies affecting part-time employees, the anti-crisis work-sharing programmes between 2008 and 2011 did not have any lasting positive effect. The programmes were designed to secure jobs and preserve companies' vitality during the economic crisis. The policies were clearly based on the work-sharing paradigm. However, job creation, which is a main concern of work-sharing policies, was not a goal of the programmes, instead they were solely focused on preserving jobs. Part-time employment was made the temporal standard form of employment at targeted vital companies. The core workforce was supported through part-time unemployment benefits in order to be available in the after-crisis economic upswing. Thus, the programmes had an employer-orientated perspective. They also incorporated the employability aspect through the obligation of employer-provided training. In comparison to similar policies in other EU member states, Dutch programmes were highly targeted and restrictive. The anti-crisis policies were finally terminated in 2011 and did not have lasting effects for policies on the working conditions of part-time employees, despite their work-sharing orientation.

5.2 Austria

5.2.1 First attempts

The first legislative proposal for regulating the working conditions of part-time employment was made in 1972 by several conservative politicians in the Austrian parliament. The opposition politicians proposed to include part-time employment in general labour laws and thereby eliminate the discrimination and exclusion of part-time employees. The number of part-time employees increased strongly from the 1960s onwards and were nearly entirely female workers. However, part-time employment with half of the standard working hours was not regulated at all and could be used as highly flexible form of employment. Employer could also unilaterally change the length and scheduling of part-time employees working hours. The conservative politicians aimed at promoting part-time employment by decreasing the unequal treatment in contrast to full-time employment. Their intention was not to equalise all atypical employment forms, because they expressed their support to continue the exclusion of marginal employment from social security regulations. The proposal was rejected by the governing social democratic party and trade unions. A social democratic member of the Austrian parliament at that time portrayed part-time employment as an unsuitable instrument to improve or even solve the societal and family situation of women (Tálos and Mühlberger 1999, 268). Interestingly the proposal was made before the first law on equal treatment of men and women in working conditions in 1979. At the time of the proposal unequal treatment of part-time and full-time employees and also of male and female employees was not explicitly forbidden (Thöny 2008, 33). The government, however, followed the previous recommendation of the economic and social advisory committee that general regulations of part-time employment were not necessary, because part-time employment was only a marginal form of employment

and only in limited sectors. The committee consisted of representatives from the Austrian social partners and was highly influential in 60s and 70s. Instead of the far-reaching proposed law, the government extended the regulation of part-time employment only marginally and without any intention to increase work-sharing or the reconciliation capabilities. Part-time employment at that point primarily corresponded to the economic flexibility paradigm, however, it was not used as active policy instrument. The left parties and organised labour objected part-time employment as means to reach their universal goal of full-employment. Until the 1970s, the biggest parties followed the common goal of maintaining full employment and simultaneously promote economic growth. At that time, they agreed on the design of most economic and employment policies. However, in the late 70s the position of the conservative ÖVP change severely and shifted towards promotion of private consumption and entrepreneurial investment. In contrast to the SPÖ and their previous position, they rejected direct state intervention and demanded budget consolidation (Seeleib-Kaiser, van Dyk, and Roggenkamp 2005, 10ff.).

5.2.2 Parental Leave Extension Act 1990 & Accompanying Act on Labour Law 1992

In the late 80s and early 90s the grand coalition of SPÖ and ÖVP under the social democratic Prime Minister Franz Vranitzky adopted two Family Policy Packages (Familienpaket I & II). Concerning part-time employment, the first Family Policy Package in 1990 introduced the possibility of part-time employment for parents after parental. The second Family Policy Package in 1993 further specified parental leave regulations and granted the option to combine part-time employment and parental leave. Preceding to the second package, the government introduced the equal treatment of part-time employees and thus the most important legislation of the early 90s. In both packages part-time employment was portrayed as family policy instrument.

In the 70s and 80s part-time employment was presented as an employment form uniquely for the rising number of women on the labour market and was critically portrayed by employers (Eckart 1983, 96). The first Family Policy Package introduced the option to reduce working hours after parental leave and specifically regard it as a support for fathers. The Parental Leave Extension Act in 1990 (Karenzurlaubserweiterungsgesetz) amended the initial law on fathers' parental leave. The maximum duration of parental leave was extended and the right of fathers to take parental leave was specified. After one year of parental leave, parents could choose to work part-time and reduce her or his working hours for at least 2/5 of their previous regular working-time. The duration was at least three months and at most until the second and under certain conditions until the third birthday of their child. The act extended the maximum duration, however, part-time employment had to be taken directly after the first birthday. Both parents could choose to work part-time, but not simultaneously and also without any pause between the periods of leave and partner's part-time. Thus the option was linked to a partial

renouncement of parental leave and benefits. In addition, an agreement with the employer on the start date, duration and scheduling of part-time had to be found. Employees had to prove that their partner was not simultaneously taking parental leave or in leave related part-time employment. If an agreement could not be reached, the employee could take legal action. The employer had to present objective reasons for the rejection, however, both parties had to cover the costs of the juridical procedure by themselves.

In 1992, the Austrian constitutional court ruled that parents had to be allowed to work part-time during their parental leave. Thus eliminating the exclusiveness of parental leave and part-time. However, part-time employment before 1992 was explicitly excluded from labour law regulation and social insurance. Employment had to occupy the majority of one's working time in order to be covered by comprehensive insurance. The initial definition was rather vague, but in 1967 the Supreme Court of Justice ruled that a 20 hours' employment contract cannot be defined as an employment relationship (Thöny 2008, 48). At a later point the definition was changed and part-time employment had to consist of at least 1/5 of the regular working time in order to be covered by labour law. In 1992, the Accompanying Act on Labour Law (*Arbeitsrechtliche Begleitgesetz*) included part-time employment in the coverage of general labour law and defined it as an employment relationship. The subsequent second Family Policy Bundle extended the part-time employment option after parental leave up to child's fourth birthday and also made it possible for parents to take part of it at the same time. However, mothers were primarily entitled to parental leave and part-time employment. Fathers only had subsidiary entitlement and could take parental leave if the mother renounced from part of the family-based entitlement. The act of 1992 also added the equal treatment of part-time employment regulation to the Working Hours Act. Any unequal treatment had to be justified by objective reasons. The act needs to be analysed in connection the legislation on equal treatment of men and women, since the majority of part-time employees were women. The equal treatment legislation explicitly prohibited indirect discrimination, which covers unequal treatment based on working hours. The new equal treatment of part-time employees covered the majority of employees and affected all aspects of employment contracts. Only the regulation of the notice period in case of dismissal remained to be linked to the working hour's threshold of 2/5 of the regular working time. Employment below the threshold had a shortened notice period of two weeks, as it was the case for all part-time employees before 1992. The Family Policy Bundle in 1993 further abolished previous exclusion of women from unemployment benefits if their partner worked full-time. The older regulation rested strongly on the male breadwinner model in which the full-time working partner has to financially care for their partner.

Problem

The first act was part of the Family Policy Bundle, whereas the act of 1992 prepared the subsequent second Family Policy Bundle. The reforms in the early 1990s introduced policy

regulations that supported a parental model based on partnership, next to the traditional model solely based on motherhood. Fathers were explicitly mentioned in the regulation of parental part-time, which supports the problem definition of the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm. However, a big emphasis was also laid on the improvement of the working conditions of mothers and women in general. The defined problem was primarily the limited working conditions of mothers that reconcile work and care, and secondly the gender imbalance. At that time the male breadwinner model was still strong and thus influenced the problem definition by highlighting women's role as primary carer. Therefore, the primary carer & secondary earner was partially influential in the problem definition.

The majority of policies of the second Family Policy Bundle further regulated the parental leave system and introduced a dual system of financial family benefits. Beforehand the government introduced labour law and social security improvements for part-time employees in general. The antidiscrimination clause covered all employees and was not specifically targeted at parents. In its proposal, the government argued for the inclusion of part-time employment into the labour law regulation due to potential excessive use part-time employment as companies' flexibility strategy. The government argued for the regulation of full-time and part-time employment due to distinctive different reasons. Full-time employment had to be regulated because of health protection of employees, whereas part-time employment had to be regulated in order to secure employees' uninterrupted use of their leisure time (Nationalrat 1992, 43). The main reason for the inclusion of part-time was not to strengthen its work-sharing capabilities or to increase employer-based flexibility. Instead the emphasis rested on part-time employments' capability to create greater leisure time. Leisure time covers any activity outside the labour market and thereby also care obligations. With the Family Policy Bundle the government consolidated its primary care & secondary earner orientation and regulated mothers' working time in order to secure their primary role as carer. The defined problem of the labour law reform was to increase the working conditions of female part-time employees and thus to encourage women's participation on the labour market. The goal was to implement general protective provision to ensure equal treatment and to tackle the existing exclusion of part-time employees in collective agreements and labour law. The labour market paradigms were not influential in the problem definition, instead the equal treatment regulation was targeted at solving the insecure working conditions of carer and thereby mothers. The dominant paradigm was the primary carer & secondary earner

Political

Both Family Policy Bundles and the labour law reform were proposed by the grand coalition of SPÖ and ÖVP with the social democratic Prime Minister Vranitzky. Between the adoptions of the acts, the government was re-elected in the general elections of 1990. The coalition partners' nearly equal number of parliamentarians and cabinet positions were changed in

favour of the social democratic party. In the family policy domain, the social democratic SPÖ aimed at encouraging equal share of care and to support women's participation on the labour market. The conservative ÖVP, in contrast, demanded the extension of parental leave to strengthened carers right to pause their career and devote their time to care of their children (Blum 2012, 83). The Family Policy Bundles were compromises and introduced policy aspects that were based on the dual-earner / dual-carer, but also on the primary carer & secondary earner paradigm. The composition of the grand coalition reflects the political assumption of both family policy paradigms.

The original proposal of the Accompanying Act on Labour Law contained an overtime surcharge for part-time employment that aimed at limiting the use of part-time employees to compensate fluctuations in production or service demands. Part-time employees only received their regular hourly wages for their overtime up to the statutory working hour's threshold. The government proposed an additional surcharge and the trade unions, chamber of labour and the catholic family association supported the proposal. Whereas, the representatives of industry, employers and farmers rejected it and highlighted the potential danger for the competitiveness of Austrian companies (Tálos and Mühlberger 1999, 268). The Chamber of Labour also called for a right to part-time employment after parental leave, whereas the Chamber of Commerce argued that the possibility for legal action in law was sufficient (Nationalrat 1992, 24). The support of organised labour and the rejection of employer organisations fits to the assumptions of the economic flexibility paradigm. Therefore, the political aspect of the labour law reform resembles both family policy paradigms with strong influence of the economic flexibility paradigm.

