
# Efficient Post-Silicon Run-Time Error Detection for Systems-on-Chip








<u>Sebastian Pointner</u>, Martin Brunner, Rainer Findenig & Robert Wille Johannes Kepler University Linz & Infineon Technologies Linz

TuZ Workshop 22.02.2021, Virtual Conference

JOHANNES KEPLER UNIVERSITY LINZ Altenberger Straße 69 4040 Linz, Austria iku.at

### **Big Picture of this work**


- Ensure that a system works as intended
- Systems which are safe (e.g., functional safety)
- Systems which are failsafe (e.g., redundant systems)
- Systems capable to react to certain scenarios





#### **Ensuring Safe Systems: Design Phase**

- Classical approach
  - ∘ I.e., ISO26262 flow
- Pre-Silicon Verification:
  - Oo we design the thing right?
- Post-Silicon Test:
  - o Do we have the right thing?






#### **Ensuring Safe Systems: After Deployment**

- Post Silicon Test
  - Covers only a point of time
- Utilizing BIST capabilities
  - Check certain properties during e.g. boot routine
  - Does also not cover entire run-time


• Goal: run-time error detection ©





### **Ensuring Safe Systems: Using Redundancy**


- Lock-step approach
  - Utilize more instances e.g. of a CPU
  - Compare result for error detection
  - Insert delay to exclude external influences





### **Ensuring Safe Systems: Using Redundancy**


- Lock-step approach
  - Utilize more instances e.g. of a CPU
  - Compare result for error detection
  - Insert delay to exclude external influences
- Advantages:
  - Simple and robust design ©





### **Ensuring Safe Systems: Using Redundancy**


- Lock-step approach
  - Utilize more instances e.g. of a CPU
  - Compare result for error detection
  - Insert delay to exclude external influences
- Advantages:
  - ∘ Simple and robust design ☺
- Disadvantages:
  - o More chip area is needed ☺
  - Higher power consumption ☺
  - ∘ Delayed computation ⊗





### **Analysis of the Lock-Step Approach I**


- Redundant usage of CPUs
- Same inputs for the CPUs
- Same firmware used for the CPUs
- Delay to exclude external influences





### **Analysis of the Lock-Step Approach I**


- Redundant usage of CPUs
- Same inputs for the CPUs
- Same firmware used for the CPUs
- Delay to exclude external influences
- Idea: Make usage of firmware to get current execution information





### **Analysis of the Lock-Step Approach II**


- Both CPUs run the same firmware
- Both CPUs have seen the same history of inputs
- Both CPUs should be in the same execution state





### **Analysis of the Lock-Step Approach II**

- Both CPUs run the same firmware
- Both CPUs have seen the same history of inputs
- Both CPUs should be in the same execution state
- Idea: Explore the firmware for valid states






### **Symbolic Execution**

Generate Control Flow Graph symbolically

Explore firmware's state space

Utilize symbolic values as placeholders


Decision finding based on reasoning engines





#### **Symbolic Execution**


- Generate Control Flow Graph symbolically
- Explore firmware's state space
- Utilize symbolic values as placeholders
- Decision finding based on reasoning engines





Utilize the explored states

• Is the state the system has reached valid?






• Utilize the explored states


• Is the state the system has reached valid?

• Taken branch as state






- Utilize the explored states
- Is the state the system has reached valid?
- Taken branch as state
- Non-taken branch






- Utilize the explored states
- Is the system allowed to take the branch?
- Considering the execution history?






- Utilize the explored states
- Is the system allowed to take the branch?
- Considering the execution history?
- Idea:
  - Pre-compute valid execution states
  - Compare current state with stored values





#### **General Idea: Utilize Checkpoints**

- Insert check points during symbolic execution
- Hash based on execution history
- Stored in check point registers
- System can compare:
  - Value stored in check point register
  - Run-time calculated hash value






#### **Check Point Insertion**

- Automatically after each branch
- Only for certain states
  - Marked by the designed
  - Using Checkpoint Functions
- Hash value for every checkpoint to be stored



#### **Check Point Insertion: Full Coverage**

- Automatically after each branch
- ALU CFG already leading to 8 register
- Does it make sense for every branch?
- Hardware overhead vs. coverage






#### **Check Point Insertion: Designer Guided**

- Checkpoint after each branch needed?
- Designer know functional safety critical code sections
- Guide the symbolic execution for the insertion
- Place "Checkpoint Functions" into the firmware
- Trade-off: hardware overhead vs. coverage




- Lockstep:
  - Duplicating or tripling the entire CPU






- Lockstep:
  - Duplicating or tripling the entire CPU
- Program Analysis approach:
  - Additional memory needed






- Lockstep:
  - Duplicating or tripling the entire CPU
- Program Analysis approach:
  - Additional memory needed
- Pros of the approach:
  - Easy to realize
  - · Less hardware overhead




Output Data



- Lockstep:
  - Duplicating or tripling the entire CPU
- Program Analysis approach:
  - Additional memory needed
- Pros of the approach:
  - Easy to realize
  - Less hardware overhead
- Cons of the approach:
  - CPU/firmware based
  - Corrupted memory for checkpoint register
  - Not feasible for AMS circuits







#### **Conclusion and Future Work**

- Demanding requirements
- Low power applications
- Production costs
- Approach being considered for industrial use ©
- Further work for better cost/benefit estimate needed



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