Policy

The core of the first policy bundle was the extension of parental leave to two years and the implementation of fathers' entitlement. However, it did not adapt the financial benefits during parental leave and also did not introduce a specific bonus for fathers. Thus, the intentions to support the partnership model in care was not followed by financial support, which is essential in the individual decision on which parent renounces from her or his income and takes parental leave. Part of the first Family Policy Bundle was also to reduce the dismissal protection for parents. However, in order to encourage fathers to be active carers and to reduce their working hours, the security to return to their previous full-time jobs is essential. The core intention of the act resembled the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm, however, the option was not accompanied by supporting benefits that enable parents to make use their part-time option.

The labour law reform as preparation for the second policy package increased severely the job quality of part-time employees with its equal treatment regulation. The aim of the government was to assure that part-time employees received at least their proportional entitlement to labour

law and social security benefits (Thöny 2008, 46). Exclusionary clauses in labour law and collective agreements were made illegal, thus the government set a strong signal that unequal treatment of part-time employees without objective reasons was unjustified. Part-time employees should not be exposed to extensive flexibility demands of their employer. However, objections made by the employer organisations led to the drop of the proposed overtime bonus for part-time employees. The obligation of overtime surcharge would have extended equal treatment legislation and strongly limited the use of part-time employees as highly flexible workforce to fill business fluctuations. Thus the strength of equalisation policies was watered down.

With its universal scope, the labour law reform resembled the policies of the work-sharing paradigm. If the family policy context and the dominance of women working part-time is taken in consideration, the policies fit the primary care & secondary earner paradigm. Part of the family policy bundle was the abolishment of women's exclusion from the coverage of unemployment benefits. The previous regulation excluded employed women from unemployment benefits if their partner worked full-time. The reform abolished a clause that was strongly based on the male breadwinner system of men's obligation to financially care for their partner. Women's right as workers were strengthened and their employment was lifted to the same level of value of men's employment. The policy had universal labour market outputs, but its ideational root was based in the family policy sphere. By improving part-time employees' labour law and social security rights, mothers were supported in their roles as carer and worker. The equal treatment legislation was primarily introduced due to gender dimension of part-time work and to secure its reconciliation capabilities (Risak 2015, 134).

To sum it up, the first act was clearly a family policy. Its intention was to improve fathers' right to parental leave. However, it only granted a subsidiarity right, which meant that mothers had to renounce partly from their parental leave entitlement. The part-time employment option had to be taken instead of parental leave and the starting point had to be directly after the first birthday. Parents were not granted the right to part-time employment, but an option on which employees and employers had to agree on. Employees had the right to file a lawsuit, but the costs had to be taken by each party. From a legal perspective the part-time work option was highly complex and confusing. Neuwirth (1998, 233) concluded in her study of parental part-time employment that the legislative and political actors were not interested in creating a uniform set of standard for its application. Despite the dual-earner / dual-carer orientation of the first Family Policy Bundle, due to the missing extension of financial parental leave benefits and due to the strict entitlement regulation, the actual design rather resembles the primary carer & secondary earner paradigm.

The second Family Policy Bundle lifted some of the restrictions of the initial design and made it more attractive for fathers to take parental leave or reduce their working hours. An essential precondition for second Family Policy Bundle was the reform of the labour law in 1992. By affecting all employees and covering all aspects of employment contracts, the equal treatment legislation was universal in its consequences. The government argued that part-time employees need to have at least proportionally access to collectively agreed benefits and legal entitlements. The reform was also adopted in preparation for the accession to the European Union and thus to fulfil the requirements of equal treatment of men and women (Tálos 1999, 268). The policy had a strong work-sharing effect and set important framework regulations of equal treatment based on working hours. However, part-time employment was still predominately seen as female employment form and its work-sharing capabilities were only marginally mentioned by the government. Equal treatment was further improved by the inclusion of women with a full-time working partner into unemployment insurance. The act had a strong gender equality orientation, but did not grant incentives to encourage fathers to work part-time. The focus rested on the reconciliation capability and the support for mothers, thus the primary carer & secondary earner paradigm was influential in problem definition, whereas the work-sharing on the choice of instruments.

The strong ideological differences of the two coalition parties in family policies led to the adoption of policies with mixed intentions and effects. The reforms in the early 90s contained work-sharing and dual-earner / dual-care aspects, but in general still rested on the family model of the primary carer & secondary earner model. First foundations for family policies based on partnership and normalisation of atypical employment were laid down, but part-time employment was dominantly portrayed as a reconciliation instrument for mothers.

5.2.3 Solidarity Premiums Model 1998

In late 1997 the grand coalition adopted the Solidary Premiums Model (Solidaritätsprämienmodell), which promoted the creation of additional part-time jobs by encouraging employees to individually reduce their working hours. The act became effective in 1998 and the government expected to create 1000 new jobs and half of these should be taken up by long-term unemployed persons (Gächter 1997). Employees who agree to reduce their working hours received a supplement for their lost income. They could reduce their working hours up to 50% and the labour market service granted a solidarity premium if the freed working hours were filled by a person, who had received unemployment benefits or social assistance. The amount of benefit was calculated proportionally to number of reduced hours and the unemployment benefit level. The substitute employee also received a benefit, which was based on its previous amount of unemployment benefits (BMASK 2011, 68). The working hours of the new employee had to cover the entire amount of reduced working time. Thus the scheme could not be used to reduce companies' extent of working hours. The maximum length

of premium entitlement for companies was two years, or three years if the replacement labour force was long term unemployed or had special needs.

Problem

The Solidarity Premiums Model was an essential part of the National Action Plan for Employment of 1998. The plan mentioned part-time employment several times and also stated the intention of the government and of the social partners to make part-time employment more attractive in order to enhance its positive effect on the employment rate (Bergmann et al. 2004, 88). Part-time employment was portrayed as a work-sharing, as a reconciliation, as a gender equality instrument and as promotion of women's labour market participation. The intention to enhance part-time employments work-sharing capability was put into practice by the Solidarity Premiums Model. The implementation was additionally encouraged through the changes in early retirement, which was a traditional Austrian labour market instrument to create jobs for younger employees. However, due to the pressure from the demographic change, the grand coalition decided to limit its use and thus reduce the financial pressure on the pension system. As a consequence, the government had to find a new policy instrument to create new jobs without moving employees into pension or unemployment. The Solidarity Premiums Model targeted the problem of the stagnating job growth and thus was based on the work-sharing paradigm.

Political

The National Action Plan and the work-sharing model were introduced by the grand coalition under the social democratic Prime Minister Viktor Klima. The Solidarity Premiums Model was designed by the government in cooperation with the social partners and thus agreed by all influential actors in the policy-making process (Gächter 1997). The social democratic party was the stronger coalition partner, however, in accordance with the previous reforms, the agreement was once again a compromise between both popular parties and social partners. The Solidarity Premiums Model was not adopted as a generally accessible labour market scheme, instead the collective bargaining partners had to agree upon the specific details in collective or company agreements. Thus the actual design and access to the scheme depended on the sector and the strength of the trade unions and employer organisations in the sector. By joining the European Union, the traditional Austrian corporatist policy making was restricted. The federal government became increasingly dominant in social policy making and the influence of peak organisations declined (Obinger et al. 2010, 52). The composition of the winning coalition did not unambiguously represent one paradigm, but similar to earlier policies of the grand coalition was a mixture of two paradigms. In this instance, due to the labour market orientation, it was between the work-sharing and economic flexibility paradigm.

Policy

From the policy perspective the Solidarity Premiums Act was unambiguously rooted in the work-sharing paradigm. It was clearly an instrument to redistribute working time between employed and unemployed people. The use as a flexibility instrument for companies was also limited by making it obligatory to employ a substitute labour force for the same number of working hours that the participating employee reduced. In contrast to earlier policies, the scheme was not focused on women or mothers. It was universal in its focus, but primarily targeted at full-time employees, thus at men. Part-time employees could also take part in the scheme, but since they would reduce their working hours for a less total number, the substitute employee would also work for a fairly reduced number of working hours. If the contractual working hours of the replacement worker were small, she or he received an additional benefit from the labour market service. The work-sharing instrument was also not targeted at a specific period in the life of the employee, instead it was a labour market policy model to redistribute work between employed and unemployed (BMASK 2011, 67). Its target was to create new jobs while keeping other employees in employment. Thus the effect of the scheme was twofold, (re-)integrating unemployed persons and enabling the employed to reduce their working hours for any kind of reason (Bucheberner-Ferstl et al. 2011, 11). It was a work-sharing instrument without any specific gender perspective, part-time employment was portrayed as suitable employment form for men and women. However, the requirement to adopt the scheme by collective agreement limited its coverage and also left part of the terms to be decided by social partners. Nearly all employees are covered by collective agreements in Austria, but a scheme that is not generally accessible through federal law might create exclusions. An additional requirement for the entitlement to the scheme was to be employed at a company with at least ten employees.

The government expected a great take up of the scheme and the creation of 1000 new jobs that benefited in particular long-term unemployed. However, the design of the scheme limited its flexibility (Greisberger 2015, 6). For instances, the employer had submit a monthly record of working hours and employment agreements. The administrative effort was rather high and limited the flexible use. The government decided to reform the model after its expectations were not fulfilled (BMASK 2011, 69). In 2000 the labour market service implemented its first directive on the scheme and the government changed its design. The new regulation was aimed at making utilisation easier and more flexible, and therefore abolished the monthly reporting obligation. In order to encourage more employees to reduce their working hours and thus create a new job, the calculation of the solidarity benefits was changed. Instead of granting a proportion of their unemployment benefits, employees were paid at least 50% of their lost income and their employer had to continue to pay the previous social security contributions. Thus the participating employee remained to be entitled to their same level of pension and

unemployment benefits. The replacement benefit was paid by the employer, which received a subsidy up to 50% of the difference between the previous and current income. Thus employees received a greater support and also some of the administrative burdens were shifted to the employer. The reform did not change the ideational root of the problem definition or policy content, instead it lifted some barriers for employees and employers which restricted the effective use of it. Thereby the work-sharing instrument was further reinforced under the same political coalition. However, the changes came into effect after the general elections in 1999, which caused a change in government. The law was still passed under the grand coalition which introduced the initial scheme.

5.2.4 Voluntary insurance of marginal employees 1998

Austrian labour law defined part-time employment as any employment form with less than the statutory or collectively agreed regular working time. Thereby, there was no minimum threshold of part-time employment. Marginal employment is a specific employment form defined by income below a statutory defined threshold. Since 1977, the threshold was updated annually and the regular increase led to a growing share of part-time employees defined as marginal employees (Tálos 1999, 271). For instances, in 2015 the monthly income threshold was €415.72. The low income could only be reached by a particularly low number of working hours and thus all marginal employees were part-time worker. Since 1955, marginal employment was explicitly exempted from social security coverage. Employers and employees did not have to pay social security contributions. Marginal employees were only covered by accident insurance to which the employer paid an indexed lump sum contribution. Policies on marginal employment are particularly important for the analysis, because they affect the job quality of the most marginalised part-time employees.

The 1992 equal treatment legislation added marginal employment to the coverage of labour law, however, it did not change the exemptions from social insurance. The pension reform in 1997 implemented an opting-in option into health and pension insurance for marginal employment (Wöss, Wagner, and Reiff 2013, 197). From 1998 onwards, employees could voluntarily pay their social insurance contributions that were calculated proportionally to the marginal employment threshold. Employers were not required to pay social insurance contributions for their marginal employees. However, if employees work more hours and thereby exceed the income threshold, they were automatically treated as regular employees. In that case, workers and employers had to pay the regular social insurance contribution. The pension reform also changed the calculation basis for social insurance contribution. The incomes of all employment contracts were taken into consideration and assessed if the marginal employment threshold was exceeded. In that case, the employee was obliged to pay her or his social insurance contributions. The mandatory or obligatory contribution of the employee

did not affect the employer's exemption, except the threshold was exceeded solely with the job at the company. Marginal employees remained exempt from unemployment insurance.

Problem

The number of marginal employed increased strongly during the 90s and similar to regular part-time employment more than half were women (Franke 2014, 80; Mairhuber and Papouscheck 2010, 19). The growing size of workers that were not covered by the health and pension insurance created a strong problem pressure for the government to react. The opting-in clause and the consideration of employees total income were both adopted as part of the pension reform in 1997. The aim was to include atypical employees into social security coverage without creating additional costs for companies. The main target group were women with a long-term record of exclusive income from marginal employment (Riesenfelder, Schelepa, and Wetzel 2011, 125). The problem addressed was the exclusion of women who devoted their life to their family obligations and thus had greater risk of poverty in old age. The reform was also motivated by financial considerations. In order to improve the financing of the pension system, the number of contributors had to be increased (Obinger et al. 2010, 49). The problem definition was influenced by both the work-sharing and the primary carer & secondary earner paradigm. The act addressed all marginal employees and thus aimed at universally improving the social security coverage. However in practice, women made up the majority of marginal employees, who contributed little to the primary income of their partner. Thus, it fits to the problem definition of the primary care & secondary earner paradigm. Mothers could voluntarily opt in into pension and health insurance coverage and thereby directly pay for their insurance and not only indirectly by their partner.

Political

The reform was implemented by the same grand coalition that adopted the Solidary Premiums Model. In contrast to the previous act, part-time employment was not promoted as particular instrument, instead the act aimed at closing gaps in social security coverage. The grand coalition had several ideological conflicts in the late 90s. The conservative party and the employer organisation argued for further deregulations, welfare state retrenchment and policies to support companies' competitiveness in an international economy. Whereas, the social democratic party and trade unions advocated for maintaining the status quo. In 1995 and 1996 the government adopted two structural adaptation acts that entailed several expenditure cutbacks and austerity measures (Obinger et al. 2010, 47f.). This led to disagreements between organised labour and the social democratic party. In 1997, a referendum on women's issues raised the topics of reconciling paid and unpaid work and the problems of returning to employment after parental leave. The referendum was supported by more than 640 000 Austrians and also received support from parts of the government, such as the women's lobby of the social democratic party (Liebhart et al. 2003, 420). In reaction to the

referendum, the government committed itself to gender equality and to implement policies targeting existing inequalities (Kreimer 2009, 285). Thereby women's interest groups outside and inside the government were influential in the design of the pension reform. However, both acts did not change the exemption of companies from social insurance contribution for their marginal employees. The act implemented the option, but also shifted the responsibility to the employee. It fits to conservative party's family and economic strategies of supporting the family and also enabling companies' competitiveness. The paradigmatic content of the political composition was ambiguous, the winning coalition was made up of both popular parties reacting partly on pressures from women's interest groups.

Policy

Marginal employment was an important Austrian labour market policy instrument to support workers through additional income. Marginal employment was permitted whilst receiving parental leave, pension or unemployment benefits (Thöny 2008, 111). Thus it was an active strategy of topping up benefits while not being primarily active on the labour market. The voluntary insurance option was targeted at employees that mainly worked in marginal employment and thus received a very low pension and did not contribute to health insurance. Marginal employees were highly dependent on co-insurance through their full-time working partner. In case of divorce or break up, this could have severe effects on their social security coverage. The new regulation granted voluntary insurance to all employees and did not differentiate between marginal employees with and without care obligations. In its effects the act reflected the work-sharing paradigm. A severe barrier for particularly marginalised part-time employees was demolished. Due to the specific life situations of the majority of marginal employees, the act mainly supported women who combined care work with limited labour market participation. Improving the social security coverage of marginal employees was a supportive instrument based on the primary carer & secondary earner paradigm with universal effects.

In sum, the ideational content of the act was the primary care & secondary earner paradigm with strong work-sharing consequences. The improved access of marginal employees to social security was legally not limited to parents or mothers, instead all marginal employees were covered. However, marginal employment was seen as secondary next to the primary obligation, such as care. The secondary nature of marginal employment was also portrayed by the permission to earn money up to the threshold as well as receiving unemployment, pension or parental leave benefits. It was not seen as employment form that generated a living wage. Instead it was seen as additional income source next to household income, which had to be generated by other means. For caring mothers this would have meant that their full-time working partner had to provide the main share of the family wage. However, the reform deviated partly from the male breadwinner model. Women were supported in the limited labour

market participation and their working conditions improved. Marginal employees could finance parts of their health and pension insurance by themselves. In a nutshell, the aspects of the pension reform that concern part-time employment were strongly influenced by the need to support working mothers, thus the primary carer & secondary earner paradigm. The consequences, however, are universal, in accordance to the work-sharing paradigm a powerful barrier for part-time employees' working condition was demolished.

5.2.5 Old Age Part-time 2000

The Old Age Part-time scheme (Altersteilzeitmodell) was reformed in 2000 with the focus to restrict the use of early retirement and tackle the problem of unemployment of older workers. The scheme already existed before 2000, however, it was one option next to early retirement and part-time pension (Gleitpension). The reform present the Old Age Part-time scheme as the governmental preferred instrument to improve employment of older workers. The other two options were based on partial withdrawal of pension benefits, and thereby put additional financial pressure on the pension system. Whereas in the Old Age Part-time scheme, employers maintained to pay the full-time based social security contributions. The reform modernised the scheme and implemented additional work-sharing aspects. It allowed the reduction in working hours without negative effects on the level of pension, health and unemployment entitlements. Male workers older than 55 and female workers older than 50 years who had worked more than five years at their company could reduce half of their working hours for a maximum period of five years. Despite reducing their working hours by 50%, the participating employees received still 75% of their previous income. The new income became also the calculation basis for pension and health insurance contributions. Employers received a financial support for the extra payment and also for the additional social insurance contributions. However, the financial support was only granted if a substitute labour force was hired. Similarly to the Solidarity Premiums Bonus model, the reduced working hours had be taken up by a new employee. Deviating from it, the number of hours of the new employees was not specified in the Old Age Part-time scheme. The replacement force had to be previously unemployed and her or his new job had to be above the marginal employment threshold (Buechbner-Ferstl et al. 2011, 27). Thereby, the scheme not only had an effect for older employees, but was also a job creation instrument.

Ten months after introduction, the initial law was already modified. The mandatory reduction of 50% was replaced by the option to reduce the working hours by 40% to 60%. The reduced working hours could be taken in a block period instead being spread over an extended period of six years. Employees also received a lowered replacement rate, but the calculation basis for employer's social insurance contributions remained the previous income. The most important change was the abolishment of the obligation to hire a replacement (Greisberger 2015, 7ff.). The reform in late 2000 was mainly motivated by the low take ups and aimed at

creating a more attractive model for companies. Between the introduction in 2000 and the use as an anti-crisis instrument in 2009, the scheme was modified multiple times. The analysis of the ideational content will focus on the initial design and its reform in 2000.

Problem

Since the accession to the European Union in 1995, the grand coalition devoted the majority of its policies to cost containment of public expenditures. Regarding pension policies, the coalition focused on limiting early retirement (Obinger et al. 2010, 47ff.). The proposal of the Old Age Part-time scheme was focused on supporting employment of older workers, by implementing a new working time model (Greisberger 2015, 9f.). Early retirement had been used by companies as strategy to cope with economic pressures and to reduce labour force costs. The government aimed at limiting it and thus increased the risk of unemployment among older workers. Therefore, the Old Age Part-time scheme was introduced as means to combat the increased risk of unemployment and to enable a sliding transition into pension. Its problem definition is, however, not clearly covered by one of the four paradigms. The work-sharing paradigm with its problem definition of combating rising unemployment is closest the problem definition of the initial reform. This is consistent with the obligation to hire a substitute labour force. The modifications in late 2000 were implemented as part of the pension reform by the newly elected conservative ÖVP-FPÖ coalition. The rising risk of unemployment of older workers and rising financial pressure on the pension system remained the defined problem of the scheme. However, the terms were changed to make it more attractive for companies to use it.

Political

The initial proposal of 1999 was presented by the grand coalition as part of the Pact for Older Employees. It was adopted by SPÖ, ÖVP and the Green party. The FPÖ and the Liberal Forum rejected the law, due to its unpractical design. They expected that companies will not make use of the scheme. The original winning coalition resembles the traditional policy-making of including the interests of the strongest parties from the left and right. However, the approval by the left Green party and the rejection by the right FPÖ indicate that the policy resemble more the work-sharing paradigm than the economic flexibility paradigm. In contrast, the modification in late 2000 by the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition resemble unambiguously the economic flexibility paradigm. Further support for the classification was provided by the political conflict on the pension reform in 2000. All parties and social partners agreed that a reform of the early retirement scheme was necessary. However, the pension reform primarily introduced cost cutting measures, which were strongly rejected by labour interest groups (Stueckler 2000). The chamber of labour predicted delayed retirement and longer periods of unemployment for older workers. The Austrian Trade Union federation even filed a lawsuit for unconstitutionality

before the Constitutional Court. Due to its connection to the pension reform, the political aspects of the modified Old Age Part-time scheme represent the economic flexibility paradigm.

Policy

Because of the obligation to hire an additional employee, the policy content of the initial scheme had a strong work-sharing implications. He or she had to be unemployed and the new employment contract had to provide an income above marginal employment. Thereby, the scheme also focused on improving the general employment level. "The new regulations have significantly stimulated part-time work among older employees since they meet the interests of both employees and employers" (Traxler 2001). Older workers could ease the transfer into pension without negative consequences on their level of pension benefits. Their risk of becoming unemployed before pension entry, and thereby increasing the risk of poverty, was reduced. On the other hand, employers could use the scheme to restructure their company and to reduce their workforce costs in a socially acceptable way. The scheme lost its strong work-sharing function when the obligation to employ an additional workers was abolished. It still had a labour market policy function by tackling unemployment among older workers, but not by creating new jobs. The reform made the calculation of the financial support for employers dependent on hiring a replacement employee. The Old Age Part-time benefit covered 100% of the additional costs if the company hired somebody, if not, the benefit only covered only 50% (Bucheberner-Ferstl et al. 2011, 27). The obligation was replaced by a financial incentive and thereby the work-sharing effect was not abolished but weakened.

In sum, the Old Age Part-time scheme was a work-sharing instrument. Its implication on the general employment rate probably remained rather low, because the revision weakened the job creation effect and also implemented a block option. Instead of easing the pension transition gradually, and thereby keeping the knowledge of the experienced workers in the company, the block option functioned as early retirement. This aspect remained to be point of contention and also of several reforms. The ÖVP-FPÖ coalition reasoned to make the scheme more attractive for companies, while accepting limitations in its effect of preventing unemployment. An additional aspect of the scheme's design limited its labour market consequences. Similar to the Solidarity Premiums Model, a condition of entitlement scheme was a collective or individual agreement between the employer and employee. The entitlement to the scheme was not universally regulated by law, but had to be implemented through collective agreements. This meant that the specific conditions and coverage could differ between sectors. The scheme was mainly an instrument to support part-time working older employees in the last years of their career, which is only a limited work-sharing.

5.2.6 Parental part-time 2004

The Parental Part-time scheme (Elternteilzeit) also promoted the use part-time in a specific life situation, particularly during parenthood. The right of parents to work part-time was introduced in 2004 and expanded the previous option to work part-time during and after parental leave introduced in 1990. Parents who worked for no less than three years at a company with at least 20 employees had the right to reduce their working hours (Thöny 2008, 117ff.). Both parents had an individual right to part-time employment und could use it separately or simultaneously until the seventh birthday or school entry of their child. However, reducing her or his working hours while the other partner was in parental leave remained to be incompatible. The essential regulation affecting the job quality was the right to return to the previous working time after parental part-time. During part-time employment, employees remained to be covered by the regular dismissal protection of parents. A novel modification was the reform of the agreement procedure between employer and employee. The entitlement was regulated in similar way than holiday entitlements (Gärtner, Klein, and Lutz 2008, 86). A legal right existed, but the use of parental part-time employment required an agreement between the employer and employee on its arrangement. If an agreement could not be reached after several official mediations, employee's preferences was treated as superior in court. Deviating from the previous regulation, parents had a strong bargaining position and employers could not prevent that their employee made use of her or his right.

Problem

Since the first introduction of the option to work part-time after parental leave in 1990 there were debates in parliament and government on implementing it as a right. With the adoption of the act, the ÖVP-FPÖ government aimed at supporting the reconciliation of unpaid care and labour market participation. Each parent had the individual right, which differs from the right to parental leave to which parents are entitled as an entity and thus primarily mothers. The gender equal treatment had some dual-earner / dual-carer connotation, but it was expected that the scheme encourages the traditional distribution of tasks between parents (BKA 2013, 1). Since the majority of carers remained to be women, mothers were the main addressee of reconciliation support. The problems in reconciling work and care were defined as the main problem of the act, thus it was based on the primary care & secondary earner paradigm with influence of the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm.

Political

The conditional right to part-time employment was adopted by the conservative coalition of the ÖVP and FPÖ. Both parties supported traditionally the conservative model of family care. The family model of the ÖVP remained to be the modernised traditional male breadwinner ideal (Seeleib-Kaiser, van Dyk, and Roggenkamp 2005, 13). In the 90s and 2000s, the party articulated several times their support for gender equality and the intention to improve the

working conditions of employed mothers. However, their policies were not determined enough to implement effective measures (Dujmovits 2011, 68). In particular, the view that care for children under three and care in the afternoon was primarily an obligation of the family, thus mothers, remained dominant.

At first glance the parental right to part-time employment deviated from the family policy positions of both ÖVP and FPÖ, since the core of the ÖVP-FPÖ's family policy reforms was the restructuring of the parental leave benefits' scheme with a strong refamilisation orientation. In 2002, a universal child care benefit model was adopted that replaced the previous income-dependent system. In the new system, parents could choose their preferred option to spread a flat rate benefit over a maximum period of 30 months, plus six additional months if both partners used parental leave. However, the dismissal protection remained to be 24 months, leading to potential job loss when the maximum duration of parental leave was used. Hereby the government implemented an incentive to ignore the maximum duration of the right to return to the previous job. Studies stated that the persons concerned quite often were not aware of the loophole and the risk to lose their job (Blum 2012, 87). Thereby, the government constituted its position that the primary obligation of mothers was care provision and their labour market participation was of secondary importance.

The right to part-time employment was generally supported by all parliamentary parties. However, the opposition rejected the actual design of the system, in particular the exemption of employees with an employment history of less than three years or that work at a small company. The political content of the reform unambiguously represented the primary-carer & secondary earner paradigm. An additional aim of the coalition was to limit the influence of organised labour in the policy-making process. The traditional policy making that respected the interest of labour and employer interests groups came to a halt during ÖVP-FPÖ's terms in office (Obinger et al. 2010, 53f.). Thus, the influence of trade unions on the design of the act was very little, which fits to the primary-carer & secondary earner paradigm.

Policy

With the new scheme employers did not have the right to object the use of parental part-time. They could only influence the arrangement through the obligatory agreement. As illustrated, in case of disagreement the law bounded the parties to several official mediations, followed up by a court hearing. The preference of the employee were treated as superior and if the court hearing did not conclude in an agreement, the employee was allowed to work part-time as he or she preferred (Gärtner, Klein, and Lutz 2008, 86). Employers had to create part-time positions and previous objections that it would not be possible organisationally were not valid. Parents were entitled to work part-time by law and not by collective agreement as it was the case of Old Age Part-time or Solidarity Premiums Model. Each parent had the individual right

to reduce their working hours once until the seventh birthday of their child. The maximum period was extended from four years to seven years, which also extends its flexibility. Concerning the ideational content of the act, it was clearly and employee-orientated family policy. Parents gained a strong position towards their employers, which values parents' role as carer over their labour market participation. Since it was granted individually and formulated gender-equally, it was unambiguously based on the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm. As mentioned, the prevailing unequal distribution of care between parents and the scarcity of child care facilities contradict the intention of the act. The right was also explicitly promoted by the government as support for preschool child care and thereby part refamilisation policies (Kreimer 2011, 96).

In sum, the act was in each of its three streams based on different paradigms. The winning coalition clearly represented the primary-carer & secondary earner paradigm, the problem definition was additionally influenced by the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm. Whereas, the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm was dominant in the policy sphere. The scarcity of child care facilities for children under three years led to the use of parental part-time employment as interim solution to fill the gap between the end of parental leave and the start of kindergarten. Thus, the environment limited the dual-earner / dual-carer intentions.

A critical restriction of the right was caused by the terms of entitlement. Due to prevailing size of companies in Austria and the increase of temporary contracts, a great share of employees were not entitled. In particular, women were working at companies with less than 20 employees. In 2007 it was estimated that 70% of male employees, but only 54% of female employees were covered by the legal right (Mairhuber and Papouscheck 2010, 29). The remaining employees had to rely on the previous part-time employment option. As illustrated, this option was more restricted and based on an obligatory agreement. One of first evaluation of the right to part-time employment showed that it was especially used by people with higher education (Dörfler et al. 2009, 183). In particular, the right to return to the previous full-time working hours was highly valued and the uptake of it among men was higher than the uptake of parental leave among men. Thereby, its dual-earner / dual-carer policy might be effective, despite the prevailing primary-carer & secondary earner environment and political coalition. Part-time employment was only promoted as a family policy instrument and not as general work-sharing measure. The restrictions due the regulation of entitlement had an additional negative effect on the scope of the right. The group of recipients was restricted in order to limit the costs for companies, which fits the employer and cost containment perspective of the ÖVP-FPÖ collation.

5.2.7 Overtime bonus for part-time employment 2008

Until late 2007, part-time employees' overtime below the statutory or collectively defined working time was salaried as regular working hours. Based on Austrian working time law there were two different forms of overtime that were also covered by different bonuses or surcharges. The regular overtime bonus was defined as any additional working hour above the statutory or collective working time. Employers had to pay an additional bonus of 50% of the hourly wage to their employee. Part-time employees were entitled to the regular overtime bonus, however, they had to exceed the statutory regular working time, usually, of 40 hours per week. That meant that part-time employees had to work several hours above their contractual working time in order to receive benefits. This unintentionally encouraged companies to use their part-time employees to cover the fluctuations in labour demand, since their overtime was cheaper than of full-time employees. Out of a pure economic perspective, it was favourable to hire part-time employees for a lower amount of working time than actual needed. Already in 1992, the government proposed an overtime surcharge for extending the contractual defined working time, thereby including any overtime of part-time employees. Due to severe objections by the employer organisation, it was not adopted.

Since 2008, the overtime of part-time employees above their contractual defined working time and below the statutory threshold had to be compensated by a bonus of 25% of the regular hourly wage (Bucheбner-Ferstl et al. 2011, 22ff.). The overtime was free of surcharge, if it was compensate in a calendar quarter or in a defined three month period. Part-time employees could only be obliged to work overtime if labour law or collective agreements prescribed for it or an unusual high demand for work existed at the company. Employers also had to consider the life situation of their employees, parents for instances could refuse to work overtime. The act was part of the Amendment to the Working Time Act (*Arbeitszeitgesetz*) of 2007, which aimed at balancing business demands and employees' need for improved work-life balance.

Problem

The Amendment to the Working Time Act implemented several measures, which on one side were targeted at increasing employer-based flexibility and on the other side included several atypical employment forms into social security coverage. The overtime surcharge for part-time employment was part of the security side of the flexicurity policy package. The addressed problem of the act was the unfairness of costs between full-time and part-time employment, since it was much cheaper for companies to use part-time employees to meet their flexibility needs. On the societal level, the bonus was a strategy to reach cost fairness and to prevent dismantling of full-time employment. On the individual level, it was expected that the bonus functions as flexibility compensation (Bucheбner-Ferstl et al. 2011, 25). The problem definition of the overtime surcharge was based on the work-sharing paradigm. By creating cost fairness and limiting the use of part-time employment as secondary workforce, the contractual working

hours might represent the actual working time and thus free working hours for additional jobs (Bergmann, Papouscheck, and Sorger 2010, 15; Buchebner-Ferstl et al. 2011, 23).

Political

The new grand coalition of SPÖ and ÖVP with the social democratic Prime Minister Alfred Gusenbauer came into power through the general elections in 2006. It replaced the conservative ÖVP-FPÖ coalition after seven years in government. The negotiations between the later coalition parties took several months and already after nearly two years in office the grand coalition collapsed. After the general election in 2008 the coalition returned into office with a severe loss of seats in the parliament. In the first term of office the parties obstructed each other in several policy fields. The Working Time Amendment Act, however, was jointly adopted in the first year with strong support by the social partners. The core of the programme was to reach greater flexicurity and that tackled poverty (Obinger et al. 2010, 62f.). The adoption of the overtime surcharge was the core measure of the working time reform that was based on a joint proposal of the social partners. Employer organisations argued beforehand that the existing working time regulation was too inflexible and an extension of working time arrangements was necessary (Adam 2007a). Labour interest groups argued for extension of social security coverage, such as the inclusion of quasi-freelancer into unemployment insurance and the opting-in option for self-employed. The proposal contained several measures from both sides and thereby resembled strongly the flexicurity concept.

The grand coalition deviated strongly from the positions of its predecessors, which explicitly renounced from a surcharge. They assumed that part-time employment's increased cost of labour will lead to discrimination of part-time employees (Juraszovich and Kranvogel-Zellermayer 1999, 34). The assumption was reversed and the different treatment of part-time and full-time employees regarding overtime was defined as discriminatory. However, the opposition parties expressed several objections, such as that the extended scope of workplace bargaining on working time will pressure employees to accept greater one-sided flexibility (Adam 2007b). To conclude, the political composition of the winning coalition resembled the traditional way of Austrian policy making, by finding an agreement between the two popular parties and social partners. Therefore, the political content of the act was a mixture of the work-sharing and economic flexibility paradigm.

Policy

The working time reform implemented several deregulations, such as the extension of maximum daily working hours to ten hours and the possibility to temporally extending the daily working hours to twelve and the weekly to 60 hours (Mairhuber and Papouscheck 2010, 435). Thereby the act aimed at fulfilling the flexibility demands of companies. On the other side, the security demands of employees were addressed with the social security coverage extension

and the overtime surcharge. The policy was designed to stop the use of part-time employment as cheap and flexible workforce to fill the fluctuations in labour demands. Thus the overtime bonus was clearly not based on the economic flexibility paradigm. The work-sharing orientation was made explicit by governmental expectations that the increase in costs would create new jobs that covered the prior overtime hours (Bucheberner-Ferstl et al. 2011, 23). The overtime bonus ended an unequal treatment of part-time and full-time employees in overtime compensation. Thereby the main policy content of the overtime surcharge was based on the work-sharing paradigm. However, it was part of a broader reform which was a combination of both labour market paradigms.

To conclude, the ideational content of the general reform was a combination of both labour market paradigms in all its three streams. Whereas, the overtime surcharge was clearly based on the work-sharing paradigm. The defined problem was to tackle the use of part-time employment as secondary workforce and thus not to combat unemployment, which would be the primary problem of the work-sharing paradigm. The policy content was, however, unambiguously based on the work-sharing paradigm. The act contributed to the equalisation of the working conditions of part-time and full-time employees. Employers had to pay a surcharge if any of their employees worked overtime, independent of their employment contract. However, from a gender perspective, the difference in overtime bonuses was questionable. To use full-time employees as flexible workforce was still twice as expensive as using part-time employees. The regulation was also vaguely formulated, which caused debates about the scope of covered employment contracts. However, it was concluded that even the difference between collective working hours and statutory working time will be treated as overtime based on the 25% bonus (Thöny 2008, 62). From a family policy perspective, parents could not be forced to work overtime and thus received additional coverage (Bucheberner-Ferstl et al. 2011, 23). However, parental part-time employment was covered by overtime surcharge, whereas short-time work was excluded from it. Officially short-time work was not defined as part-time work and exceeding the crisis-induced reduced working time would contradict the logic of short-time work.

5.2.8 Short-time Work during the economic crisis 2009

The global financial and economic crisis hit the Austrian economy and labour market in 2008. In contrast to several other EU member states, Austria had already a short-time work scheme (Kurzarbeit) in place since 1943. Thereby the scheme reacted automatically to the increased risk of unemployment without direct government intervention. However, the labour market problems continued and the government implemented two labour market policy package in the first half of 2009. The anti-crisis policy package were designed to increase the flexibility of the Short-time Work, the Old Age Part-time and the Solidary Bonus Premiums scheme. All of the schemes were based on the logic that part of the labour force reduces their working hours in

order to preserve their and potentially the jobs of their co-workers (Flecker and Schönauer 2013, 76). In general, the policy packages temporarily suspended restrictive conditions, extended the maximum entitlement period and added additional benefits for training during short-time work. Companies that were affected by temporary economic difficulties due to reasons beyond their control were entitled to short-time work. However, beforehand they had to make use of all internal alternatives in coordination with the employee representatives. A precondition for the application to the short-time work scheme was an agreement between the social partners. A further condition was that the company had to undergo several consultations by the labour market service with participation of the employee representatives before the start of short-time work. It could be used for six months and renewed for additional two times, thus for a maximum duration of 18 months. All employees except marginal employees, apprentices and members of the executive board could take part in the scheme. They received an employer-paid financial support for the reductions in working time, which considered their number of children and accounted for at least their respective unemployment benefit rate. The concrete amount was jointly decided at the company level. The labour market service supported the employer through the compensation of 55% of the net wage of their participating employees up to a maximum gross wage of €3727.28 (Eurofound 2010, 5).

The first policy package that directly targeted the labour market was adopted in March 2009 and the second in June 2009. In particular, the second reform modified the three working time reduction schemes (AK Wien 2009; BMASK 2009). Until 2013, the maximum period of short-time work was extended by an additional six months up to 24 months in total. During short-time work the employers had to maintain to pay their social security contributions based on the previous salary of their employee. However, the government assumed that this will increase the risk of dismissal at companies with lasting economic problems. Therefore, from the seventh month onwards, the additional costs for social insurance contributions were covered by scheme. The reform also defined that the working time could be reduced by 10% to 90%. A training scheme was also implemented in order to improve the employability during short-time work. If companies offered their employees general training of 16 hours per week, they received a 15% higher training benefit instead of the short-time work benefit. The content of the training had to be defined beforehand and could not contain training which benefited solely current and future occupation at the company. Employers were also entitled to a training supplement that covered 60% of the training costs.

The labour market policy package also modified the Old Age Part-time scheme. In order to increase its flexibility, the obligation to hire a substitute employee was suspended. The yearly adjustment of the entry age was suspended for 2009 and part-time employees with at least 60% of the statutory working time were included in the Old Age Part-time scheme. The reason for the suspensions were due to concerns that during the crisis companies could not pay for

an additional employee. The replacement rate of benefits were also adapted to hinder the use of the scheme as early retirement. For the continuous option a benefit of 90% of the previous wage was paid, whereas for the block model only a 55% benefit. The Solidarity Premiums Model was opened to be used jointly by a group of employees. The freed working hours of several workers could be used to hire a single employee or an apprentice. The Solidarity Premiums Model was modified to tackle in particular the increasing unemployment among young people. With the old regulation it was not possible to use the freed working hours to employ an apprentice on a regular employment contract after her or his training.

Problem

The underlying problem of the two labour market reforms were the concerns of not having access to scarce skilled workers in economic upswing after the crisis. The main focus of the three schemes was the preservation of jobs and not the creation of new jobs. Thereby, the government aimed at maintaining jobs and to avoid unemployment during temporal economic difficulties, while additionally ensuring that companies will have workers at their disposal (Eurofound 2010, 2). The majority of anti-crisis labour market measures were already in place before the crisis and thereby functioned automatically. The first part of the problem definition focused at the risk of unemployment and thus was based on the work-sharing paradigm. Whereas, the second part defined the potential negative effect of the crisis on companies' competitiveness as problem and was thereby based on the economic flexibility paradigm. The additional training to improve adaptability and employability further supported the market perspective of the policy packages. The policies were based on combined problem definition by the work-sharing and economic flexibility paradigm, emphasising the thread of unemployment and loss in competitiveness.

Political

The labour market policy packages were introduced by the grand coalition under the social democratic Prime Minister Werner Faymann. The coalition came into power after the general elections in 2008, in which both the SPÖ and ÖVP lost severely, whereas the populist parties FPÖ and BZÖ gained additional seats. Thereby, the government had a strong right-leaning opposition in parliament. The anti-crisis labour market policies were drafted by a tripartite taskforce that consisted of representatives from the social ministry, employer and employee organisations (Eurofound 2010, 3). The social partners agreed on the need to extend the budget for anti-crisis schemes, but they had different perspectives on the specific design. However, as in previous negotiations, the taskforce found an agreement that was adopted by the government without major modifications. The social partners also had a strong role on the company level, because the Short-time Work, Old Age Part-time or Solidarity Premiums Model had to be implemented through an agreement. Thus the arrangement could differ severely from company to company. The composition of the policy coalition resembled the work-sharing

and the economic flexibility paradigm. Both major parties and social partners had influence on the design of the policy measures. The policy packages were even unanimously approved by the Austrian parliament (Obinger et al. 2010, 65), which even further illustrates the support from all political sides.

Policy

Before 2008, short-time work was rarely used, however, it was already in place when the economic crisis started. The automatic buffer gave the government time to decide on additional labour market policies. In spring 2009 the first anti-crisis package targeted at the problems on the labour market was adopted. The desired effects were not generated and a second and more far-reaching package was adopted in June 2009 (Adam 2009). Short-time work schemes are job preserving instruments and the job creating aspects of the Old Age Part-time and Solidarity Premiums Model were suspended during the economic crisis (Flecker and Schönauer 2013, 76). Thereby, the governmental response was primarily focused on preventing unemployment and to support companies in securing the necessary skilled workers for the upswing after the crisis.

The rights or the working conditions of part-time employees were not sustainably altered. All measures were temporary and specifically designed to tackle the economic crisis. Part-time employees were treated as regular employees in all schemes and they were included in the Old Age Part-time scheme. However, an entitlement condition of minimum 60% of the regular working time was applied. Marginal employees were excluded from all schemes, because only employees that are covered by social security were entitled. One of the preconditions for the short-time work scheme was the use of all internal options, which probably led to the dismissal of marginal employees. The work-sharing influence on the policy content was limited and the job preservation effect only temporal. The preservation of companies' competitiveness was a policy goal based on the economic flexibility paradigm, however, the policies did not contribute to the deregulation part-time employment or increased unilaterally the employer-orientated flexibility. Despite its limited influence, the work-sharing paradigm was relatively influential, because jobs were preserved and the negative consequences that probably would have affected the more vulnerable employees were prevented. The economic flexibility paradigm was influential through its company perspective of securing competitiveness. The ideational content of the policy aspect was a combination of the work-sharing and economic flexibility paradigm, however with a greater influence of the first.

To conclude, the anti-crisis policy measures were highly effective and Austria had one of the lowest unemployment rates during the economic crisis. Probably the long lasting tradition of the short-time work and other working time reduction schemes led to the quick adaptation and effective use. The majority of participants were male employees that worked in the

manufacturing sector (Flecker and Schönauer 2013, 78). In particular the export-orientated automobile industry made use of short-time work (Eurofound 2010, 8f.). The peak of short-time work usage was reached in April 2009, thus before the second policy package was implemented. In contrast to the Netherlands, the budget for short-time work was not exceeded during the crisis. Companies registered more workers for the scheme than actually participated in it. It was used as last safety net and registrations were done as precaution. The temporal modification were in place until 2013, but companies had to register before the end of 2010. From the ideational perspective the labour market policy packages were rooted in both paradigms. The problem definition and the political sphere were influenced by a balanced combination. The policy content, however, on a combination with stronger influence by the work-sharing paradigm. From the perspective of part-time employee, the policies did not implement and long-lasting changes and thereby did not contribute to an improvement or deterioration of their working conditions. The purpose of the work-sharing and economic flexibility based policies were to tackle the temporal problems caused by the economic crisis.

5.2.9 Summary: Ideational genesis of Austrian part-time employment legislation

Part-time work in Austria remained a female dominated employment form in Austria and policies supported the empirical use of it as a reconciliation instrument. The primary carer & secondary earner paradigm was highly influential in the majority of policies affecting part-time employment. In the early 90s, the grand coalition of SPÖ and ÖVP introduced the first policies that promoted part-time work as an explicit policy instrument. It was part of the first family policy package in 1990 and gave fathers the right to parental leave, thereby aiming at introducing a modified family model based on equal partnership. Part-time employment was portrayed as the employment form to reconcile labour market participation and unpaid care provision. Employed parents obtained the option to work part-time after and partially instead of parental leave. However in contrast to the parental part-time right of 2004, the employer had great influence on the arrangement and permission. The option was in coherence with the traditional perspective on families as the main care provider and thereby the primary carer & secondary earner paradigm. Part-time employment was designed to bridge the gap between the end of parental leave and the start of kindergarten.

The second family policy package further strengthened the use of part-time employment as a family policy instrument. The primary-carer & secondary earner paradigm was highly influential in both reforms and mainly affected the problem definition. Parental part-time employment was granted to both parents, however, it was assumed that it will be used by the main carer, thus mothers. The missing additional financial support and the conditional partial renouncement from parental leave benefits were strong disincentives for the higher-paid parent to make use of parental leave. The father also had to convince their employers, thereby creating strong disincentives in a male breadwinner dominated business culture (Bergmann, Papouscheck,

and Sorger 2010, 8ff.). The promotion of part-time employment as a family policy instrument in the early 1990s had some dual-earner / dual-carer intentions, however, the design of the policies supported the predominant parental roles of the primary-carer & secondary earner paradigm.

The combination of opposing paradigms was common in Austria, and in particular in the political stream, the majority of policies were based on agreements between political actors that represent different paradigms. Austria has a strong tradition of compromise-based policy making (Obinger et al. 2010, 4f.). The majority of policies affecting part-time employment were also adopted by a grand coalition and with social partners' consent. The adoption of the right to parental part-time constituted an exemption. It was adopted by a populist conservative government and thereby represented unambiguously the primary carer & secondary earner paradigm, while the total orientation of the policies was the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm. The institutionalised roles of social partners under the grand coalition governments lead to the influence of opposing paradigms and thus to policy output with ambiguous intentions.

Despite the influence of multiple paradigms, the traditional primary-carer & secondary earner paradigm remained dominant in 1990s family policies. However, this does not imply that the policies affecting part-time employment had only family policy intentions and effects. In preparation for the second family policy package in 1992, the government obliged the equal treatment of part-time employees in all regulations of working conditions. Part-time employees had to have at least proportional access to the statutory and collectively agreed benefits, which had not been the case before 1993 (Bergmann, Papouscheck, and Sorger 2010, 14). In preparation for the planned accession to the European Union in 1995, the Austrian government enforced the legal equal treatment of men and women. Since part-time employment remained to be a female employment form and was also promoted by the family policy packages as a reconciliation instrument specifically for women, unequal treatment constituted indirect discrimination (Bucheber-Ferstl et al. 2011, 19ff.). The output of the labour law reform and equal treatment legislation was a work-sharing policy, and therefore legal barriers for the equalisation of part-time and full-time employees were demolished. However, the perspective on part-time employment continued to be affected by the primary carer & secondary earner paradigm. It was necessary to improve the working conditions of part-time employees in order to support the employment of women next to their main obligations outside the labour market.

The Solidarity Premiums Model in 1998 was the first governmental act that promoted the use of part-time employment for the entire labour force. The scheme supported individual employees who wished to reduce their working time independently of their intended use of it. At the same time, the freed hours were used to employ a former unemployed person. Employers received financial support to cover the additional costs and to maintain the social

insurance level of their employee. One condition of all public working time reduction schemes, except parental part-time employment, was the continued payment of previous social security contributions to prevent long-term negative consequences for employees. The Solidarity Premiums Model was clearly a labour market policy instrument and in contrast to the previous family policies promoted part-time employment as a temporary employment form for all full-time employees, by providing subsidies to employees and employers. In combination with the obligation to hire a substitute labour force, the scheme was unambiguously based on the work-sharing paradigm. The initial Old Age Part-time scheme that was adopted in 2000, was also predominantly based on the work-sharing paradigm. However, its focus rested on the support of older workers and the prevention of early retirement, thus preventing additional financial pressure on the pension system. The original design also contained the obligation to hire a substitute employee, and was thus a work-sharing instrument. However, ten months after its introduction, the conservative ÖVP-FPÖ coalition revoked the obligation and introduced instead a financial incentive.

Austria showed a specific pattern in promoting part-time employment as a labour market policy instrument. Both the Solidarity Premiums Model and the Old Age Part-time supported the individual reduction of working time and simultaneously the use of the freed working time in order to hire a new employee. Companies could not use the schemes to reduce labour costs, which supported the employee-orientation of the schemes. However, the outputs of these work-sharing instruments were limited. They were not focused on the entire labour force, but rather designed to meet the demands of a limited number of employees. The Old-Age Part-time scheme was explicitly restricted for older employees. The Solidarity Premiums Model was open to a greater share of workers, but the number of participants did not fulfil the expectations of the government. Both schemes were designed for temporary use, whereas the non-temporary part-time employment remained to be portrayed as female employment form. Regular part-time employment was a family policy instrument, whereas subsidised part-time employment was designed to meet the demands of full-time employees and to redistribute part of the working time. Additionally, both schemes had to be implemented by collective agreements, which further limited their availability and also created differences in their specification.

In contrast, the parental right to part-time employment of 2004 was unconditional. Parents received the right to reduce their working hours after parental leave and their preferences were treated as superior in negotiations with their employer. The previous parental part-time time option contained several restrictive regulations. The new right extended the maximum duration and each parent was individually entitled. This increased severely the flexibility of the scheme. The concerns of fathers were addressed by the improved bargaining position and the right to return to the previous workplace. The implementation as legal right supported fathers in their

negotiations, because even in a contradictory business culture without other part-time working fathers, they could refer to their legal entitlement. Thus the parental part-time scheme supported the gender equal use of part-time employment as defined by the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm. Both parents received support in their wish to reconcile labour market participation and child care provision. It was also possible for both parents to reduce simultaneously their working time and thereby fill the gap until the start of kindergarten together. Thus, it was also a support for informal provision of preschool childcare by fathers and mothers. However the impact on part-time employees' working condition was limited.

Firstly as assumed, dual-earner / dual-carer policies are limited to parents. Secondly, not all parents were entitled. To be entitled it was necessary to be employed for at least three years at a company with at least twenty employees. Workers at small enterprises were excluded from the right and could negotiate with their employer to take parental leave based on the 1990 option. It was expected that the majority of employees would not be entitled to parental part-time. In 2007 only 6% of people who were entitled to parental part-time employment made use of their right. Out of those were 14% men, however, in comparison to other family leaves the share of men was quite high (Bergmann, Papouscheck, and Sorger 2010, 15). The design of the right to parental part-time work severely limited the coverage of the dual-earner / dual-carer policy and thereby the effect on the working conditions of part-time employees.

The voluntary insurance of marginal employees remained in accordance with the predominant family policy paradigm of the 90s. It addressed the problem of uninsured marginal employees as a problem of female part-time employees. In particular, women who devoted the majority of their life to the provision of informal child care and worked only in marginal employment could face severe risks of poverty in old age. In the primary carer & secondary earner paradigm, mothers are dependent on the income from their partner. The Austrian contribution-based social insurances provide for the coinsurance of mothers through their partner. The act granted marginal employees the option to contribute by themselves to their pension insurance and also independently finance their health insurance. The exclusion had a negative effect on the job quality of part-time employees with a particularly low number of working hours. They received very little wages, but also had to rely on their partner's co-entitlement to welfare. Thus, the work-sharing paradigm together with primary carer & secondary earner paradigm had an influence on the policy. Its output was, however, universal. Not only parents, but all employees in marginal employment received the option for voluntary insurance.

In contrast, the overtime bonus of 2008 was a pure labour market policy and was unambiguously rooted in the work-sharing paradigm. Any overtime beneath the statutory or collective regular working time was salaried as regular working hours in contrast to the 50% overtime bonus of full-time employees. Thus it was economically favourable to employ part-

time employees on a lower working time than actually needed. In case of low demand the part-timer workers had a low amount of guaranteed working time, whereas in case of high demand, the company could oblige them to work overtime. The cost unfairness between part-time and full-time employment had negative effects on the job quality and it was also expected that it would contribute to the dismantling of full-time employment. This was clearly an unequal treatment based on working hours. A bonus of 25% for overtime that exceeded the contractual working time was adopted to tackle the inequality. On the individual level, it was also a flexibility compensation and on the societal level to create cost fairness. By equalising part-time and full-time employees in a specific regulation, the act was based on the work-sharing paradigm and its effect was universal. Thereby, the over-time surcharge had the strongest positive effect on the policies affecting part-time employees' job quality. Similar to the equal treatment legislation in 1992, it was a universal labour law reform. However, in contrast, it was not part of a family policy package, but part of a flexicurity policy package. The policy package aimed to increase employer-oriented flexibility, and at the same time to improve the working conditions and social security of atypical employees. Thereby it represented the Austrian tradition of combining two opposed ideas.

Similar to the Netherlands, the Austrian anti-crisis policies did not have any lasting effect for the job quality of part-time employees. Part-time employment was strongly supported as a temporal measure to reduce labour costs and thus preserve employment during the crisis. The short-time work scheme was the most used measure and was modified twice in 2009. The use of the modified Old Age Part-time and Solidarity Bonus Model was also promoted to adapt the working time of employees to the economic downturn. The mandatory employment of a substitute worker, and thereby the job creation aspect, was suspended during the crisis. The government aimed at preventing unemployment by redistributing the reduced labour demand between people who were already employed. This resembles the problem definition of the work-sharing paradigm, however, its policy of creating additional jobs was not implemented. The second aim was to secure the competitiveness of companies by preserving their skilled workers for the expected economic recovery. Together with the additional support for improving employees' employability, the second aspect resembled the economic flexibility paradigm. However, regular part-time employment was not addressed directly and their job quality not altered. The focus rested in preserving jobs, which were mainly full-time jobs of male workers in manufacturing. The anti-crisis policies expired in 2013, but in contrast to the Netherlands the budget was not exhausted. Both short-time work schemes were nearly identical in their ideational setup of combining work-sharing with economic flexibility, and also had the no long-lasting effect on policies for part-time employees.

5.3 Comparison

Up to now the genesis of policies affecting part-time employment and their ideational setup was analysed separately for Austria and the Netherlands. Both countries showed several similarities and differences in the influence of certain paradigms. Table 5 and 6 summarise the influence of paradigms in each stream of Dutch and Austrian reforms. In particular the 'total' and the 'impact' column are important for the analysis of the assumed relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable. In the 'total' column, the dominant paradigm or combination of paradigms that shaped the intention, design and scope of the act are listed. It encapsulates the ideational content and thus the independent variable. In the 'impact on part-time employees' job quality' column, the scope and strength of the act's effect on policies affecting part-time employment are illustrated. Part-time employment can be regulated universally, by implementing legal rights, or regulated conditionally for a specific group of employees, for instance parents. The first is categorised as positive effect, whereas the second as positive effect with limitations. Acts can also deregulate part-time employment or adopt a discriminatory regulation. This is classified as negative impact. The 'impact' column illustrates the Austrian and Dutch policies affecting the working conditions and job quality of part-time employees, and thus the dependent variable of the hypothesis.

In the 1990s part-time employment in the Netherlands was mainly portrayed as a work-sharing instrument to create new jobs and also to answer the flexibility needs of employers and employees. The work-sharing paradigm was the dominant ideational orientation, however, the flexibility concerns of the economic flexibility paradigm were also addressed. The positive influence of the reforms on the scope of policies regulating the job quality of part-time employees support the assumed effect of the work-sharing paradigm. The increased regulation of part-time employment was universally defined and affected the entire labour force. All part-time employees were included in important labour law regulations. The 1996 equal treatment law made unequal treatment on grounds of working time unlawful, and thereby lifted part-time employment to the same level than full-time employment in all regulations of working conditions. Austria introduced a similar act in 1992 and thus unequal treatment was made unlawful already four years earlier. However in contrast to the Netherlands, it was part of a family policy package that aimed at improving the working conditions of mothers next to their role as main carer. The dominant paradigm was in both cases the work-sharing paradigm, however the additional influence came from different paradigms; in the Netherlands from the economic flexibility paradigm and in Austria from the primary carer & secondary earner paradigm. The strength of the dependent variable was not affected by it, and the output was a reform of the labour law with universal coverage.

Table 4: Influential paradigms in Dutch legislation on part-time employment

Reform/act	Year	Problem stream	Ideational content			Total	Impact on part-time employees' job quality policies
			Political stream	Policy stream			
Wassenaar Agreement	1982	WS	(WS EF)	WS (EF)	WS (EF)	0	
Pension and Savings Act & Minimum Wage and Minimum Holiday Act	1990 & 1993	WS	WS EF	WS	WS	+	
Non-discrimination on grounds of working time	1996	EF (WS)	WS DE/DC EF	WS	WS (EF)	+	
Adjustment of Working Hours	2000	DE/DC WS	DE/DC	WS DE/DC	WS (DE/DC)	+	
Work and Care Act	2001	DE/DC	DE/DC	DE/DC	DE/DC	(+)	
Life-course Savings Scheme	2006	EF	EF	EF	EF	-	
Short-time Work & Part-time Unemployment Scheme	2008-2011	WS EF	EF WS	WS (EF)	WS (EF)	0	

WS: Work-sharing; EF: Economic Flexibility; DE/DC: Dual-earner / Dual-carer; PC&SE: Primary carer & Secondary earner; (): with reservations

The genesis of policies designed to regulate or deregulate part-time employment had different origins in Austria and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the Wassenaar Agreement put the discourse of part-time employment as a work-sharing and flexibility strategy on the political agenda. Therefore the subsequent governmental policies portrayed part-time employment primarily as a labour market policy instrument. The acts of the 1990s improved the regulation of part-time employment in order to normalise atypical employment and diversify the employment forms on the labour market. This was influenced by the strategy to create a more flexible form of employment for companies, but also for workers. In Austria, part-time employment in the early 1990s was portrayed as family policy instrument. The discourse on part-time employment originated in the support for working mothers that provided informal care. Similar to the Netherlands, the majority of part-time employees were women, however, the Austrian government did not focus on the work-sharing or economic flexibility capabilities of part-time employment. The status of part-time employment in labour and working time law

was improved to support its reconciling capabilities. The dominant idea on care at that time was the informal provision by families and thus by mothers. Part-time employment was promoted as way to combine both limited participation in the labour market and child care. Thereby, the Austrian perspective on part-time employment originated from a family policy perspective, whereas, in the Netherlands from a labour market policy perspective. The outputs, however, had similarities because the choice of instruments was to expand labour law, thus to equalise the legal regulation.

Table 5: Influential paradigms in Austrian legislation on part-time employment

Reform/act	Year	Ideational content			Total	Impact on part-time employees' job quality policies
		Problem stream	Political stream	Policy stream		
Parental Leave Extension Act	1990	PC&SE (DE/DC)	PC&SE DE/DC	(DE/DC)	PE&SC (DE/DC)	0
Accompanying Act on Labour Law	1992	PC&SE	PC&SE DE/DC EF	WS (PC&SE)	WS PC&SE	+
Solidarity Premiums Model	1998	WS	WS EF	WS	WS*	(+)
Voluntary insurance of marginal employees	1998	PC&SE (WS)	ambiguous EF PC&SE DE/DV	PC&SE	PC&SE WS	+
Old age Part-time & reform	2000	(WS)	WS <u>EF</u>	WS (<u>WS</u>)	WS	(+)
Parental Part-time	2004	PC&SE (DE/DC)	PC&SE	DE&DC	DE/DC	(+)
Overtime Bonus	2008	WS	WS EF	WS	WS	+
Short-time Work	2009	WS EF	WS EF	WS (EF)	WS (EF)	0

WS: Work-sharing; EF: Economic Flexibility; DE/DC: Dual-earner / Dual-carer; PC&SE: Primary carer & Secondary earner; () : with reservations

* reinforced through the reform in 2000

Part-time employment as a family policy instrument in the Netherlands was introduced in 2001 with the Work and Care Act. In contrast to the Austrian approach, it was promoted as dual-earner / dual-carer policy and aimed at tackling gender inequality in care provision and on the labour market. Part of the reform of the parental leave system in the Netherlands was the

introduction of paternity leave. Austrian fathers still do not have a statutory right to paternity leave, but they might be entitled to specific leave through their collective agreement. In both countries, parental leave is closely connected to part-time employment. In Austria, the 1990 family policy package introduced the option of parental part-time, whereas in the Netherlands, parental leave can only be taken part-time. The initial Austrian parental part-time scheme was based on the primary carer & secondary earner paradigm and was a support for the provision of pre-kindergarten informal care. The dual-earner / dual-carer orientation of the Dutch reform in 2001 put a stronger focus on equal share of labour and care between parents. Its effects continued to be limited to parents who worked part-time and thus the dependent variable was restricted in its scope. In Austria, the initial parental part-time had to be negotiated with the employer and was also subject to further restrictions. The impact on the dependent variable was therefore marginal.

Both countries introduced a version of the right to part-time employment in the early 2000s and in both countries it was part of dual-earner / dual-carer based family policy reforms. Dutch employees received the statutory right to part-time employment and thus the working time autonomy of all workers was severely improved. Independent of the contractually defined working time, employees could unilaterally change their working time. The policy was strongly oriented to diversify employment patterns and to make part-time employment a regular employment form. The output had universal validity and every employee was covered by the right. Thus it had a strong effect on the scope and strength of the total composition of policies affecting part-time employment. The Adjustment of Working Hours Act was unambiguously a work-sharing based policy with a strong influence of the dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm in the problem definition. As part of the Work and Care Act, the gender inequality in care provision and on the labour market was defined as the prime problem. In Austria, the right to part-time employment was only granted to parents. Similar to the Netherlands, the preference of employees was treated superior to the company's interest and the law gave them a strong bargaining position. However, only parents with a contract of at least three years at a company with at least twenty employees were entitled to the right. The entitlement also ended with the school entry or the seventh birthday of their child. Thus, the scope of the policy was limited, while its strength for the target group was equal to the Dutch policy. In accordance with the pure dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm, the policy only implemented a conditional right for parents and did not promote part-time employment as a suitable employment form for the entire labour force.

In Austria, part-time employment as labour form for non-parents was promoted by the Solidarity Premiums and Old Age Part-time scheme. Both were labour market policy instruments that supported employees' wish to reduce their working time and thus the creation of a new workplace. This was unambiguously a work-sharing policy. Working time was redistributed

between employed and unemployed, and the additional costs were partially compensated by the public labour market service. Despite their ideational roots both schemes had limited coverage. They had to be implemented by collective agreements, which does not cover all employees equally and the Old-Age Part-time scheme was specifically focused on older employees. Their restricted duration further constrained part-time employment to a temporary employment form for a specific group of employees. Its impact on the policies affecting part-time employment was positive but limited, similar to dual-earner / dual-carer policies. Except during the economic crisis, temporal part-time schemes were not implemented in the Netherlands. However, with the statutory right to part-time employment every employee was entitled to working time reductions. Thus there was no necessity to create different working time reduction schemes for specific groups of employees.

Similar to the Dutch equal treatment acts in the early 90s, the Austrian government dismantled legal unequal treatment of part-time and full-time employees with labour market policies in 1998 and 2008. The over-time bonus aimed at creating cost fairness in overtime bonuses and at limiting the use of part-time employees as a cheap and flexible workforce. Thus to stop a practice based on the economic flexibility paradigm. Overtime above the contractual defined working time had to be additionally salaried with a 25% bonus. Independent of the concrete amount of contractual working time every worker was entitled to an overtime bonus. The Dutch Minimum Wage & Minimum Holiday Act in 1993 had similar intentions. Every employee, independent of their contractual working time, had to be entitled to a minimum wage and also proportionally to minimum holiday. Both policies were labour law reforms and had general validity. Their positive impact on the scope and strength of policies affecting part-time employment was universal and limited to a specific group. The voluntary insurance for marginal employees in Austria closed a critical gap in the coverage of social security. However, it affected only part-time employment with very low working hours, which only provides additional income. Yet by law all part-time employees were at least voluntarily covered by social insurance.

Deviating from the many similarities between the Austrian and Dutch approach to part-time employment, the Netherlands introduced a pure economic flexibility based scheme in 2006. The life-course savings scheme deviated from the previous ideal of negotiated flexibility that combined both labour market policies. The new financing scheme for leave periods indirectly discriminated against part-time employment. The option to save part of one's income to finance parental or other leave by oneself could only be used by employees with sufficient income. It implemented a disincentive to work part-time before the 'rush hour of life' and also shifted the financial responsibility for any kind of leave to the individual. It therefore had a negative effect on the aggregated policies affecting part-time employment. It did not actively deregulate part-time employment to create a secondary workforce as the economic flexibility paradigm

prescribes, but it implemented disincentives to work part-time. Austria did not implement a specific scheme that negatively affected policies regarding part-time employment. However, it also did not implement far-reaching policies like the Dutch statutory right to part-time employment.

Both countries had similar anti-crisis policies in the late 2000s. They modified their short-time work scheme to promote the temporary reduction of working time and thus to maintain employment and secure companies' competitiveness. Part-time employment was only promoted as a temporal employment form at companies with economic difficulties. Preservation of employment is part of the work-sharing paradigm, however, the main goal of creating employment was neglected. In Austria, the job creating aspect of the Solidarity Premiums Model was explicitly suspended during the economic crisis. Both anti-crisis policy approaches had no lasting effect on policies affecting part-time employment. The work-sharing paradigm was not implemented in its entirety and thus led to temporary policies.

6 Conclusion

The genesis of Austrian and Dutch policies regarding part-time employment and thereby their strategic use of it originated in different policy fields; in Austria as family policy, and in the Netherlands as labour market policy. However both implemented strong equal treatment legislation around the time equal treatment on grounds of working time was on the political agenda of the European Union. In the 2000s, the Dutch government started to promote part-time employment as family policy instrument, but in contrast to the previous Austrian approaches, as an instrument to tackle gender inequality. The dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm had only limited influence on Austrian policies. However, with the parental right to part-time employment in 2004, it had the expected positive effect.

With similar considerations, the Dutch government introduced the statutory right to part-time employment, and thus strongly improved policies on job quality. In most instances, Dutch governments promoted part-time employment as an employment form for the entire workforce and implemented policies with universal validity. Even the Life-course Savings Scheme with its economic flexibility orientation had universal but negative consequences for part-time employees. In Austria, part-time employment as a labour market instrument was mainly targeted at specific groups of employees and at specific life situations. Their impact was additionally restricted by the implementation through collective agreements. Thereby not all employees were entitled to the same scheme. An important Austrian reform was the overtime bonus for part-time employees. It demolished an important barrier for equal treatment on grounds of working time. The aggregated policies affecting the job quality of part-time employees in Austria were primarily affected by the primary carer & secondary earner

paradigm and secondly by the work-sharing paradigm. The primary carer & secondary earner paradigm did not have any influence on Dutch policies. The economic flexibility paradigm was instead in several policies the secondary paradigm, whereas it did not have a strong role in Austria.

Part-time employment started in both countries as an unregulated employment form in an environment of informal-care based family policies and labour market policies based on the male breadwinner model. Concerning part-time employment, the dominant paradigms in society were the economic flexibility and primary carer & secondary earner. Any subsequent reform in both countries can be interpreted as an alteration of these two paradigms. Dutch policies on part-time employment continued to be influenced by the economic flexibility paradigm, while their main orientation became the work-sharing paradigm. From the 2000s onwards, the Dutch government actively changed the ideational orientation of the family policy field through dual-earner / dual-carer policies. In Austria, the prevailing primary-carer & secondary earner paradigm was highly influential in the design of policies, which led to the framing of part-time employment as an employment form for mothers next to their obligation to care. This point of view remained influential, even in policies that reformed labour laws in the direction of the work-sharing paradigm. The improvement of working conditions of part-time employees took place under different assumptions, however, with similar outputs. In Austria mainly from the primary carer & secondary earner perspective and in the Netherlands from the combined work-sharing and economic flexibility perspective. Despite the economic flexibility paradigm's influence, the Dutch government adopted the far-reaching statutory right to part-time employment. Part-time employment in Austria and the Netherlands was differently portrayed and also differently used as an active policy instrument, which led to differences in the orientation and scope of policies affecting the job quality of part-time employment.

In general, ideas had a strong impact on the design and scope of policies affecting part-time employment and the difference in influential paradigms led to differences in Dutch and Austrian aggregated policies. Thus the results of the ideational analysis support the majority of the assumptions stated in chapter 3. However, a single paradigm was only rarely the sole ideational source for policies. In the majority of policies, a combination of paradigms exercised influence on the design of policies. These combinations also entailed paradigms from which opposed effects had been expected. In particular, Dutch policies combined work-sharing and economic flexibility policies and nevertheless had positive effects on the dependent variable. In Austria, the majority of policies were primarily or secondarily influenced by the primary carer & secondary earner paradigm. Thus part-time employment was in one country dominantly defined as a labour market instrument and in the other as a family policy instrument. The assumed effect of both family policy paradigms was confirmed. Primary care & secondary

earner policies led to improved policies targeted at mothers. The dual-earner / dual-carer paradigm caused broader policies, however still limited to carers, but to both parents.

Concerning the labour market policy paradigms, as predicted, policies that were primarily influenced by the work-sharing paradigm had strong positive effects and mostly with universal validity. However, the Austrian approach of targeted policies deviated from it. These work-sharing policies were targeted at specific group of employees, such as older workers or varied from sector to sector, due to the implementation by collective agreement. Despite having work-sharing intentions, governments can deviate from the assumed effect by specific decisions on the terms and conditions of the work-sharing policy. Part-time employment of older employees had been a strong topic in Austria and was not fully covered by the four paradigms. However, the study focused on part-time employment as a reconciliation instrument and as an employment instrument for greater flexibility and job creation. The effect of the economic flexibility paradigm did not occur with the strength was assumed. Only in one instance was it the prime source, where it led to unequal treatment of part-time and full-time employees. The expected contradictory effect on work-sharing policies also has to be revised. Several Dutch policies were based on a combination of the two labour market paradigms and led to broader concepts such as economic flexibility or flexicurity. In sum, the different composition of influential paradigms in Dutch and Austrian labour market and family policies explained the different design and orientation of aggregated policies affecting the job quality of part-time employment. However, the paradigms mainly exercise influence in combination, thereby bridging policy fields but also intervening policy reforms and responding political actions.

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SWORN DECLARATION

I hereby declare under oath that the submitted Master's Thesis has been written solely by me without any third-party assistance, information other than provided sources or aids have not been used and those used have been fully documented. Sources for literal, paraphrased and cited quotes have been accurately credited.

The submitted document here present is identical to the electronically submitted text document.

Linz, 20.04.2016

Signature